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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
irective 2004/25/EC on takeover bids (the ‘Takeover Bids Directive’ or 
the ‘Directive’) sets out minimum rules for the conduct of takeover bids 
involving shares admitted to trading on a regulated market established 
in the European Union. It also seeks to provide an adequate level of protection 
for shareholders throughout the Union by establishing a framework of 
common principles and general requirements that member states must 
transpose by means of more detailed rules in accordance with their national 
systems and cultural contexts.1  
Art. 20 of the Directive provides that five years after the transposition 
deadline, the European Commission shall examine the Directive “in the light of 
the experience acquired in applying it and, if necessary, propose its revision”.  
In the framework of this examination, the European Commission 
decided to appoint an external adviser to produce a study assessing the 
functioning of the Directive from a legal and economic perspective. The legal 
review was conducted by Marccus Partners under the supervision of 
Christophe Clerc (now managing director of the Paris office of Pinsent Masons 
LLP) and Fabrice Demarigny (Chairman of Marccus Partners and Head of 
Capital Markets at Mazars). The economic study was carried out by the 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI), within the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, under the supervision of Diego Valiante 
(Coordinator and Fellow) and Mirzha de Manuel (Researcher).  
This book is an abridged version with additional commentary to the 
original study prepared for the European Commission.2 It is structured in two 
separate parts: i) a legal review and ii) an economic analysis. 
The legal review considers a sample of twenty-two member states, 
representing 99% of the EU’s total market capitalisation, while comparing the 
EU legal framework with those of nine major countries abroad.3 It also builds 
                                                        
1 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on takeover bids, OJ L 142/12, 30.4.2004. The full text of the Directive can be found on 
the website of EUR-Lex (http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). 
2  The (original and unabridged) study by Marccus Partners and CEPS (2012) is 
available on the website of the European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm).  
3 The following EU member states are part of the sample: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
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on the results of a perception survey conducted within a broad sample of 
stakeholders, including supervisors, stock exchanges, issuers, employee 
representatives, associations, investors and intermediaries.4 
The legal review finds that the Directive introduced no radical changes 
but improved the coherence of the regulatory framework for takeovers in 
Europe. The study monitors the implementation of the Directive in the sample 
member states, with particular attention to those provisions exhibiting an 
element of optionality – namely, Art. 9 on board neutrality and Art. 11 on the 
breakthrough rule.  
The legal review discusses the position of the Directive vis-à-vis the two 
main corporate governance systems – shareholder-oriented (including the 
‘shareholders’ primacy’ system) and stakeholder-oriented (including the ‘team 
production’ system). It concludes that the Directive has taken a balanced view 
that aims at protecting offerors, shareholders of offeree companies, offeree 
companies and their employees. Thus, it has not adopted a single approach to 
company defences, which remain largely subject to national laws. The 
Directive has harmonised EU laws on a number of significant issues, however, 
including mandatory bids, information, squeeze-outs and sell-outs. This has 
been done efficiently, although there is room for clarification of some issues, 
such as the available exemptions to mandatory bids. According to the survey 
conducted within the study, most stakeholders have expressed general 
satisfaction with the Directive, with the exception of employee representatives. 
The economic study surveys the main academic literature on takeovers 
bids and puts forward a theoretical framework and an empirical analysis of the 
information asymmetries and incentives driving the behaviour of offerors, 
offerees and other stakeholders. 5  From this perspective it discusses the 
economic rationale for takeover regulation and the economic impact of the 
Directive. It identifies and appraises market failures, including coordination 
problems (free-riding, pressures-to-tender), agency costs and incentives related 
                                                                                                                                             
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK. Selected third countries are Australia, Canada, China, 
Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, Switzerland and the US. 
4 The perception study should be interpreted with some caution. As fewer takeover 
bids have been launched since 2008, the experience of the various players may be 
limited, particularly in some of the smaller EU member states. In addition, a number of 
stakeholders are unlikely to be aware of whether the source of any particular regulation 
is the Directive itself or national measures. 
5 The empirical analysis is based on a rich dataset kindly provided by Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum, available at http://thomsonreuters.com/. 
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to firm-specific investments. The study evaluates the Directive in its different 
components and finds that similar takeover rules have different effects 
depending on country-level and company-level characteristics – in particular 
ownership and control concentration. It further elaborates on the trade-offs 
affecting takeover regulation and the balance between individual short-term 
interests and the long-term interests of stakeholders.  
The empirical analysis finds that the Directive had a marginal impact on 
the market for corporate control, in line with the legal review and given the 
financial crisis. The analysis also provides early evidence of a negative impact 
on incentives to launch a competing offer, as the Directive seems to have 
increased takeover costs. 
The economic study also considers the effects of the Directive on growth 
and competitiveness and employment, based on the Global Competitiveness 
Index of the World Economic Forum and employment data from the European 
Monitoring Centre on Change, respectively. In these respects, the impacts 
appear to be limited but broadly consistent with the ‘Europe 2020’ agenda.  
Following the publication of the study, the European Commission 
delivered a report to the European Parliament and the Council (the 
‘Commission Report’), notably calling for i) a clarification of the concept of 
‘acting in concert’; ii) a review of the numerous national derogations to the 
mandatory bid rule, including in particular the exemption for situations where 
control has been acquired following a voluntary bid for all shares of the 
company; and iii) further dialogue with employee` representatives with a view 
to exploring possible future improvements to the rights of employees in 
takeover situations.6 The Commission Report does not, however, propose to 
make compulsory the optional articles of the Directive. 
To date, no legislative procedure has been initiated to review the 
Directive. This study nonetheless constitutes a useful reference on takeover 
regulation in the European Union and in an international context, with a 
comprehensive assessment from a legal and economic perspective. 
 
                                                        
6  The Commission Report, Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, 
COM(2012) 347 final, Brussels (2012), is available on the Commission’s website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm). 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 History and adoption of the Directive 
First steps. The Commission presented the first proposal for a directive 
regulating takeover bids to the Council in 1989. This proposal called for far-
reaching harmonisation in the field, an approach that was inspired by the 
favourable economic climate of the time. The proposal encountered significant 
opposition from EU member states, in particular in relation to i) the mandatory 
bid rule, and ii) the limitation of defensive measures. The Commission 
presented a second proposal containing less detailed provisions to the Council 
and the European Parliament in 1996.  
Initial rejection. A compromise text was negotiated in a conciliation 
procedure between the European Parliament and the Council, but the 
European Parliament finally rejected the proposal in July 2001, as an equal 
number of votes had been cast against and in favour of it. The vote was mainly 
motivated by concerns related to i) the board neutrality rule (which provides 
that the board should seek shareholder approval before taking defensive 
actions), and ii) insufficient protection of employees. 
Adoption. Following the rejection of the proposal, the Commission set up 
a group of high-level business law experts who were tasked with resolving the 
issues raised by the European Parliament. A third proposal was introduced on 
2 October 2002. After a compromise was reached (the so-called ‘Portuguese 
compromise’, see Box 1), the Directive was adopted on 2 April 2004 and 
member states were required to transpose the Directive by 20 May 2006.  
Box 1. The Portuguese compromise 
In the years of negotiation that preceded the adoption of the Directive, one of 
the most controversial proposed aspects of the Directive was whether to adopt 
the board neutrality rule (Art. 9 of the Directive) and the breakthrough rule (Art. 
11 of the Directive). These provisions were controversial because they crystallise 
oppositions on the value of facilitating and frustrating takeovers. For the 
Directive to be enacted, the member states eventually agreed to a compromise 
suggested by Portugal, in late 2003. The compromise made was essentially to 
make Arts. 9 and 11 of the Directive optional. That is, member states could opt 
out of transposing the board neutrality or breakthrough rule, or both, but they 
could not prevent individual companies from voluntarily opting in to the rules.  
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This compromise made Arts. 9 and 11 of the Directive options for which 
there are two levels of possible adoption: at the national level, and then at the 
company level. Even if the breakthrough or board neutrality rule is adopted at 
the national or company level, the Portuguese compromise further introduced a 
third option: reciprocity. If a member state allowed for reciprocity, even if one or 
both of the opt-in rules is adopted, a company still has the option not to apply 
the rule when faced with an offeror who has not adopted the same rule.  
1.2 The study 
Scope and definitions. The study focuses on 22 member states (the ‘sample 
countries’), which are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. The sample countries represent 99% of the total EU 
market capitalisation. Out of these sample countries, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK are referred to as ‘main EU jurisdictions’ and Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia and Sweden are referred to as ‘other EU jurisdictions’. The study also 
proceeds with a comparison of the Directive’s legal framework with nine major 
non-EU countries (the ‘major non-EU jurisdictions’), which are Australia, 
Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, Switzerland and the US.  
Perception study. In addition, a perception study has been conducted with 
a sample of stakeholders (the ‘sample stakeholders’) including supervisors, 
stock exchanges, issuers, employee representatives, other stakeholder 
associations and investors and intermediaries. Within this last category, a 
distinction can be made between retail investors, financial intermediaries and 
institutional investors. The perception study included questionnaires and 
interviews. 
Limits to the perception study. The perception study should be interpreted 
with some caution. As fewer takeover bids have been launched since 2008, the 
experience of the various players may be limited, in particular in some of the 
other EU jurisdictions. In addition, a number of stakeholders of the Directive 
are likely to provide only limited views on the Directive for two reasons. The 
first is that they may not have been involved in a significant number of 
takeovers subject to the Directive and are likely to have considered the 
takeover only from the perspective of either the offeror or the offeree. The 
second is that they are unlikely to be aware of whether the source of any 
particular regulation is the Directive itself or national measures (either to 
transpose the Directive or which existed before the Directive was transposed).  
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Review of the legal regimes. In each EU sample country and major non-EU 
jurisdiction, a law firm was selected to provide a review of the corresponding 
legal regime (Table 1). We would again like to thank all of these laws firms for 
their joint efforts in contributing to this study. 
Table 1. Law firms selected to review legal regimes, by country 
Country Firm 
EU countries  
Austria Wolf Theiss 
Belgium Eubelius  
Cyprus Papaphilippou 
Czech Republic Wolf Theiss 
Denmark Accura  
Estonia Raidla Lejins & Norcous 
Finland Roschier  
France Marccus Partners 
Germany Marccus Partners 
Greece Karatzas & Partners 
Hungary Wolf Theiss 
Ireland Arthur Cox  
Italy Pavia e Ansaldo 
Luxembourg PH Conac 
Netherlands Houthoff Buruma  
Poland Siemiatkowski & Davies  
Portugal F Castelo Branco & Associados  
Romania Wolf Theiss  
Slovakia Wolf Theiss  
Spain Gómez-Acebo & Pombo  
Sweden Setterwalls  
UK Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP  
Non-EU countries   
Australia Freehills  
Canada Miller Thomson  
China HHP  
Hong Kong Cheng Wong Lam & Partners  
India JSA Associates  
Japan Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu  
Russia Sameta Tax & Legal Consulting  
Switzerland Homburger  
US McCarter & English  
Source: Authors. 
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1.3 The report from the Commission 
Following the publication of the study, the European Commission delivered its 
report (Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, European 
Commission (2012), hereinafter the ‘Commission Report’). 
The Commission Report, after review of the study, calls for 
 a clarification of the concept of ‘acting in concert’; 
 a review of the numerous national derogations to the mandatory bid 
rule, including in particular the exemption applying to situations where 
control has been acquired following a voluntary bid for all shares of the 
company; and 
 further dialogue with employee representatives with a view to exploring 
possible future improvements to the rights of employees in takeover 
situations.  
The Commission Report does not propose to make compulsory the 
optional articles of the Directive (i.e. Art. 9 on board neutrality and Art. 11 on 
the breakthrough rule). 
1.4 Twelve key results 
1) The Directive has been transposed in all sample countries and no 
substantial compliance issue has emerged, except in a limited number of 
other EU jurisdictions or for a limited set of specific issues.  
2) The transposition of the Directive has not led to major changes. 
Regarding the legal framework in each member state, this is due to three 
factors: in a number of countries, the Directive prescribed rules that had 
been in existence for a long time (e.g. in the UK); in other countries, 
changes were introduced in view of the future adoption of the Directive 
(e.g. in Germany); and in several cases, the most important changes were 
introduced in reaction to sensitive bids or the economic situation, 
without there being a direct link with the Directive (e.g. Italy or 
Hungary). Regarding the impact of the Directive on the frequency and 
structure of bids, the 2008 crisis has rendered meaningful comparisons 
almost impossible. 
3) The Directive has, however, led to improvements (in view of its 
objectives) that should not be underestimated: coordination in relation to 
cross-border bids; general principles; disclosure; the mandatory bid rule; 
squeeze-out and sell-out rules. A mapping of changes that were 
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introduced after the transposition of the Directive, or in view of its 
adoption, show that the legal system is more ‘shareholder-oriented’7 as a 
result. 
4) The debates that led to the optionality of Arts. 9 and 11 of the Directive 
have not faded away. There is no clear consensus on how to move on the 
optionality and reciprocity issues and generally speaking, there seems to 
be little appetite to change these rules. This appears to be stem from two 
factors: at the national level, there seems to be both fear that there is 
more to lose than to gain as a result of a possible change (this being true 
for the main EU jurisdictions, notably the UK and Germany) and a need 
to absorb new EU rules (for other EU jurisdictions for which the 
transposition has led to significant changes); at the level of issuers along 
with investors and intermediaries, the feelings regarding defences are 
balanced. First, such defences are perceived as a way to increase bid 
prices, but also as creating an increased risk that bids will fail. Second, 
there is a general feeling that there are not many possibilities for board 
defences and sufficient abilities to break through existing defences. 
Regarding other barriers to takeovers, which are not addressed by the 
Directive, such as pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings, there is 
both a general desire to remove undue obstacles to bids and also a 
question as to whether any measures in this respect would be efficient 
and not counter-productive. Regarding other barriers, such as those that 
may be derived from the uses of control-enhancing mechanisms, there is 
no evidence that the conclusions reached in the ‘One Share–One Vote’8 
study commissioned by the European Commission in 2007 should be 
changed. 
5) Legal and economic analysis shows the intrinsic contradiction between 
the mandatory bid rule, which acts as an anti-takeover device, and the 
board neutrality rule, breakthrough and squeeze-out rules, the purposes 
of which are to facilitate bids. From a legal standpoint, the contradictions 
may be reconciled if the Directive is viewed as intending to facilitate bids 
(through the board neutrality and breakthrough rules) while protecting 
the interests of minority shareholders (through the mandatory bid and 
the sell-out rules). 
                                                        
7 Yet whether a system is more or less ‘shareholder-oriented’ is subject to debate.  
8  The study, by Shearman & Sterling et al. (2007), can be downloaded from the 
European Commission’s website (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ 
docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf). 
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6) Economic analysis shows that there is no clear evidence that the 
Directive promotes economic efficiency. From a theoretical standpoint, 
free movement of capital is an element of overall economic efficiency, 
under the conditions of rational behaviour, fully informed agents and 
absence of transaction costs; however, these conditions are not always 
met (e.g. acquisitions may be made for empire-building purposes, 
shareholders are subject to the contradictory forces of free-riding 
propensity and pressure-to-tender coercion, information may be missing 
and transaction costs may be high for dispersed shareholders) and 
acquisitions come with negative externalities (e.g. they create a 
disincentive for firm-specific investment in human capital). As a result, 
from an empirical standpoint, the evidence in the literature is mixed. 
Takeovers can both increase or decrease shareholder value. 
7) ‘Corporate governance’ analysis shows that the Directive is based on two 
different views of corporations: shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented. 
This contradiction is summarised in the general principle set forth in Art. 
3.1(c) of the Directive, which states that “an offeree company must act in 
the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of 
securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid”. 
8) Comparative analysis shows that three systems of corporate governance 
co-exist and affect capital markets: a management-oriented system (such 
as in the US), a shareholder-oriented system (such as in the UK) and a 
blockholder-oriented system (such as in Continental Europe). Each 
system should be assessed in light of its specificities regarding 
shareholder structures (dispersed versus concentrated), legal framework 
(protection of minority shareholders, employees and other stakeholders 
and general corporate law regarding fiduciary duties and corporate 
interest) and financial status (mature financial markets versus emerging 
markets). Only a comprehensive analysis may prevent the pitfalls of 
insufficiently tailored legal transplants. 
9) Overall, there is a reasonable level of satisfaction among stakeholders 
regarding the Directive: a majority of them considers it clear; 
enforcement is not generally considered an issue; the allocation of 
competences between supervisors has not raised practical issues; the 
protection of minority shareholders is seen as having been enhanced by 
the Directive; the disclosure regime is not contested and seems to be 
essentially complied with; and the mandatory bid, squeeze-out and sell-
out regimes are, in substance, approved. 
10) One category of stakeholders, the employees, is not satisfied with the 
Directive. They generally view takeovers as creating high risks of lay-offs 
and voluntary retirements at the level of the purchased company, an 
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assessment that is shared by issuers and investors and intermediaries. 
They see risks regarding working conditions and early retirements and 
consider that the risks also exist at the level of the acquirer (an analysis 
that is generally not shared by other stakeholders). In addition, they 
consider that the consultation process is not organised in a satisfactory 
manner and regret the absence of appropriate enforcement mechanisms 
when offerors do not act in compliance with the intentions they stated 
during the bid period. 
11) The mandatory bid rule is perceived as effective, although there is some 
debate regarding some of the (numerous) exemptions that exist, e.g. 
exemptions for shareholders who act in concert without acquiring 
shares, exemptions regarding certain corporate transactions (such as 
capital increases) or benefiting certain entities (such as foundations). 
Stakeholders do not perceive any significant issue regarding the 
exemption for companies in financial distress, which is frequently used. 
Price adjustment, although possible, seems to be rare in practice. The 
frustrations seem to come from three areas: the definition of acting in 
concert (viewed as potentially too broad by institutional investors), the 
use of cash-settled derivatives to build up an interest in connection with 
a takeover bid, and the propensity to try to obtain de facto control 
through an interest remaining just below the threshold that triggers a 
mandatory bid (e.g. a 29.9% interest). Some concern has also been raised 
in connection with voluntary bids launched at a low price in order to get 
slightly above the triggering threshold (e.g. 30%), which allows the 
offeror to increase its stake in a second step without triggering a 
mandatory bid. 
12) The squeeze-out and sell-out rules are generally approved. The former is 
frequently used while the latter seems a rare occurrence. The 90% and 
95% thresholds are generally accepted, with a preference for the former, 
in particular since a popular strategy with speculative investors seems to 
be to acquire a 5% (or 10%) interest to block the squeeze-out and attempt 
to negotiate a higher price with the offeror. Nevertheless, solutions exist 
to limit this risk (such as the German ‘top-up’ rule). The risk may also be 
avoided by facilitating alternative means of acquiring 100% control for 
cash (such as cash-out mergers or schemes of arrangement). 
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1.5 Eight key proposals9 
Although there are some causes for satisfaction with the Directive, this does 
not mean that some improvements are not desirable. The question is which 
types of improvements? Considering the diversity of objectives of the Directive 
and the huge disparity in the status of capital markets and shareholding 
structures among member states, some choices need to be made. The potential 
objectives may be listed as follows (with the caveat that various combinations 
among these items are possible): i) increase overall harmonisation; ii) facilitate 
bids; iii) support integration of EU companies; iv) mandate complete 
neutrality; v) integrate shareholder primacy and stakeholder paradigms in a 
new set of rules; vi) harmonise key technical items of the Directive; vii) 
enhance disclosure requirements; and viii) improve employee rights. 
1) The best way to improve overall harmonisation would be to give the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) a coordination role 
in the transposition of the Directive. Considering that cross-border bids 
are frequent and are likely to happen more and more often, general 
coordination by ESMA would make sense. Yet it must be noted that this 
option was recently considered and rejected at the time ESMA was set 
up. An alternative option is to increase the powers of the group of 
contacts existing among supervisors. 
2) If the main objective is to facilitate bids, one way would be to mandate 
the board neutrality rule and/or breakthrough rule (with, as an option to 
this rule, the possibility to set neutrality as a default option with the right 
for companies to opt in, as is the case in Italy). This option, however, is 
likely to revive the 2001 debates, the premises of which have not 
materially changed. Another option would be to relax the mandatory bid 
regime. In countries with significant blockholders, the obligation to share 
the control premium with all minority shareholders may have a 
significant price impact and thus reduce the number of value-enhancing 
transactions. There are a number of reforms that may be structured, 
some of which may have significant positive effects on the reductions of 
the level of undue private benefits of control. It is true that the 
mandatory bid rule is now well rooted in EU law; it should nonetheless 
be noted that this has some typical features of a debatable legal 
transplant and, furthermore, it does not exist in the US. 
                                                        
9 This subsection is not part of the report delivered to the European Commission. Please 
refer to chapter 9, where the potential reforms outlined here are discussed in more 
depth. 
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3) Supporting the build-up of EU companies while keeping a level playing 
field with non-EU companies could be achieved through an amendment 
to the reciprocity exception, which could be mandated for transactions 
with non-EU companies and removed for intra-EU bids. Another option 
is to remove the reciprocity exception altogether, but this would lead to 
debate regarding the fairness of the systems as well as ‘social control 
gap’ issues. 
4) Mandating complete neutrality during bids is another option. ‘Complete 
neutrality’ differs from the current neutrality rule, as it would remove 
both pro-bid and anti-bid incentives for board members. 
5) As takeover bids are the centre of debates between proponents of the 
‘shareholder primacy’ theory and ‘team production’ supporters, an 
alternative mechanism could be proposed, revolving around the choice 
of shareholders acting in general meetings. This would combine an 
individual decision of shareholders with a collective process, including a 
potential auction procedure, the management of counter proposals (if 
any) and an open debate. 
6) Harmonising key technical items of the Directive could achieve better 
functioning without major changes. Reforms could include such items as 
the definition of control, some presumptions regarding acting in concert 
and propositions regarding exemptions to the mandatory bid rule. The 
reform could include enhanced protection for minority shareholders 
(through an extension of the equality principle) and the offeree company 
(through reduction of the disturbance of the company with a harmonised 
‘put up or shut up’ rule). 
7) There is strong support among investors and intermediaries for an 
enhanced disclosure regime. A number of proposals may be made in this 
respect. 
8) As employees constitute the very basis on which company value is built, 
it seems appropriate to review the bundle of rights that they have 
received pursuant to the Directive. Some proposals may be made 
regarding the right to be consulted (instead of being informed), the costs 
they incur while preparing their opinion, their relationship with the 
offeror and the review of the commitments made in connection with the 
bid. In addition, appropriate sanctions should be provided, considering 
the high level of disregard for employee protection, and an extension to 
takeover bids of the provisions contained in Directive 2001/23/EC on 
transfers of undertakings could be contemplated. 
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2. STATUS AND QUALITY OF 
TRANSPOSITION 
This chapter addresses in particular the following questions: 
 What are the objectives of the Directive? 
 Has the Directive reached its objectives?  
Key concepts 
 The Directive has been fully transposed. 
 A precise analysis of the content of the Directive leads to a balanced 
conclusion regarding its objectives. 
 Significant progress has been achieved with respect to harmonisation, in 
particular on process (supervision of cross-border bids) and substance 
(mandatory bids, squeeze-outs and sell-outs). 
 The overall effect of the Directive, although difficult to measure 
precisely, seems to be in line with its original intent. Still, a more detailed 
analysis (developed below) is necessary to assess its impact in 
comparison with its objectives.  
2.1 Status of transposition 
Transposition is complete. All sample countries have transposed the Directive. It 
should be noted, however, that Finland has set up a framework that is partially 
non-binding; although it is unclear whether such a non-binding framework is 
sufficient, the Finnish rules appear in practice to comply with the Directive. It 
should also be noted that many member states transposed the Directive 
gradually, through various pieces of legislation, rather than all at once. The 
dates of transposition refer to the year in which the Directive was substantially 
or fully transposed in the relative member states. Sample countries and the 
respective transposition dates of the Directive are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Transposition dates for sample countries 
Year Countries 
2005 Poland, Romania 
2006 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, UK 
2007 Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain 
2008 Czech Republic, Estonia 
Source: Authors. 
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2.2 General assessment of whether the objectives have been 
reached 
2.2.1 Description of objectives  
What are the objectives of the Directive? This subsection assesses the Directive 
in light of the general objectives of EU law and the specific objectives of the 
Directive itself. 
General objectives of EU law 
Broad objectives. The objectives of EU law are broad and take into account a 
variety of concerns, including the following:  
 Economic growth and social cohesion. With regard to general principles, the 
Lisbon Strategy introduced the EU objective of becoming the “most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion” (European Council, 2000). The Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
“Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community 
Lisbon Program” confirmed that “the internal market for services must 
be fully operational, while preserving the European social model” 
(European Commission, 2005).  
 Specific concerns. EU law shows a wide variety of concerns, including 
financial issues, social and environmental issues, and stakeholder 
protection. For instance, the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan and the 
2003 EU Company Law Plan called for an integrated financial market 
and improved shareholder rights, while remaining sensitive to “social 
and environmental performance” in view of “long term sustainable 
growth”. Specific concern for stakeholders has also been mentioned in 
the Commission’s vision for the single market of the 21st century 
(February 2007).  
Consistency with OECD principles. This all-inclusive approach, which 
takes into consideration the interest of the stakeholders, appears consistent 
with the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, which provide that 
“corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004). 
Specific objectives of the Directive  
Description. The objectives of the Directive, as described in its recitals, are i) 
legal certainty on the takeover bid process and Community-wide clarity and 
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transparency with respect to takeover bids; ii) protection of the interests of 
shareholders, in particular minority shareholders, employees and other 
stakeholders, when a company is subject to a takeover bid for control; and iii) 
reinforcement of the freedom for shareholders to deal in and vote on securities 
of companies and prevention of management action that could frustrate a bid. 
Looking at the content of the Directive, its main objectives may be described as 
follows:  
 Integration and harmonisation. One of the purposes of the Directive is to 
promote the integration of European capital markets through the 
creation of a level playing field. Several rules of the Directive work 
towards that goal, notably the board neutrality rule, the breakthrough 
rule and the squeeze-out rule. The board neutrality and the 
breakthrough rules, however, are mitigated by optional arrangements 
and the reciprocity exception, resulting in a more balanced approach. 
The harmonisation goal has an intrinsic limit – when transposed into a 
different legal system, a rule can achieve different results than expected. 
Although the EU legal framework regarding company law is far from 
harmonised and the ownership structure of companies also varies 
significantly from country to country, this ‘legal transplant’ issue is not 
specifically addressed in the Directive. 
 Protection of three main interest groups. A variety of interests are protected 
by the Directive:  
- Minority shareholders are protected by the mandatory bid and sell-out 
rules. 
- Employees of the offeree company are protected through information 
rights and the right to issue an opinion. These rules allow employees 
and employee representatives to proceed with a proper analysis of 
the bid and, if need be, to express their concerns. In addition, the 
Directive does not affect national provisions on co-determination. 
- Protection of offeree companies is achieved by taking into account the 
interests of the offeree company ‘taken as a whole’, and through the 
rules concerning the disclosure of the offeror’s intentions as to the 
future business of the offeree company and the likely repercussions 
of the takeover on the employees of the offeree company. Moreover, 
the opinion of the Board of the offeree company is taken into 
account and the bid should not disturb the normal course of 
business of the offeree company for an excessive duration. 
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2.2.2 Assessment 
Debate on the net impact of the Directive. There is a general debate as to whether 
the Directive has had any significant impact and whether, when assessed in 
light of its objectives, any such impact has been positive or negative. As 
discussed below, the impact of the Directive is tangible and overall, subject to 
various caveats, it seems to be in line with its objectives. 
Scope of changes 
Creation or reinforcement of the national legal frameworks. The Directive has 
contributed to the establishment of a legal framework in countries (such as 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Greece) where no substantial legal framework 
existed, as well as in others where the legal framework had been put in place 
while negotiations relating to the Directive were underway (e.g. in Germany). 
In member states with a substantial pre-existing legal framework, the Directive 
strengthens or further details certain provisions of the pre-existing legal 
framework.  
Harmonisation. The Directive has led to the harmonisation of certain rules 
regarding takeover bids, such as the mandatory bid rule, the equitable price, 
employee information rights or squeeze-out and sell-out rights. It is interesting 
to note that the harmonisation triggered by the Directive also took place where 
the Directive left flexibility (e.g. factual convergence of the thresholds for 
‘control’). In addition, Art. 3 of the Directive lays down a series of general 
principles that must always be complied with (even when exemptions are 
applied). The optionality principle, however, has led to an absence of 
harmonisation regarding board neutrality. In contrast, the fact that almost no 
country has opted for the breakthrough rule leads to a harmonised ‘freedom of 
contract’ approach to pre-bid defences. 
Facilitation of bids. As its transposition is still rather recent and because of 
the market turndown in 2008, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the 
Directive facilitates takeover bids. Nonetheless, 59% of the stakeholders 
consider that the transposition of the Directive produced benefits compared 
with the previously existing legal framework. 
Direction of changes 
Level of changes. Producing an overall mapping of changes introduced by the 
Directive is a complex exercise. The level of change (significant, not significant, 
in between) may not be precisely quantified and is dependent upon three 
factors: i) what the content of the legal framework is, ii) how it is applied by 
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supervisory authorities and jurisdictions, and iii) how it is applied and 
perceived by interested parties.  
Difficult mapping. A precise description of the legal framework always 
shows a number of grey areas, with untested situations and potential conflicts 
between the spirit and the letter of the applicable laws and regulations. The 
enforcement of the legal framework by supervisory authorities is difficult to 
assess as many of them do not fully communicate on their activity and are 
eager to keep some discretionary power, which is typically justified by the 
need to fight against attempts at circumventing applicable laws and 
regulations. Regarding court cases, they are not that frequent in many 
jurisdictions and are often highly fact-intensive. Finally, in legal matters, and 
even more in financial matters, perception is key: the best legal framework is 
not worth much if interested parties are unaware of its existence or do not 
believe in its correct enforcement. A mapping exercise is all the more complex 
because it goes beyond a simple description of the current status: a mapping of 
changes doubles the above-described uncertainties. 
Criteria. The concepts and criteria that are used may also be debated. For 
the purposes of this mapping, we have considered the following assumptions: 
 The mandatory bid rule is in the interest of shareholders, as well as the 
squeeze-out and sell-out rules. The rationale behind this position is that 
mandatory bids permit all shareholders to benefit from the control 
premium, while the squeeze-out rule is attractive for potential offerors 
(and thus increases the number of bids) and the sell-out rule provides 
shareholders with an exit at a fair price. 
 Defences are stakeholder-oriented, as incumbent directors and managers 
are more likely to take into account the interests of the parties with 
whom they have worked for years (including employees, creditors and 
local communities) without trying to maximise shareholder value. By 
contrast, the main objective of newly appointed directors and managers 
is to make sure that the offeree company quickly generates enough cash 
to repay the acquisition price paid by the offeror. Defences may also 
operate to allow entrenchment of underperforming management. 
At the same time, the opposite position could also be defended: 
 The mandatory bid rule may discourage potential offerors, thus 
depriving minority shareholders of the opportunity to receive any 
portion of the control premium. 
 Defences may be used to negotiate higher bid prices, thus leading to 
higher premiums paid to minority shareholders. 
Preliminary mapping of changes. Table 3 provides an analysis regarding 
changes in connection with the Directive.  
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Table 3. Changes connected with the Directive 
Country Mandatory 
bid 
Passivity Break-
through 
Squeeze-out Sell-out Overall 
view 
Austria Yes, not new Yes, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, not new  
(but 
amended) 
Yes, not new No 
significant 
changes 
Belgium Yes, not new 
(but 
amended) 
No, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, not new 
(slightly 
amended) 
Yes, new Some 
changes 
Cyprus Yes, new Yes, new No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Czech Rep. Yes, not new 
(but 
significantly 
amended) a) 
Yes, not new 
(clarified) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, not new 
(amended) 
Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Denmark Yes, not new No, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, not new 
(but 
improved 
minority 
shareholder 
protection) 
Yes, not new No 
significant 
changes 
Estonia Yes, not new 
(slightly 
amended) 
Yes, not new 
(specified with 
Directive and 
amended) 
Yes, new Yes, not new 
(specified 
with 
Directive and 
significantly 
amended) b) 
Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Finland Yes, not new 
(but 
threshold 
amended) c)  
Yes, not new d)  No, not 
new 
Yes, not new  
(but 
amended) 
(redemption 
price) 
Yes, not new 
but amended 
(redemption 
price 
presumption) 
Some 
changes 
France 
 
Yes, not new Yes, not new 
(enhanced, but 
reciprocity 
added) 
No (with 
one new 
exception) 
not new 
Yes, not new 
(but 
amended) 
Yes, not new Some 
changes 
Germany Yes, not new No, not new  No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new [No 
significant 
changes] e) 
Greece Yes, not new Yes, not new 
(but reciprocity 
added) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Hungary Yes, not new 
f) 
No, not new g) No, not 
new 
Yes, not new Yes, not new  Significant 
changes 
Ireland 
 
Yes, not new 
 
Yes, not new 
 
No, not 
new 
 
Yes, not new  
(but new 
threshold) 
Yes, not new 
(but new 
threshold) 
Some 
changes 
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Table 3. cont’d 
Country Mandatory 
bid 
Passivity Break-
through 
Squeeze-out Sell-out Overall 
view 
Italy Yes, not new 
(but 
amended) 
Yes, not new 
(but added 
reciprocity and 
company opt-
out) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, not new  
(but 
amended)  
Yes, not new 
(but 
amended) 
Significant 
changes 
Luxembourg Yes, new No, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Netherlands Yes, new No, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, not new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Poland Yes, not new 
(but clarified) 
No, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, clarified Yes, clarified Significant 
changes 
Portugal Yes, not new Yes, not new 
(but reciprocity 
added) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, not new  
(but more 
difficult to 
apply) 
Yes, not new 
(but more 
difficult to 
apply) 
Some 
changes 
Romania Yes, not new Yes (only for 
voluntary bids, 
not for 
mandatory 
bids), not new 
No, not 
new 
Yes, not new Yes, not new No 
significant 
changes 
Slovakia Yes, not new Yes, not new 
(clarified) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Spain Yes, not new 
(enhanced) 
Yes, not new 
(clarified, but 
limited 
reciprocity 
added) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, new Yes, new Significant 
changes 
Sweden Yes, not new Yes, not new No, not 
new 
Yes, not new Yes, not new No 
significant 
changes  
UK Yes, not new Yes, not new 
(slightly 
strengthened) 
No, not 
new 
Yes, not new Yes, not new No 
significant 
changes 
a) Prior trigger events: two-thirds and three-quarters of securities or voting rights. New trigger event: one-third. Price: 
expert price replaced by Directive criterion (highest price paid by the offeror in the previous 12 months). 
b) Before the transposition of the Directive, only squeeze-outs outside the takeover bid situation existed (i.e. squeeze-
outs under the Commercial Code). The ‘Directive squeeze-out’ was introduced once the Directive was transposed by 
way of amending the Securities Market Act. Therefore, the ‘Directive squeeze-out’ was completely new. 
c) The threshold moved from two-thirds to 30% (and 50%). 
d) The passivity rule has not been transposed as such in Finland, as the Finnish Companies Act included provisions 
before the transposition of the Directive that were deemed to be sufficient with respect to the passivity rule; however, 
the non-binding Helsinki Takeover Code provides further guidance with respect to the passivity rule. 
e) Yet significant changes were made in view of the transposition of the Directive (mandatory bid, squeeze-out and sell-
out). 
f) Pre-transposition of the Directive. 
g) Passivity was adopted in 2006 with the transposition of the Directive and abandoned in 2007 (‘Lex Mol’). 
Source: Authors. 
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Direction of changes. Based on the foregoing analysis, Table 4 provides a 
summary analysis on the direction of changes that have taken place. 
Table 4. Mapping the changes introduced by the Directive and their direction  
 Significant changes Some changes 
No significant 
changes 
More 
shareholder-
oriented 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
[Germany],a) Greece, [Hungary], 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, Spain 
Belgium, 
Finland 
[Germany], 
Romania 
More 
stakeholder-
oriented 
[Hungary],b) Italy France, 
Ireland,  
Portugal  
 
Neutral   Austria, 
Denmark, 
Sweden, UK 
Notes: This table provides a qualitative analysis, the value of which is mostly indicative. The 
option for companies to voluntarily opt into the breakthrough and board neutrality rules is 
in practice never used. As a consequence, we have considered that for the direction of 
changes this opt-in option has no impact and have thus disregarded this option. 
a) Introduced mandatory bid, squeeze-out and sell-out rules in view of the transposition of 
the Directive. There are significant changes if compared with the situation before this ‘pre-
transposition’ and there are no significant changes since this time.  
b) In 2001 (pursuant to a pre-transposition procedure), mandatory bid and passivity rules 
were introduced. ‘Lex Mol’ (2007) removed the passivity rule. Compared with pre-2001, the 
overall change is shareholder-oriented. Although reciprocity was introduced, compared 
with pre-2007, it is stakeholder-oriented. 
Source: Authors. 
Impact on takeover activity 
Difficult issues to assess. Because of the 2008 crisis, takeover activity overall has 
decreased. In addition, the recent and piecemeal transposition of the Directive 
has made it difficult for stakeholders to assess its overall impact on takeover 
activity. This is why it is logical to find that 50% of the issuers and 30% of the 
investors and intermediaries have no opinion on whether they considered 
initiating takeover bids more often after the entry into force of the Directive, 
and that, among those having an opinion, a majority does not consider 
initiating bids more often (64% for issuers and 72% for investors and 
intermediaries). 
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3. BROADER ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF TAKEOVER REGULATION 
This chapter addresses the following questions in particular:  
 What are the corporate governance principles underpinning the 
regulation of takeover bids? 
 Going deeper into the analysis, what are the representations that shape 
the thinking on takeover bid regulations? And how have such 
representations evolved over time? 
 How are such representations influenced by the shareholding structure?  
 As takeover bids are very often cross-border transactions, what issues 
are raised by such transactions from a community standpoint?  
Key concepts  
 Traditionally, two key corporate governance issues are identified: the 
opposite forces of the collective action issue and the pressure-to-tender 
issue. 
 Reflection, in this case on i) the definition of a corporation, ii) its 
potential identification with a political body and iii) whether it is 
‘owned’ by anyone, has a potential impact on how regulation is 
structured.  
 The main concepts are moving from shareholders’ primacy to team 
production. 
 The market and blockholder standpoints lead to a taxonomy of the three 
main models (shareholder-oriented, management-oriented and 
company-oriented).  
 Cross-border transactions raise ‘community control gap’ issues.  
3.1 Some theoretical bases of corporate governance 
Selected issues. When reviewing takeover bid regulations, corporate governance 
studies typically focus on two issues: the collective action issue and the 
pressure-to-tender issue. Although they are more thoroughly presented in the 
economic part of the study, these issues are analysed here on the basis of 
typical conducts and applicable legal rules. 
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3.1.1 The collective action issue 
The collective action paradox 
Description of the paradox. The collective action issue may typically arise during 
a bid when shareholders believe that the offeror is not including in its bid price 
the full potential of synergies that may be derived from the future entity 
combining the offeror and the offeree company. If there is no coordination 
among shareholders, a shareholder ‘A’ will have to make a bet:  
 either A will bet on the success of the bid (even if A will not himself 
tender into the bid), and as a result, his interest will be not to accept the 
bid, as the post-bid value of his shares will be higher than the bid price 
(since, as mentioned above, the full value of expected synergies for the 
offeree company is not fully reflected in the bid price); or 
 shareholder A will think that the bid may fail if he does not accept the 
bid, in which case it is in A’s best interest to accept it. 
Yet, if A is a small shareholder (i.e. one who is not likely to make any 
difference in the outcome of the bid), he should opt for the first solution and 
keep his shares in order to ‘free ride’ on the success of the bid. This behaviour 
would be all the more rational because, practically speaking, most bids 
succeed. This is where the paradox lies: if all the shareholders were acting 
rationally, bids should generally fail, as the minimum condition typically 
introduced in the bid (e.g. a majority or two-thirds of shares) will never be 
reached. This is not the case, however. How can this be explained? Figure 1 
illustrates the issue. 
Figure 1. Collective action paradox 
If A tenders into the bid, he will receive his share of PBVC and SBS; if he 
does not tender, he may decide after the bid to sell his share for a price equal to 
his share of PBVC, SBS and RBS. 
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Explanation of the paradox 
Several explanations. Apart from the pressure to tender issue (which is examined 
below), there are three main explanations to the absence (in practice) of 
collective action issues. 
Economic inability of shareholders to cooperate. The better shareholders can 
cooperate, the higher the risk that they will free ride. This is best explained 
through an example: consider a bid with a 50% minimum condition, and a 
shareholding structure where 40 shareholders each hold 2%. Their interest is to 
cooperate so as to offer 1.25% each, so that the bid will succeed, while each 
keeping 0.75%, so as to benefit from post-bid synergies. Practically speaking, 
however, this situation is not frequent and the shareholding structure is either 
more concentrated (with blockholders holding much larger blocks) or more 
dispersed. In the former case, there will be a discussion between the offeror 
and the blockholder and if they agree on a price, the blockholder will offer his 
or her shares, which will be seen as a strong indication that the bid is likely to 
succeed – in this case, some free-riding is possible (unless there are other 
obstacles). In the latter case, cooperation is likely to be too costly and too 
complex to be implemented. 
Legal impediment to cooperation. There is one rule that may have been 
ignored as an impediment to cooperation: the so-called ‘defensive concert’, 
created by Art. 5.1 of the Directive. This rule may be understood as creating a 
risk for cooperating shareholders to have to launch a bid. Of course, this 
obligation will only arise if the cooperating shareholders aggregate enough 
shares to reach the threshold triggering a mandatory bid (e.g. 30%) and if the 
offeree company is involved in the cooperation. Cooperating shareholders may 
take appropriate steps to avoid the realisation of this risk. Yet these steps will 
add to the costs and complexity of cooperation, thereby pushing small 
shareholders to opt for the easiest solution, i.e. tendering their shares. 
Irrational behaviour. The core assumption of the free-riding issue is that 
shareholders behave rationally. This hypothesis is based on two premises: 
 There is sufficient information to assess the post-bid value of the offeree 
company. 
 Shareholders correctly discount the value of time. 
It is likely, however, that these assumptions are not true: 
 There is only little information on potential post-bid synergies (and the 
offeror has no incentive to disclose any meaningful information in this 
respect). 
 Shareholders are likely to have a short-term bias when confronted with a 
bid (under the theory that ‘it is better to have a bid in the hand than two 
in the bush’). Actually, the easiest solution for a shareholder, when a bid 
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is announced, is to sell his or her shares at a price that is close to the bid 
price. There is no bet, the gain is certain and there are absolutely no costs 
associated with this strategy. Thus, what may seem to be irrational 
behaviour from a theoretical standpoint may well be a very rational 
mode of conduct for all practical purposes.  
3.1.2 The pressure-to-tender issue 
Defining the issue. As discussed above, the so-called ‘pressure-to-tender’ issue is 
one of the reasons why shareholders tender into bids when they would be 
better off free-riding. There may be two main determinants to this issue: 
 Liquidity issue. Shareholders may fear that post-bid liquidity is severely 
reduced, thus affecting their ability to sell (the pure ‘liquidity’ effect) and 
potentially reducing the listed price of their shares (the ‘price’ effect). 
The liquidity effect is most salient for small caps, where already low 
liquidity is further reduced. The price effect is likely to take place in all 
events, as investors (and in particular international institutional 
investors) are likely to divest from controlled companies whose float is 
limited. 
 Extraction of private benefits of control. Shareholders may fear that the 
controlling shareholder will extract some value from the offeree 
company to the detriment of other shareholders, through an undue 
appropriation of private benefits of control.10 The ability to proceed in 
such a way is obviously linked to the overall legal framework, and in 
particular to the way related-party transactions are structured. 
Thus, minority shareholders will be pressured to tender even if the 
acceptance of the bid is not in their collective self-interest and the offeror may 
consequently be able to acquire an offeree company for a low premium 
constituting only a small fraction of the takeover’s gain. 
Solving the issue. The pressure-to-tender issue can be alleviated in a 
number of ways (which are more thoroughly discussed below), including 
 providing for an automatic re-opening of the bid, which would allow the 
shareholders to know the potential outcome of the bid when they decide 
to tender; 
 enhancing the rules regarding related-party transactions; and 
 introducing more transparency for private benefits of control. 
                                                        
10 On these benefits, please refer to section 5.1 of this study. 
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3.2 Broader issues of corporate governance 
Impact of the corporate governance premise. As it is difficult to structure a legal 
framework on the sole basis of traditional studies of corporate governance (the 
results of which are often the subject of debate), it is necessary to highlight the 
various theories that have helped shape modern corporate governance 
thinking. As we will see, the legal framework on takeover bids may vary 
significantly, depending on the corporate governance system that is selected. 
3.2.1 Preliminary questions 
Three preliminary questions. Against the background of corporate governance 
issues, three questions are always present, although they may not always be 
explicit: What is a corporation? Who ‘owns’ a corporation? Are corporations 
‘shareholder democracies’? 
What is a corporation? There are two ways to view a corporation. The 
traditional legal analysis considers a corporation an ‘incorporated’ body, i.e. a 
legal entity of its own, with its assets, liabilities and contracts. Under a different 
approach, a corporation may be seen as a ‘nexus of contracts’ between 
investors, management, employees, suppliers, clients, etc.; legal personality is 
thus a fiction. If this latter view were to be preferred, it would entail a complex 
legal structure for takeover bids: as all contracts are potentially entered into 
with all other parties, the change of one set of contracting parties (i.e. the 
investors) would need to be approved (or at least pre-approved) by all other 
parties. This is why the traditional ‘legal personality’ view is generally 
preferred. This position is based on the argument that if it is true that legal 
personality is a fiction, it should not be seen as an issue – after all, all legal 
rules are a fiction; the most practical and useful fictions should be selected. 
Who ‘owns’ a corporation? A popular view holds that shareholders are the 
‘owners’ of a corporation. They have invested money, they can sell their shares 
and they have financial and political rights. This view, in connection with 
takeover bids, is problematic in two respects: first, if shareholders are owners, 
the use of squeeze-out mechanisms against minority shareholders should be 
deemed an expropriation in favour of a private party (the majority 
shareholder) and in the interest of such a party, which is a source of difficult 
debates; second, if shareholders own the corporation, majority shareholders 
own their majority rights and thus the value (control premium) of this 
majority, in turn leading to the controversial question of how it is possible to 
justify the sharing of the control premium with all shareholders when this 
premium is the property of the majority shareholders. This question, as well as 
the previous one, is best solved in the traditional framework of corporate law. 
From a legal standpoint, companies are not ‘owned’: shareholders hold 
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transferable contractual rights, just as other finance providers; they have no 
rights to the company assets and incur no liability in connection therewith, and 
regarding the notion of control, it has also been held that this would be 
considered a corporate asset. This analysis appears especially relevant in the 
context of listed companies, where the relationship between a company and its 
shareholders is often weak. 
Are corporations a ‘shareholder democracy’? Companies are often described 
as a ‘shareholder democracy’. Shareholders are compared to the people in a 
democracy; they are accordingly deemed to hold the ultimate power. Directors, 
as elected representatives, are considered the ‘executive branch’. Under this 
theory, in a takeover bid, directors should have no autonomy – they should 
defer to the shareholders for all decisions that may frustrate the bid. The 
shareholders’ democracy theory has been criticised from two standpoints. 
First, a company has nothing to do with a political system, and the comparison 
appears to have no scientific value. Second, if the comparison were to be made, 
then corporations should apply the ‘one man–one vote’ principle that is typical 
of democracies; the ‘one share–one vote’ concept, which provides more voting 
rights to wealthier shareholders owning several shares, is more akin to a 
plutocratic regime. 
How the various positions that may be taken on corporate governance 
may impact takeover regulation is summarised in Tables 5-7. 
Table 5. What is a corporation? 
View one 
(Jensen & Meckling) 
View two (legal analysis) Impact on takeovers 
 A ‘nexus of contracts’ 
(investors, management, 
employees, suppliers, 
clients, etc.). 
 Corporations are a 
fiction. 
 Corporations are legal 
entities. 
 All legal rules are 
fictions. The most 
practical fictions 
should be selected. 
 How could a nexus of 
contracts be 
transferred? Consent of 
all parties is needed. 
Source: Authors, partially based on Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Table 6. Who owns a corporation? 
View one (popular view) View two (legal analysis) Impact on takeovers 
 Shareholders own the 
corporations. 
 Corporations (as legal 
entities or contracts) are 
not ‘owned’. 
 Shareholders hold 
transferable contractual 
rights. 
 Conflict between the 
‘ownership’ view and i) 
squeeze-out 
(expropriation) and ii) 
the obligation to share 
the control premium. 
Source: Authors. 
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Table 7. Are corporations based on a ‘shareholders’ democracy’? 
View one (popular view) View two (legal analysis) Impact on takeovers 
 Shareholders represent 
the people, 
management and the 
government. 
 Democracy applies, ‘one 
man, one vote’ rule; 
corporations do not. 
 Political systems and 
economic institutions 
are completely different. 
 Who should have a final 
say on the merits of a 
bid? 
Source: Authors. 
3.2.2 Basic corporate governance views and their impact on 
takeover regulation 
Main systems. Corporate governance is an open concept. In theory, it is possible 
to design an almost unlimited number of systems. We can nonetheless focus on 
three, which basically represent three successive states of corporate governance 
thinking: the traditional view, the shareholder primacy view and the team 
production view. 
Traditional view. In the 19th century, when large corporations started to 
develop on a significant scale, there was little debate about corporate 
governance. Most companies were family-controlled and the legal framework, 
in particular regarding securities regulation, corporate law and labour law, 
was not as complete and sophisticated as it is today. Corporate governance 
issues had been identified by various philosophers and economists, including 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx, but no precise set of rules had been proposed. The 
relationship between shareholders and employees, described as ‘capitalists’ 
and ‘workforce’, was analysed from a philosophical, political and economic 
standpoint. The time of takeover regulation had not yet arrived. 
Shareholder primacy view. The ‘agency’ issue in the relationship between 
management and shareholders became a dominant theme of corporate 
governance in the 20th century, with the emergence of a growing number of 
large, listed companies with dispersed shareholders. The main question 
became shareholder control over management, in order to prevent the latter, 
through laziness or theft, from squandering shareholder wealth. The 
shareholder primacy view thus emerged: drawing on the old master/servant 
legal concept, it applied a ‘principal/agent’ theory to the relationship between 
shareholders and management. Its premise is a complete reversal of the 
traditional view: where shareholders, as capitalists, used to be seen as the 
‘strong’ party in a corporation, they suddenly were viewed as the ‘weak’ party, 
with only residual income rights, while other parties (such as creditors, 
employees or management) were viewed as ‘strong’ parties protected by their 
fixed-income revenues. Shareholders therefore had to be protected. Two key 
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concepts were introduced to this effect: first, the ‘alignment of interest’ theory, 
which aimed at aligning the financial incentives of management with those of 
shareholders; the massive development of stock options was one result of that 
idea. Second, the ‘disciplinary effect’ theory, which provided that takeover 
bids should be facilitated, as the fear of being taken over would continuously 
push managers to increase their company’s performance (or at least to take 
steps to boost the share price of their company). As a result, under this theory, 
pre-bid defences should be removed and post-bid defences should be subject 
to shareholders’ approval within the framework of a ‘no frustration’ rule. 
Team production view. The shareholder primacy view has been criticised 
since the end of the 20th century. At least three criticisms have been formulated: 
i) the finance view leads to short-termism,11 ii) shareholders are not in a weak 
position, especially if compared with employees (see Table 8), and iii) 
neglecting other stakeholders creates negative externalities. As a result, 
alternative models have been designed, among which the team production 
theory has emerged for its overall consistency (Blair, 1999). Under this theory, 
a company is characterised by several features, including the following: i) 
when production takes place in a team (which is the case in all large 
corporations), it is difficult to allocate precisely the merits of success or failure 
to specific team members; ii) most contracts entered into between a company 
and its stakeholders (in particular employees) are ‘incomplete’ – they do not 
specify everything that may happen, as it would be too complex; and iii) 
employees are encouraged to make ‘firm-specific investments’, which have a 
value for the company but are lost for the employee if he or she moves to 
another company. In the context of ‘incomplete contracts’, the encouragement 
mainly comes from implicit promises that firm-specific investments will be 
rewarded in the future, through increasing wages and internal promotions. 
One of the main issues to be solved is therefore how to make sure that no 
stakeholders unduly obtain a portion of the profit that should be shared among 
all stakeholders. This ‘hold-up’ problem may appear in the event of a takeover: 
new controlling shareholders may be tempted to disregard all implicit 
promises made by the previous management in order to reap the benefit of all 
past investment for themselves,12 thus breaching the ‘incomplete contracts’. In 
                                                        
11 In particular, the ‘disciplinary effect’ has some negative consequences. 
12  According to Davies et al. (2010, p. 19), “[a] shareholder-focused system can 
discourage employees from investing in firm-specific skills, as no credible promises of 
long-term employment are available. A lack of highly specialised workforce may well 
yield higher efficiency costs than prevented control shifts resulting from an entrenched 
management for certain firms or even sectors of the economy.” 
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this setting, the board is called to act as a ‘mediating hierarch’, with a view to 
keeping a fair balance among the interests of all stakeholders involved. This 
role is facilitated by the fact that managers are the only parties to have some 
proximity with all stakeholders. 13  It is thus important to empower the 
management in its relationship with shareholders. A ‘no frustration’ rule is not 
appropriate in this respect, if it leads to a complete shift of power in the hands 
of the shareholders. 
Shareholders and employees: A risk analysis. The shareholder primacy view 
is now based on the idea that shareholders incur more risk than other 
stakeholders. Is this correct? An analysis of the respective risks of shareholders 
and employees in listed companies shows that shareholders, although they are 
residual claimants, may not bear as much risk as employees, with their ‘fixed-
income revenues’. The comparison is summarised in Table 8. Figure 2 depicts 
the views that have been developed above. 
Table 8. Shareholders as ‘residual claimants’ and employees as beneficiaries of fixed-
income revenues: Who bears the most risk? 
Period Shareholders Employees 
Beginning of 
the 
relationship 
At the time of investment, the 
shareholders of a listed company: 
 may choose among thousands of 
companies; 
 benefit from extensive normalised 
information prepared by 
management (who may be liable if 
the information is false or 
misleading), reviewed by auditors 
and controlled by supervisors;  
 may diversify their risks as precisely 
as they wish. 
At the time of hiring, a 
prospective employee of a listed 
company: 
 may choose among a few 
companies; 
 has little access to 
information, which is not 
normalised and essentially 
not controlled; 
 cannot diversify his or her 
risk. 
  
                                                        
13 This is also why the role attributed to the board by the team production theory is 
often seen as providing a better description of what boards actually do than the 
shareholder primacy view. 
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Table 8. cont’d 
During the 
relationship 
Shareholders who have made a one-off 
money investment: 
 decide the level of control they want 
to have over the affairs of the 
company (no control, vote at 
shareholders’ meetings, active 
engagement);  
 receive a residual payment 
(dividends), partly resulting from 
the control that has been exercised;  
 may benefit from a high reward in 
the event of a takeover bid with a 
large premium. 
Employees, who are making a 
continuous time investment: 
 have limited or no control over 
the affairs of the company; 
 receive a fixed-income payment 
(wages); 
 incur the risk of a ‘hold-up’ in 
the event of a takeover bid. 
When the 
relationship 
terminates 
Upon exit, shareholders: 
 receive a benefit or suffer a loss, 
depending on the share price; 
 may apply their exit strategy within 
seconds or minutes (a sale order 
transmitted by phone or the 
Internet). 
When leaving, employees: 
 are in a neutral position vis-à-vis 
the share price; 
 are faced with long delays to 
apply their exit strategy (a notice 
period upon resignation, time to 
find a new job). 
Source: Authors. 
Figure 2. Traditional, shareholder primacy and team production views 
 
Sources: Authors, partially based on Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Blair and Stout (2005).  
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3.2.3 The different standpoints 
The dual view. The ‘market view’ of corporate governance, which is often 
considered the ‘finance’ standpoint, is frequently opposed to the ‘industrial’ 
standpoint. It is worth recalling the main terms of the debate, as it has a direct 
impact on takeover regulations. The main arguments for both sides are 
summarised in Table 9. 
Table 9. Different standpoints 
 Market standpoint Industrial standpoint 
Bases  Unfettered markets are the best 
places to monitor companies. 
 Blockholders are best placed to 
control companies. (Issues of 
transaction costs) 
 The fear of takeovers pushes 
management to act diligently (a 
‘disciplinary effect’ against 
‘management entrenchment’). 
 If the markets discipline managers, 
who disciplines the markets? 
(Issues of market rationality and 
short-termism) 
 Focus: shares as a class of assets. 
Method: “Forecasting the 
psychology of the market” (John 
Maynard Keynes). 
 Focus: productive assets. Method: 
“Forecasting the prospective yield 
of assets over their whole life” 
(John Maynard Keynes). 
Results  Shareholders should have the 
ultimate power, as they bear the 
ultimate risks (shareholder 
primacy). The ‘no frustration’ rule 
should prevail. 
 A system of checks and balances is 
preferable (consensus formation). 
Company interest must prevail. 
 Blockholders may misuse their 
powers. 
 Transparency rules and 
appropriate protective laws should 
address this risk. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
The triangle model. The dual model may be complemented by the 
‘triangle’ model, which distinguishes among three typical regimes that may be 
best illustrated as forming the three tips of an equilateral triangle. The main 
(and archetypical) features of these three models are in Table 10. 
Table 10. Main features of the three models 
Shareholder-oriented 
model (UK) 
Company-oriented model 
(Continental Europe) 
Management-oriented 
model (US) 
 Dispersed shareholders  Blockholders  Dispersed shareholders 
 No takeover defences  Mild takeover defences  Strong takeover defences 
 Fiduciary duties   Corporate interest  Fiduciary duties 
 Ex ante controls on takeover 
bids (Takeover Panel) 
 Mixed control (ex 
ante/ex post) on bids 
 Ex post judicial control 
on takeover bids 
Source: Authors. 
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3.2.4 The ‘community control gap’ 
Community fears. Legal control is not the only way to influence an institution’s 
conduct. Community control, through cultural habits and the proximity 
network, may play a role. A typical fear associated with cross-border 
acquisitions is the loss of this community control, which may typically lead to a 
loss of the ability to keep headquarters in the country of origin, develop high 
added-value products along with research and development in the same 
country, and protect employment and the environment at home. These issues, 
in economic terms, may be considered an increased risk of negative 
externalities imposed by foreign shareholders to a local company. The extent to 
which these assumptions hold true is beyond the scope of this study (it may be 
the case, for instance, that an international group acquiring a small local offeree 
company applies enhanced social or environmental rules as part of its general 
corporate policy). Still, these concerns exist and are exacerbated in the context 
of acquisitions of large companies (often listed companies) and of highly 
publicised takeover bids, and more specifically, unsolicited takeover bids. This 
issue, which may be referred to as the ‘community control gap’, should thus be 
borne in mind when designing potential legislation affecting takeover bids. 
The issue may be visualised in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Community control gap 
 
 Pre-acquisition situation Post-acquisition situation 
Potential solution. There are two main ways to address the issue. The first 
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second way is to address the issue through regulatory action. If restricting the 
free market for corporate control is not an option, then the main alternatives 
are the following: 
 Enhance community protection through 
- increased regulation of company activities, and 
- increased accountability of shareholders. 
 Incentivise proper management conduct through the enforcement of a 
rule whereby managers must act in the interest of the company taken as 
a whole. 
Impact on takeover regulations. If the issue of a community control gap is to 
be addressed through takeover regulation, the simplest way to proceed seems 
to be to insert a ‘company interest’ rule. This rule already exists in the 
Directive, but as it is balanced with the ‘no frustration’ rule, its overall effect is 
unclear (please refer to Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive). 
 31 
4. NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND 
OPERATION OF THE DIRECTIVE 
This chapter addresses the following questions in particular:  
 How has the Directive generally been transposed? And what has been 
the impact of other takeover bid legislation adopted during the same 
period as, but independently of, the transposition process? 
 How do the general principles of the Directive protect shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders? 
 Has the general possibility to provide for exemptions significantly 
weakened the Directive? 
 How is the Directive generally perceived? 
Key concepts 
 The Directive is generally considered clear and without significant 
loopholes (if we leave aside the optionality issue, which is further 
described below).  
 In certain countries, some events (generally linked to highly publicised 
and country-sensitive takeover bids) have induced some amendments to 
takeover regulations that were not connected to the transposition process 
and not in the original spirit of the Directive. 
 General principles of the Directive, when read in conjunction with 
associated rules, protect shareholders well, even if there is room for 
harmonised improvement. The protection of employees is less 
satisfactory, as their protection mechanism is much more limited and the 
enforcement of their rights far less efficient. Recent reforms in the UK are 
interesting in this respect. 
 Major non-EU jurisdictions tend to have similar general principles, 
focusing essentially on protecting minority shareholders. 
 The perception study confirms the overall satisfaction of shareholders 
and dissatisfaction of employees. 
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4.1 Transpositions, loopholes and gold-plating 
Clarity and transposition. There is an overall perception that the Directive is 
sufficiently clear (58%), with national transposition being the main source of 
lack of clarity. There are no major transposition issues. 
Loopholes. As the Directive provides for broad concepts and allows for 
both gold-plating and exemptions, it is difficult to identify meaningful 
loopholes. Nevertheless, the following issues are noteworthy: 
 Negative competence conflict. The Directive’s mandatory takeover bid and 
squeeze-out rules are not applicable to companies whose securities are 
admitted to trading in a member state but which are not headquartered 
in a member state. In such a company’s non-EU home country, 
mandatory takeover bid provisions, if any, may not be applicable either, 
if the non-EU home country only considers such rules to apply to 
companies whose securities are listed in the respective home countries. 
This negative competence conflict leaves shareholders of such a 
company unprotected; this result appears particularly unfair in cases 
where countries – the company’s home state and the member state in 
which the securities are admitted to trading – provide for mandatory 
takeover bid rules. 
 Illustration. As a case in point, a majority of the mandatory public 
takeover bid rules applicable to Swiss or French public companies are 
inapplicable to a company with a registered office in Switzerland and 
shares admitted to trading on the French regulated market. Given that 
such a company is headquartered in Switzerland, a country that is 
neither a member of the EU nor the EEA, under the general regulations 
of the AMF (Autorité des marchés financiers), provisions relating to 
mandatory public takeover bids and squeeze-outs do not apply. Swiss 
regulations do not apply to such a company either, as its shares are not 
listed on a Swiss stock exchange. 
In practice, such Swiss companies attempt to avoid the lack of 
shareholder protection by incorporating the Swiss mandatory takeover 
bid rules in their articles of association. It is questionable, however, 
whether these statutory provisions provide the full protection afforded 
by the respective AMF or Swiss mandatory takeover bid regulations, as 
it is unclear whether these provisions may be enforced by the company’s 
shareholders. 
Gold-plating. The Directive allows member states to introduce provisions 
going beyond the Directive’s requirements in order to enhance the protection 
of those whose interests are supposed to be protected by the Directive (Art. 
3.2(b)).  
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For those member states that had already introduced regulations 
regarding takeovers or other public bids before the entry into force of the 
Directive, it is questionable whether one should really consider such 
provisions that are not provided for by the Directive as gold-plating, since their 
adoption was not the result of a specific choice made in view of the Directive. 
For the sake of completeness, some examples are addressed below. 
 Threshold triggering the obligation to submit a mandatory bid. Some member 
states provide for a double threshold (e.g. in Finland, exceeding 30% and 
50% of the voting rights) or apply the threshold not only to voting rights 
but also to capital (France), whereas the Directive’s ‘control’ definition 
only refers to a single threshold expressed in voting rights.  
 Criteria for equitable price for mandatory bids 
- Price determination. To determine the equitable price, a significant 
number of member states 14  use an additional criterion, which 
provides for additional protection to minority shareholders. In these 
member states, the equitable price must be at least equal to the 
(weighted) average stock exchange price of the shares of the offeree 
company during a reference period. Other member states request 
that either the offeree company’s independent directors mandate an 
independent expert to prepare a fairness opinion in relation to the 
evaluation of the offeree company (Belgium) or that in cases of 
conflicts of interest, an appraiser be appointed by the offeree 
company (France). 
- Post-bid adjustments. Adjustments of the bid price have to take place 
retroactively in connection with certain cases of share acquisitions 
made after the expiry of the bid period (e.g. Germany, Finland).  
 Content of the offer document. Some member states (e.g. Ireland) require 
the offer document to contain more detailed information and indications 
than the items requested by the Directive.  
4.2 Developments not directly linked to transposition 
Developments. Certain member states have adopted additional regulations 
related to takeover bids that have no direct link with the Directive. This is the 
case, for instance, in the United Kingdom following the Kraft/Cadbury bid, in 
Italy with the ‘Decreto Anticrisi’ and the recent ‘Lactalis’ decree, and in 
                                                        
14 An example could be Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain and (only 
under certain circumstances) Italy. 
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Hungary with ‘Lex Mol’. As shown in the following examples, these 
developments may be substantial. 
 Hungary. In Hungary, in the context of the attempted takeover of the 
Hungarian oil and gas champion (MOL) by its Austrian rival (OMV), the 
Hungarian parliament passed an additional anti-takeover act (Act CXVI 
of 2007, customarily referred to as ‘Lex Mol’). Lex Mol aims at protecting 
strategic companies in the energy and utilities sector, by increasing the 
shareholder majority required for the removal of board members and by 
giving offeree companies a relatively free hand in adopting protective 
measures, such as share buybacks or voting right limitations. Lex Mol 
provided special regulations for companies in which the Hungarian State 
had held a preference-voting (or golden) share. The European 
Commission launched an investigation against Lex Mol examining 
whether the law constituted a barrier against the free movement of 
capital. As a consequence of the investigation, Lex Mol was slightly 
amended and has remained in force since. 
 United Kingdom. In the UK, following the acquisition of Cadbury by Kraft 
Foods, there have been significant reforms implemented by the Takeover 
Panel with the explicit purpose of empowering the offeree company 
when a bid is launched (Box 2).  
Box 2. Recent UK reforms following the Kraft/Cadbury bid 
In the wake of the 2009–10 controversial acquisition of Cadbury by the US food 
company, Kraft, the UK Takeover Panel undertook to make appropriate changes to 
the UK Takeover Code (the legal instrument under which the Directive was 
transposed). The Code Committee of the Takeover Panel issued a consultation 
paper in June 2010 to investigate whether the existing regulatory framework of the 
Takeover Code (which transposed the Directive) left UK companies too vulnerable 
to hostile bids. Among the key issues the Takeover Panel sought to address were 
the following: 
 whether the minimum, voting-rights acceptance threshold (50% plus one) 
should be raised to 66%; 
 disenfranchisement of voting shares acquired in the offeree company during 
the bid period;  
 whether there should be greater disclosure in offer documents and offer 
voting intentions; 
 possible standardisation of various aspects of the existing ‘put up or shut up’ 
(PUSU) rule, including 
 – imposing a standardised deadline; 
 – automatic application of the rule upon the announcement of a possible bid; 
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 – whether a private PUSU rule should be allowed if the possible offeror has 
not been made public yet;  
 rules regarding inducement fees in recommended bids or other protective 
measures concerning the bid; and 
 whether the timetable of the Code should be shortened. 
Throughout the consultation paper, the UK Takeover Panel made reference to the 
general principles of the Directive and how their concerns coincided with the 
objectives therein. The revisions to the Takeover Code came into force on 19 
September 2011 and encompassed the following changes: 
1) Enhanced protection of the offeree company 
 Greater protection for offeree companies against protracted ‘virtual bid’ periods. A 
‘virtual bid’ refers to a scenario in which a potential offeror announces that it 
is considering launching a bid but without committing itself to doing so. If the 
announcement of a potential bid is made by an offeree company, the name of 
the offeror and any other potential offeror who has been in discussion with 
the offeree company regarding a potential bid (that has not been rejected) 
must be disclosed by the offeree company in their announcement. If the 
potential offeror makes the announcement to launch (regardless of whether 
the announcement was intended or leaked), the offeree company is not 
required to disclose to any other potential offeror that such a launch took 
place. Yet, if the presence of another offeror is announced by the offeree, 
intentionally or through a leak, the offeree company must disclose the identity 
of such a potential offeror.  
 Following the announcement of any potential offeror, a 28-day PUSU 
deadline is enforced within which such an offeror must announce a firm 
intention to launch a bid or not. This deadline can only be extended at the 
request of the offeree company to the Takeover Panel, which will ‘normally 
consent’ to such extensions.  
 The intended purpose of the PUSU deadline is to minimise uncertainty arising 
from bid rumours and allow shareholders and other market participants the 
benefit of this information so that they may make informed decisions.  
 The effect of the rule is to empower offeree companies with greater ability to 
control the pace and information disclosure of the bid.  
 Prohibition of deal protection measures and inducement fees. Concerned over 
packaged deal-protection measures and the pressure they placed on offeree 
company boards and other potential offerors, the Takeover Panel has 
instituted a general ban on “any offer-related arrangement”, such as 
inducement fees, with the offeror or those acting in concert with them. The 
rule carves out exceptions for certain “offer-related agreements”, which are 
not prohibited, including a specific exception for inducement fees for white 
knights.  
36 | CLERC & DEMARIGNY 
 Bids that are structured as schemes of arrangement are subject to the same 
general prohibition; however, the offeree company recommending the scheme 
mush disclose the scheme along with a timetable for its application (which it 
must abide by), within 28 days of the offeror’s announcement of a firm intent 
to launch a bid.  
 Ability of the offeree company’s board to give an opinion on the bid. The offeree 
company board must obtain independent advice on the bid in giving its 
opinion on the bid to its shareholders. The offeree company board is not 
limited in the factors it may consider when giving its opinion on the bid and is 
specifically not restricted to considering the bid price. Art. 9 of the Directive 
does not include any such rule requiring independent advice on the bid; 
however, in view of the objectives of the Directive, there is no indication that 
the Directive disfavours such a practice.  
2) Enhanced disclosure regime 
 Disclosure of offer-related fees and expenses. The total of offer-related expenses 
regarding the bid, such as fees for financial advisers, lawyers and accountants, 
must be estimated and disclosed by all parties to the bid. If the actual 
aggregate fees and expenses exceed the disclosed figure by more than 10%, 
the Takeover Panel may require a second disclosure regarding the actual 
figures. 
 Disclosure of bid financing and other financial information. Financial information 
regarding a bid and its financing relating to an offeree company or an offeror 
must be disclosed by publishing the relevant financial information for the last 
two financial years on a website providing the website address. 
3) Improved employee rights. These rights are described in subsection 4.3.2 of this 
report.  
Sources: The Takeover Panel, “Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover 
Bids”, PS 210/22, London, 21 October 2010, and “Review of Certain Aspects of the 
Regulation of Takeover Bids, Response Statement by the Code Committee of the Panel 
Following the Consultation on PCP2011/1”, RS 2011/1, London, 21 July 2011. 
4.3 General principles of the Directive  
Guiding principles. Art. 3.1 of the Directive contains general principles with 
which the member states must comply. These “general principles” are 
commonly viewed as being part of the overall level playing field supported by 
the Directive. It has nonetheless been noted that the concept of the level 
playing field alone does not provide definitive guidance in determining the 
best corresponding regulatory framework for takeovers. Indeed, these general 
principles should be interpreted in the light of the decision issued by the Court 
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of Justice of the European Communities on 15 October 2009,15 which provides 
that they are “guiding principles” for the transposition of the Directive and 
cannot be regarded as general principles of Community law.16  
Review of the general principles. Generally, the principles provided in Art. 
3.1 of the Directive are fully transposed (sometimes with a verbatim 
transposition) or do not raise fundamental legal issues. The study therefore 
examines if i) each general principle is specific enough to protect the interests 
of the relevant constituents, and ii) transposition of the laws raises legal issues 
or is helpful for the application of these general principles. The study also 
provides a comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions.  
4.3.1 Protection of shareholders  
Equal treatment – Descriptions and general assessment 
The principle. According to Art. 3.1(a) of the Directive, “all holders of the 
securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded equivalent 
treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a company, the other 
holders of securities must be protected”. The protection of the minority 
shareholders is therefore added to the principle of equal treatment.  
Associated rules. Equal treatment and the protection of minority 
shareholders are more specifically addressed by the mandatory bid rule under 
Art. 5 of the Directive and the equitable price provision under Art. 5.4 of the 
Directive. The provisions regarding the publication (Art. 6 of the Directive – 
information concerning bids and Art. 8 of the Directive – disclosure of bids) 
serve prima facie the proper provision of information to shareholders, but also 
ensure their equal treatment by granting all shareholders access to the same 
information. The requirement for a fair price in the squeeze-out and sell-out 
provisions (Art. 15 of the Directive) is also intended to protect minority 
shareholders.  
                                                        
15  Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 October 2009, Case C-101/08, 
European Court reports 2009, Page I-09823. The Court considered that  
it cannot be inferred from the use of the term ‘general principles’ in Article 3 of that 
directive that the Community legislature thereby intends the principles mentioned 
in that Article to be treated in the same way as general principles of Community 
law. As is clear from the words ‘for the purposes of implementing this Directive’, 
they are only guiding principles for the implementation of that directive by the 
Member States. 
16 These principles also set boundaries to the right granted to member states to derogate 
from the Directive rules (Arts. 4.5 and 5.4 of the Directive). 
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Issues. In nearly all member states, the sufficient specificity of the 
principle of equal treatment itself is not an issue. The general principles 
referred to in connection with the application and operation of the Directive 
appear rather to help interpret other rules, when such rules contain 
uncertainties. Yet a few specific issues may be pointed out:  
 Exclusionary bids. In contrast with the equality principle, most member 
states allow bids to be structured so as to exclude some foreign 
shareholders (typically located in the US). Although it is questionable 
whether these exclusions are lawful, they seem necessary, in practice, 
when extending a bid abroad would impose excessive costs on the 
offeror in light of the number of shareholders that may be concerned. 
 The ‘class struggle’ issue. According to the Directive, only shareholders of 
the same class must be afforded equal treatment, but the boundaries of 
this principle are unclear. The principle of equal treatment is at stake 
when a distinct price is proposed for different categories of shareholders. 
Although it is indeed permitted to offer different prices for different 
classes of shareholders, it may be difficult in practice to determine the 
extent to which differentiations are justified or how substantial such 
divergences in price may be. This issue may, however, be addressed at a 
national level, or in major non-EU jurisdictions, as described below. 
- Separate treatment of each class. This principle may, for instance, be 
found in Germany, where regulations provide expressly that the 
minimum price must be calculated for each class separately. The bid 
must contain an explanation of the price calculation and set forth 
why the price is justified.  
- Independent expert. This principle may be found in France, where the 
regulations state that the offeree shall appoint an independent 
appraiser if a squeeze-out pertains to different classes of financial 
instruments and is priced in a way that could jeopardise the 
principle of equal treatment. The independent expert will typically 
consider the price that was offered in a previous bid for each 
security class. 
Extension to other situations. In some countries, the equal treatment 
principle has been further extended to provide equal rights to shareholders 
whose situations are different, as described below: 
 Post-bid top-up clause. In Belgium and Germany, for instance, if within one 
year after the closing of the bid, the offeror acquires securities subject to 
the bid at a price that exceeds the bid price offered for said securities, all 
holders of said securities who accepted the bid are entitled to receive the 
price difference. In Finland, the automatic bid adjustment applies within 
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a nine-month period. Thus, shareholders who have tendered their shares 
benefit from the same price as shareholders who have kept their shares 
during the takeover bid and sold them afterwards. These top-up clauses 
may also prevent shareholders from blocking the application of a 
squeeze-out. In Switzerland, a major non-EU jurisdiction, a similar 
principle is applicable: the best-price rule applies from the pre-
announcement or publication of the bid until six months after the expiry 
of the additional acceptance period. If, during such a period, the offeror 
acquires additional securities for an amount exceeding the bid price, the 
offeror is under an obligation to offer this higher price to all recipients of 
the public bid. 
 Extension to competing offerors. Some countries, such as the UK, provide 
equality of information to competing offerors, thus extending the equal 
treatment principle from relationships among shareholders to 
relationships among offerors.  
Other ways to address equal treatment: The US example. In the US, equal 
treatment is addressed through different mechanisms: 
 SEC rules. In the US, the first part of the equal treatment principle set out 
in Art. 3.1(a) of the Directive (“all holders of the securities of an offeree 
company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment”) is 
applied through the so-called ‘all-holders/best-price’ rule set out by the 
SEC in Rule 14d-10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The all-
holders/best-price rule applies to takeover bids, both friendly and 
hostile, but does not apply to statutory mergers. The rules are outlined 
below.  
- All-holders rule. Under Rule 14d-10, no offeror is permitted to make a 
takeover bid unless the bid “is open to all security holders of the 
class of securities subject to the tender offer”. It is customary that, if 
a bid is made for less than all the shares of a particular class, the 
offeror will purchase the shares tendered on a pro rata basis.  
- Best-price rule. Rule 14d-10 also provides that “the consideration paid 
to any security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer is 
the highest consideration paid to any other security holder for 
securities tendered in the tender offer”.  
 State rules. The state laws may typically include certain provisions, 
described below.  
- Merger statutes. Under state merger statutes, if an offeror proposes to 
acquire control of an offeree company by means of a merger 
pursuant to the laws of the state of incorporation of the offeror and 
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the offeree company, both the majority and minority shareholders of 
the offeree company must receive the same price and type of 
consideration in exchange for their shares.  
- Dissenter rights. In addition, under the laws of many states, if 
minority shareholders believe that the price being offered by the 
offeror is below the fair value of the shares, but a majority of 
shareholders nevertheless accepts the bid and the merger occurs, the 
minority shareholders (often called ‘dissenters’) have the right to 
petition a court to set a ‘fair value’ for their shares. If a court rules in 
favour of the minority shareholders, the surviving company is 
required to purchase their shares for a cash amount equal to the fair 
value.  
- Protection of the offeree company. While takeover statutes vary from 
state to state, most states generally prohibit offerors who acquire a 
controlling block of offeree company stock from engaging in certain 
transactions with the offeree company for a period of time, usually 
ranging from three to five years after the acquisition, unless the 
acquisition was pre-approved by the offeree company’s board of 
directors. These statutes have the effect of making offerors obtain the 
approval of the offeree company’s board before acquiring a 
controlling share in the company. This allows the offeree company’s 
board of directors to bargain for provisions that are protective of 
minority shareholders. 
Proper information 
Principles and associated rules. According to Art. 3.1(b) of the Directive, “the 
holders of the securities of an offeree company must have sufficient time and 
information to enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid”. 
The content of the required information is more specifically set out in Art. 6 of 
the Directive (information concerning bids) and Art. 8 of the Directive 
(disclosure of bids). 
The general principle of “sufficient time and information” is further 
developed in Art. 7.1 of the Directive, which states that “the Member States 
shall provide that the time allowed for the acceptance of a bid may not be less 
than two weeks nor more than 10 weeks from the date of publication of the 
offer document”. 
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No significant issue. No significant issue seems to have arisen in 
connection with these general principles. With respect to timing, the 
procedures typically provide for an adequate time frame; however, 
circumstances such as anti-trust procedures or litigation may, de facto or de 
jure, extend the period during which the offeree company is ‘in play’.  
Additional protection for the offeree company. Some of the major non-EU 
jurisdictions provide for a maximum time period between the announcement 
of the bid and its effective opening. The Directive lacks such a specific rule, but 
provides in Art. 3.1(f) that “an offeree company must not be hindered in the 
conduct of its affairs for longer than is reasonable by a bid for its securities”. 
Mandating a specific maximum time period between the announcement of the 
bid and its opening could reduce the sometimes lengthy disruption to the 
offeree company’s affairs that occurs in certain EU member states. Moreover, 
such a specific rule would be in line with the ‘put-up or shut-up’ rules 
introduced by some member states (such as France and the UK), which 
provide for a maximum time frame during which a declared offeror must take 
certain actions resulting in the launch of a bid. The situation in major non-EU 
jurisdictions is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Maximum time period between the bid announcement and its opening in 
non-EU jurisdictions 
 Maximum time period 
between announcement 
of the bid and its 
opening  
Acceptance period* 
Minimum Maximum 
Australia 2 months 1 month 12 months 
Canada Not applicable 35 days No maximum time 
period 
China Not applicable, the bid 
period opens upon 
announcement 
30 days 60 days 
Hong Kong  21 days (cash offer) and 
35 days (exchange offer) 
21 or 28 days; 
unless 
unconditional, 
the bid must 
remain open for a 
further 14 days 
81 days 
India 55 days  20 days 20 days 
Japan Not applicable 20 business days 60 business days 
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Table 11. cont’d 
Switzerland The bid may be pre-
announced up to 6 weeks 
before its publication 
(subject to extensions). 
The acceptance period 
starts at the end of a 10-
day cooling-off period 
beginning on the 
publication of the bid 
20 days (but may 
be shortened to 
10 days) 
40 days 
Russia Not applicable 70 days 80 days 
US Not applicable 20 days 60 days (cash)** 
* Subject to extensions, e.g. in case of competing bids, regulatory or antitrust approvals or 
litigation. 
** An exchange offer usually adds six to eight weeks (or more) to the timetable for a cash 
takeover bid owing to registration requirements or the offeror’s shareholder approval (or 
both) required in connection with certain capital increases. 
Source: Authors. 
Market integrity 
Principles and associated rules. Under Art. 3.1(d) of the Directive, “false markets 
must not be created in the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror 
company or of any other company concerned by the bid in such a way that the 
rise or fall of the prices of the securities becomes artificial and the normal 
functioning of the markets is distorted”.  
In addition, Art. 3.1(e) of the Directive provides that “an offeror must 
announce a bid only after ensuring that he can fulfil in full any cash 
consideration, if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to 
secure the implementation of any other type of consideration”. Art. 3.1(e) of 
the Directive confirms Art. 3.1(d) of the Directive in that an offeror who 
announces a bid without fulfilling his or her cash consideration discloses false 
information that may contribute to creating false markets.  
Prevention of false markets. This principle is typically secured through the 
transposition of transparency requirements and market abuse prohibitions, 
which are outside the scope of this study. 
Full financing requirements. To secure a consideration in cash, some 
member states either request a bank guarantee or a bank confirmation. This is 
also customary practice in most major non-EU jurisdictions. In one case (India), 
it may be required from the offeror to maintain cash or cash equivalents in an 
escrow account. 
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4.3.2 Protection of employees 
Principle and associated rules. According to Art. 3.1(b) of the Directive, “where it 
advises the holders of securities, the board of the offeree company must give 
its views on the effects of implementation of the bid on employment, 
conditions of employment and the locations of the company’s places of 
business”. General provisions regarding the information of work 
representatives, co-determination, etc. provided by national laws apply in 
parallel (Art. 14 of the Directive). The practical application of these principles is 
further described below. 
Disclosed information. Offer documents must contain certain information, 
including on the future business of the offeree company, the safeguarding of its 
employees’ jobs and strategic plans (Art. 6 of the Directive). The same applies 
to the opinion published by the board of the offeree company, which must 
include the board’s view on the effects of the bid on, among other things, 
employment and the locations of the company (Art. 9.5 of the Directive). The 
documents that are published (bid documentation, amendments thereto and 
the position of the offeree company’s board) must be disclosed to the 
representatives of the employees of the offeree company (or the employees 
themselves) (Art. 6.2 and Art. 8.2 of the Directive).  
Opinion issued by employee representatives. Employee representatives may 
voice their concerns: for instance, when the board of the offeree company 
receives ‘in good time’ a separate opinion from them on the effects of the bid 
on employment, such an opinion must be appended to the opinion issued by 
the board of the offeree company (Art. 9.5 of the Directive). 
Structure. The interests of employees are thus protected in two manners. 
First, the provision of information gives them the ability to voice their concerns 
(which may have an impact on the offeror) and to exit (although this second 
option is in most cases essentially theoretical). Second, their specific interests 
may be represented by the board of the offeree company, as employees have 
no decision-making authority. Yet it has been argued that this system is not 
efficient (Sjåfjell, 2010a, pp. 15 et seq.), as ultimately the final decision-making 
authority rests with the offeree company’s board, which has little or no 
incentive to take into account employee protection in the process. Because of 
this structure, the disclosure requirements of the Directive may have very little 
effect on employee protection.  
Major non-EU jurisdictions. For comparative purposes, it is worth noting 
that, under takeover bid regulations in major non-EU jurisdictions, the 
protection of employees in terms of information as well as their involvement in 
the bid appears to be weak. Still, an offeror is sometimes obliged to disclose in 
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the offer documents its intention regarding offeree company employees and 
the effect of the bid on the latter (for instance, in Australia, Canada, China and 
Hong Kong).  
Basic and enhanced protection 
Effective transposition in all member states. The formal transposition of the 
information requirements regarding employees does not, in principle, raise 
specific issues. All member states have introduced the information 
requirements of the Directive. The majority of member states have transposed 
the Directive without imposing further information requirements in the offer 
document or in the public statement of the offeree company’s board.  
Enhanced transposition in some member states. Some member states have 
introduced further requirements, such as the following: 
 Additional information. Some countries have added information 
requirements that relate to information to be provided in the offer 
document. For example, in Ireland, further requirements have been 
introduced relating to the information provided to the employees 
concerning the long-term commercial justification for the bid. In other 
cases, such additional information must be provided by the board in its 
public statement. In the Netherlands, for instance, the board must 
explain why, if applicable, it disagrees with the opinion of the works 
council regarding a transaction that is to take place between the offeree 
company and the offeror. 
 Consultation rights. In some member states (e.g. Belgium, Estonia, France, 
the Netherlands), works councils or representatives of the employees not 
only make a statement that must be published along with the statement 
of the board or management of the offeree company, but also have a 
consultation right. 
 General protections. General labour law may often provide some 
additional protection. For instance, it may be necessary to consult the 
works council or employees’ representatives in connection with the 
takeover bid or its application. General laws in this respect may be 
difficult to apply, however, in view of the confidentiality requirements of 
the pre-announcement period and the time constraints associated with 
the bid period. 
 Meeting rights. Some countries have gone a step further. Taking into 
account the need to initiate a dialogue between employees and the 
offeror (as a potential new, controlling shareholder), such countries have 
provided for a meeting right, as in the examples below. 
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- In France, the works council of the offeree may decide to hear the 
offeror. The authorised representative of the offeror must, in a 
hearing, first present the offeror’s industrial and financial strategies, 
its strategic plans for the offeree company and the impact on the 
interests at stake, and subsequently receive comments and answer 
questions on the bid from the works council. If the offeror’s 
representative does not attend the hearing, the offeror’s shares are 
deprived of their voting rights until after the hearing takes place. 
- In Belgium, the works council has the right to invite the offeror for a 
hearing at the latest ten days after the start of the acceptance period. 
 Co-determination system. In member states where a co-determination 
system is in place (such as Germany), the employees’ delegates on the 
supervisory board directly participate in the public statement made by 
the offeree company’s supervisory board.  
Traditional limits and recent reforms 
Significant enforcement issues. Employee representatives have clearly stated that 
there are significant issues with the enforcement of employees’ rights under 
the Directive, indicating that there were numerous cases where employee 
representatives were not informed in an appropriate and timely manner and 
many cases where the information provided was not adequate. As a result, in 
some countries, such as the UK, it appears that employees’ rights have almost 
never been used, creating a real compliance issue concerning the Directive. 
Limited prior review; no post-bid enforcement. Another issue in relation to 
the protection of employees is that although information provided to 
employees may be controlled before the bid, no enforcement takes place after a 
successful bid. Thus, an offeror may fail to comply with what it had stated or 
diverge from its plans. Furthermore, even if ex-ante control of the information 
provided in the offer document takes place, it is more of a formal tick-the-box 
type of control and does not question the offeror’s real intentions.  
UK analysis of recent reforms. In the UK, following the Kraft takeover of 
Cadbury, the above-mentioned concerns were addressed through a revision of 
takeover regulations regarding employee protection.  
As a starting point, the Takeover Panel noted that, during recommended 
bids, employee representatives had no time to express their views. If, as is 
usually the case in recommended bids, the firm’s offer announcement and the 
offer document are published on the same day (with the offeree company 
board’s circular effectively being combined with the offer document), there 
will not be time for the employee representatives to produce a circular 
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expressing their views. The offeree company board has no obligation to 
subsequently disclose to the market any circular that it may have received 
from employee representatives. In practical terms (especially where the offeree 
company operates through a number of divisions), it appears difficult for 
employee representatives to collate information on the likely effects of the bid 
on all divisions within the bid timetable. As such, the Takeover Panel (2010) 
observed a lack of protection of employees during a takeover bid, stating the 
following: 
 The ability of the offeree company board and other interested 
constituencies to comply with their own obligations, and to provide 
meaningful information to offeree company shareholders and 
employees, depends on the accuracy and adequacy of the information 
published by the offeror in accordance with its own obligations. 
 Better communication between the offeree board and the offeree 
employees (and employee representatives) would enable employee 
representatives to provide their opinion on the effects of the bid on 
employment more effectively and, in so doing, would facilitate a wider 
understanding of the implications that the bid may have for the interests 
of offeree company employees. The Takeover Panel has thus made the 
amendments described in Box 3.  
Box 3. UK reforms regarding employee protection 
Improving employees’ information 
 Right to be informed. Clarify that the Code does not prevent the provision of 
information in confidence to employee representatives acting in such a 
capacity during the bid period. 
 Timing of information. Require the offeree company board to inform employee 
representatives at the earliest opportunity of their right to circulate an opinion 
on the effects of the bid on employment. 
 Publication at the offeree company’s expense. Require the offeree company board 
to publish employee representative circulars (which have not been received in 
good time) on the company’s website (and make an announcement that the 
circular has been thus published). Clarify that it is the responsibility of the 
offeree company board to publish the opinion of the employee representatives 
at the offeree company’s expense. However, the employee representatives’ 
opinion will be excluded from the scope of the responsibility statement of the 
offeree company’s board. 
 Reimbursement of representatives’ costs. Require the offeree company to pay the 
costs incurred by employee representatives in obtaining any advice needed to 
verify the information in the employee representatives’ opinion in order to 
meet required information standards under the Code. 
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Strengthening the offeror’s obligations 
 Negative statements. Offerors should make negative statements if there are no 
plans regarding the offeree company’s employees, locations of business and 
fixed assets, or if it considers that its strategic plans for the offeree company 
will have no repercussions on employment or the location of the offeree 
company’s places of business. 
 A 12-month minimum validity of the statements. Any party to a bid must adhere 
to any public statement it makes during the bid period relating to any course 
of action it intends to take (or not to take) after the end of the bid period. 
Where no time period for the application/non-application of the course of 
action is specified, the statement should be adhered to for a period of at least 
12 months from the date on which the bid becomes or is declared wholly 
unconditional. 
4.3.3 Protection of other stakeholders 
Description 
Principle and associated rules. According to Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive, “the 
board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a 
whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on 
the merits of the bid”. Furthermore, “an offeree company must not be hindered 
in the conduct of its affairs for longer than is reasonable by a bid for its 
securities” (Art. 3.1(f) of the Directive). One of the purposes of time frames for 
acceptance (Art. 7 of the Directive) is to prevent the offeree company from 
being hindered in the conduct of its affairs.  
The core debate 
Interests of the company and interests of stakeholders. It is always a difficult and 
controversial task to define what the interests of a company encompass. From a 
prima facie reading of Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive, it appears that the “interests of 
the company” are not equivalent to the interests of shareholders; otherwise the 
sentence would be mostly redundant and thus essentially meaningless. The 
reference to the company taken “as a whole” also points in favour of a broad 
analysis of the concept and suggests that the company is considered a 
representative of the interests of all of its stakeholders. There is no definition of 
the stakeholder concept, but the Directive suggests two directions: employees 
(who are the subject of several clauses of the Directive) and local communities 
(which are addressed in Art. 9.5 of the Directive through the reference to the 
“locations of the company’s places of business”). Other interests of the 
company taken “as a whole” would typically include the interests of creditors, 
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contracting parties (such as sub-contractors) and public authorities. The 
environment may also be included, to the extent it affects both the employees 
and the local communities. 
Striking the right balance. The Directive does not explain how conflicts 
between stakeholders’ and shareholders’ interests may be resolved. Such 
conflicts may for instance occur when an offeror intends to break up a 
company, relocate its activities, proceed with massive lay-offs or disregard its 
contractual commitments or legal obligations. Depending on the circumstances 
and the identity of the stakeholders considered, the offeror may act in a 
manner contrary to the interests of the company “taken as a whole”. On the 
other hand, if a company puts up a defence, even if its objective is to negotiate 
a higher price, it risks acting in breach of Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive. The 
Directive leaves to member states the task of setting the limits of what is 
permitted or prohibited. 
Prohibited conduct. Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive would seem to call for a 
proportionality test between the two rules with which the board has to comply 
during a bid – acting in the interest of the company as a whole and not denying 
the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid. A 
member state applying one of the two rules in full and completely 
disregarding the other would probably not be compliant with the Directive. For 
instance, no legal system should allow the board to adopt frustrating measures without 
strong grounds to do so – and the more efficient the measures, the stronger the grounds 
should be. On the other hand, no board should be fully prohibited from putting up 
defences that are necessary to defend the interests of the company – the more restricted 
the board’s ability to defend the company’s interests, the stronger the company’s 
interest in the bid should be.  
Transposition. This article does not seem to have a strong impact on the 
way the Directive has been transposed. Member states that have transposed 
Art. 9 of the Directive tend to consider that the passivity rule should override 
all other concerns, although their legal systems formally acknowledge that the 
board should not act against the company’s interests. Member states that have 
not transposed Art. 9 emphasise the board’s duty to defend the company’s 
interest, and pay less unilateral attention to the consequences this may have on 
shareholders’ rights.17 Actually, member states tend to justify their position as 
follows. Where Art. 9 has been transposed, it is claimed that the company’s 
                                                        
17 In Germany, for instance, the management board and the supervisory board must 
always respect the general principles set out in the Stock Corporation Act. They must 
serve the interests of the company, which includes the interests of shareholders and 
other stakeholders. In case of a voluntary takeover bid or a mandatory bid, the 
management board must, again, act in the interest of the company as a whole. 
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interests (taken as a whole) are best served by the disciplinary effect that comes 
with the non-frustration rule: this leads to better-managed companies and a 
lower cost of capital, both of which ultimately serve the interests of all 
stakeholders. Where Art. 9 has not been transposed, the reverse position is 
adopted: the overriding duty to protect the company’s interests is deemed to 
best serve the interests of all shareholders, at least in the long run. Is either 
attitude compliant with the Directive? It is rather difficult to provide a clear 
answer. 
Major non-EU jurisdictions: The US example of ‘stakeholders’ statutes’. 
Among major non-EU jurisdictions, the US provides an interesting example of 
stakeholder protection: approximately 30 US states have enacted so-called 
‘other constituency’ statutes that authorise an offeree company’s board to 
consider the interests of stakeholders other than the financial interests of 
shareholders. Notably this rule is not applicable in Delaware, where, if the 
offeree company board has decided to put the company up for sale, the board 
is subject to the Revlon duty to maximise shareholder value exclusively and 
thus cannot consider the interests of other stakeholders, including employees.  
4.4 Exemptions to the Directive 
The principle and its purpose. According to Art. 4.5 paragraph 2 of the Directive, 
member states may, in their national legal frameworks, provide certain 
exemptions or derogations from the rules of the Directive, or grant supervisory 
authorities the power to waive certain rules. Nevertheless, such derogations 
are still subject to the general principles in Art. 3 of the Directive. The granting 
of exemptions may help to improve attainment of the objectives and general 
principles of the Directive, in particular where they help to balance diverging, 
protected interests. As a result, these exemptions have generally not been seen 
as weakening the Directive. 
General and specific exemptions. Some member states (such as the UK,18 
Finland19 and Ireland20) entrust their supervisory authority with the general 
                                                        
18 General exemption. The Panel may derogate or waive the application of a rule to a 
person (provided, in the case of a transaction and rule subject to the requirements of 
the Directive, that the general principles are respected), either 
i) under the circumstances set out in the rule; or 
ii) under other circumstances where the Panel considers that the particular rule would 
operate unduly harshly or in an unnecessarily restrictive or burdensome or 
otherwise inappropriate manner (in which case a reasoned decision will be 
provided). 
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power to grant exemptions without specifying the provisions for which an 
exemption can be granted. Such exemptions take effect in cases where the 
application of a rule appears to operate in an unduly harsh or burdensome 
manner, taking into account the general principles of the rules and the interests 
of the shareholders. In the UK, such exemptions can also be granted if the 
offeree company has very few shareholders, provided that a certain procedure 
and several safeguards are observed.  
In the other member states, exemptions or derogations are granted 
specifically for certain obligations, in particular the mandatory bid rule.  
4.5 Perception  
Perception. Stakeholders are generally positive regarding the Directive, with the 
noticeable exception of employee representatives.  
 Enhanced principles of certainty and transparency. A majority of 
stakeholders are of the opinion that the Directive has enhanced legal 
certainty and transparency (65%) and that its transposition has enhanced 
certainty and clarity (67%). Among the stakeholders who consider that 
the Directive is unclear, there is disagreement on the source of the lack of 
clarity. Some stakeholders consider that the vagueness is caused by the 
Directive itself (40%) while others believe that it stems from the national 
transposition of the Directive. Stakeholders nevertheless agree that the 
absence of clarity could be addressed through further guidance (77%). 
 
                                                                                                                                             
19 General exemption. According to a provision in the Finnish Securities Markets Act 
(SMA), the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA) can for a special reason 
authorise exemptions from the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Finnish SMA. In its 
Takeover Standard, the Finnish FSA has stated that the exemption consideration is 
based on an overall assessment of all circumstances at hand, taking into account the 
effect of the exemption on the position of the minority shareholders as well as the 
question of whether the minority shareholders were aware of the arrangement 
beforehand and had an opportunity to affect its contents (e.g. in a general meeting of 
shareholders). The Takeover Standard sets out examples of circumstances that can 
constitute a special reason to diverge from the mandatory bid obligation. 
20 General exemption. The Panel, as the Irish supervisory authority for the purposes of 
takeover bids under the Takeover Regulations, has the power under Irish statute “to 
grant derogations from, or waive, any rules under [Section 8 of the 1997 Act (i.e. the 
Takeover Rules)] in relation to a particular matter where, in the opinion of the Panel, 
having regard to the exceptional circumstances of the matter but taking into 
consideration the schedule principles, it is appropriate to do so”. 
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 Divergent opinions on the protection of employees. While stakeholders in 
general believe that the obligations set out in the Directive regarding the 
protection of employee rights are sufficient and enforced appropriately 
(73%), employee representatives strongly disagree with this view (100%). 
 Negative effects of takeovers. Stakeholders at large recognise the negative 
effects of takeover bids on employment, admitting that takeovers 
sometimes or frequently result in lay-offs (76%) and early retirements at 
the offeree company’s level (63%).  
 
52  
5. MANDATORY BID RULE 
nder the mandatory bid rule (Art. 5 of the Directive), if an entity 
acquires control over a company, it is obliged to make a takeover bid 
for all the remaining voting securities of such a company at an 
equitable price. This rule protects minority shareholders by granting them both 
a right to sell their shares in the event of a change of control, and the benefit of 
the premium paid for the controlling stake. The percentage of voting rights 
conferring control and the method of calculation of this percentage must be 
determined by the member state in which the registered office of the company 
is located. The supervisory authorities may be authorised by member states to 
adjust the equitable price under certain circumstances and in accordance with 
criteria that are clearly determined. Any such decision must be substantiated 
and made public.  
This chapter addresses the following questions in particular:  
 Is the mandatory bid a takeover-hostile provision? 
 How are the key concepts of control and ‘acting in concert’ defined and 
used? 
 What are the main exemptions to mandatory bids and how can they be 
categorised? 
 What rules are applicable outside the EU?  
Key concepts  
 The mandatory bid rule protects minority shareholders through the 
prohibition of two-tier bids and the sharing of the control premium, 
while potentially reducing the number of bids, thus functionally acting 
as a takeover defence. This issue is confirmed by economic analysis and 
the perception of stakeholders. 
 Its application raises some issues, such as the lack of harmonisation in 
the key concepts of control and acting in concert. Still, different 
shareholding structures mean that a cautious approach is required 
regarding the harmonisation of control. ‘Acting in concert’ is a notion to 
which active shareholders who wish to coordinate pay close attention, 
and which has been the object of specific scrutiny in Italy (which uses 
‘hard’ concepts) and in the UK (which uses ‘soft’ concepts). A majority of 
stakeholders also consider that the definition of acting in concert may be 
easily circumvented.  
U
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 The variety of exemptions to the mandatory bid rule (more than 35) is 
justified by the diversity of situations and interests that are covered; 
however, it seriously reduces the predictability of the Directive in this 
area. 
US laws on ‘control share cash-out’. There is no direct counterpart to the 
Directive’s mandatory bid rule under US federal law or, with only a few 
exceptions, under the laws of most US states (including Delaware). The only 
exception is that three states (Maine, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, none of 
which have a significant number of public companies incorporated under their 
laws) have ‘control share cash-out’ laws, which provide that if an offeror gains 
voting control over a specified percentage of the outstanding shares of a 
company (ranging between 20% and 50%), the other shareholders of the latter 
can require the offeror to purchase their shares at a ‘fair price’.  
5.1 The mandatory bid – A takeover-hostile provision?  
A takeover-hostile provision. The mandatory bid rule may be seen as a ‘takeover-
hostile’ provision in that it prevents the offeror from using coercive bid 
structures, such as partial bids and two-tier bids (Enriques, 2009, p. 11). In 
addition, the mandatory bid rule may increase the cost of acquisitions, both 
friendly and hostile, to a level that acts as a deterrent to takeover bids 
altogether.  
As an illustration, consider a potential offeror who may only wish to 
purchase, for instance, 35% of the shares in a company. With the mandatory 
bid, he or she will have to be prepared to purchase 100%. This substantially 
increases the prospective cost of a takeover for the offeror and may deter the 
offeror from launching a bid at all. This issue is even worse when there are 
private benefits of control, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. The mandatory bid and private benefits of control 
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As Figure 4 shows, the offeror’s expected synergies (E) need to be 
sufficient to pay for both the private benefit of control21 of the blockholders (A) 
and the extra amount resulting from the application of the mandatory bid rule 
(D); otherwise there will be no bid (unless the blockholder is ready to give 
away a portion of its private benefits of control, which would not be rational). 
In addition, even in the absence of the private benefit of control, a blockholder 
may be in a position to negotiate a higher bid price than dispersed 
shareholders would. 
Private benefits of control. The amount of the private benefits of control is 
thus a significant component of the analysis, as it has a direct impact on the 
anti-takeover effect of the mandatory bid rule. It has been the subject of a 
certain number of studies. Although the precise figures may be subject to 
debate, they give a broad indication as to the possible levels of private benefits 
of control in different countries. For instance, the figures in Table 12 have been 
computed (Zingales and Dyck, 2004).  
Table 12. Value of private benefits of control 
Country Value (%) 
US 
Germany  
UK  
France 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Spain 
Finland  
Sweden 
Denmark 
4 
7 
7 
8 
Portugal 
Italy  
Austria 
Czech Republic 
Brazil 
20 
37 
38 
58 
65 
Source: Authors; Zingales and Dyck (2004). 
In several countries, the value of private benefits of control may thus be 
significant enough to make the mandatory rule a powerful anti-takeover 
device.  
                                                        
21 The private benefit of control refers to the power of a controlling shareholder to use 
corporate resources for its private advantage. 
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5.2 Transposition 
Dynamics of transposition. The mandatory bid rule existed in many member 
states before adoption of the Directive. In 4 out of 22 member states (Cyprus, 
Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), no mandatory bid rule existed 
prior to the transposition of the Directive, and in 5 other member states the rule 
has been amended in connection with the transposition of the Directive. 
Generally the Directive has helped to improve protection of minority 
shareholders by lowering the threshold, specifying the triggering events, 
requiring control over the price and setting out time periods within the bid 
processes.  
5.2.1 Definition of control 
Flexibility. The Directive has granted member states a large degree of flexibility 
in the definition of ‘control’. As a criterion for defining control, member states 
use either the crossing of a specified threshold, the acquisition of de facto 
control, or a combination of both criteria.  
Crossing a specified threshold 
Success of the ‘threshold’ approach. With the exception of Estonia, all member 
states provide for a specific threshold of voting rights or shares carrying voting 
rights that must be met or exceeded. This is generally considered the simplest 
method of defining control, although, to be meaningful, it must come with a 
number of exemptions (such as the ‘larger shareholder’ exemption, which 
provides that a shareholder crossing the specified threshold does not need to 
launch a mandatory bid if there is a shareholder with a larger holding). 
Concentration on 30% and 33% and the issue of de facto control. Although the 
Directive grants flexibility to the member states in the determination of this 
threshold, in most member states the threshold is either 30% or 33%. This 
convergence is interesting, as there is no ‘magic’ in these numbers. Whereas the 
33% threshold may, in some cases, correspond to the blocking minority for 
decisions subject to super-majority vote, the 30% level has no specific 
justification. Compared with the ‘hard’ control level of 50%, it is low. Yet, if it 
is meant to prevent acquisition of de facto control, it is often too high, since 
companies with a widespread shareholding and an average turnout ratio at 
general meetings of 50% or less may be controlled with 25% of the voting 
shares. One manner of addressing the de facto control issue is the ‘Hungarian 
method’, which is described in Box 4. 
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Box 4. The Hungarian method 
In Hungary, two thresholds have been introduced and the holdings of the other 
shareholders are taken into account. A person must launch a mandatory bid if 
he or she  
 acquires (directly or indirectly) more than 33% of the voting shares or voting 
rights (regardless of the shareholdings of others); or  
 acquires (directly or indirectly) more than 25% of the voting shares or voting 
rights in an offeree company in which no shareholder other than the offeror 
holds more than 10% of the voting rights. 
The ‘creep-up’ issue. A shareholding between 30% and 50% does not give 
its holder the certainty that it will retain control of the company forever. Such 
shareholders are thus left with uncertainty, as a result of which they may be 
tempted to ‘creep up’, i.e. to move from 30% to 50% without triggering a bid. 
There are two approaches to address this issue:  
 The restricted increase approach. Some countries provide that any 
acquisition of shares – or of a certain quantity of shares over a certain 
time period – above the 30% (or 33%) threshold will give rise to a 
mandatory bid. Examples of such additional percentages and relevant 
time periods include  
- France – 2% of shares or voting rights within 12 months; 
- Greece and Italy – 3% of voting rights within 12 months;  
- Ireland – 0.05% of voting rights within 12 months; and 
- the UK – one share (which means that any acquisition triggers a 
mandatory bid). 
Yet these rules have different functions, for instance, 
- in France and Greece, which have a large number of blockholders, 
the rules allow blockholders to slowly increase holdings. Large 
blockholders thus retain some freedom to increase their 
participation and the market has ample time to be informed; and 
- in the UK and Ireland, where shareholding is more widespread, no 
leeway is granted. 
 The 50% threshold approach. If the ‘magic’ figure is 50%, the easiest way to 
address the issue is to set a second threshold at the 50% level. This has 
been done by Portugal and Finland. Poland has followed a similar 
approach, but with a second threshold set at 66%. 
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Acquisition of actual control 
Compliance with the Directive. The Directive requires a threshold to be 
considered when determining whether control has been taken. However, this 
may leave the door open to use of the notion of actual control coupled with a 
presumption of control set at a certain threshold, as well as the use of a 
threshold combined with other criteria.  
Reference to actual control. Only Estonia refers to the notion of actual 
control. Two member states, Denmark and Spain, combine two alternative 
criteria: either crossing a specified threshold or holding actual control. 
Summary view 
The definition of control used in the various member states is shown in Tables 
13 and 14. A synthesised map is presented in Figure 5.  
Table 13. Definition of ‘control’ 
Threshold Actual control Mixed (both threshold 
and actual control are 
provided) 
30% 33% or 1/3 Second threshold 
Estonia: There is a 
presumption of dominant 
influence if i) a person 
holds a majority of the 
votes represented by the 
shares (i.e. 50% +1); or ii) a 
person, being a 
shareholder of the 
company, has the right to 
appoint or remove a 
majority of the members 
of the management or 
supervisory board; or iii) a 
person, being a 
shareholder of the 
company, has sole control 
over a majority of the 
votes pursuant to an 
agreement entered into 
with other shareholders; 
or iv) a person has 
dominant influence or 
control over the company 
or the possibility of 
exercising it. 
Denmark: The acquirer 
controls 50% of the 
voting rights through a 
holding or pursuant to an 
agreement and thereby 
holds a controlling 
influence, controls the 
financial and operational 
aspects of the company 
pursuant to the articles of 
association or an 
agreement, controls the 
majority of the members 
of the board of directors, 
or owns more than 1/3 of 
the voting rights and 
exercises a controlling 
influence over the 
company. 
 
Spain: The acquirer 
obtains 30% of the voting 
rights or appoints more 
than half of the board 
members within 24 
months. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
UK 
Greece 
Hungary 
Luxembourg 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Finland 
(50%) 
Poland 
(66%) 
Portugal 
(50%) 
Source: Authors. 
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Table 14. Additional criteria 
No increase Slow increase Large shareholder 
Ireland (0.05% increase 
above 30% within 12 
months provided that 
a single shareholder 
who holds more than 
50% of the voting 
rights may acquire 
additional securities) 
UK (any increase 
between 30% and 
50%) 
France (increase by 2% in capital or 
voting rights between 30% and 
50% within 12 months) 
Austria (increase by 2% between 30% 
and 50% within 12 months) 
Greece (increase by 3% between 33% 
and 50% within 6 months) 
Italy (increase by 5% between 30% 
and 50% within 12 months) 
Poland (increase by 10% by a 
shareholder holding less than 33% 
within 60 days or 5% increase by a 
shareholder holding more than 
33% within 12 months) 
Spain (increase by 5% between 30% 
and 50% within 12 months) 
Hungary (25% threshold if 
no other shareholder 
holds at least a 10% 
participating interest in 
the offeree company) 
 
Source: Authors. 
Figure 5. Synthesised map of bid thresholds 
 
Note: In Hungary the threshold is 33% voting rights with an additional criterion – a 25% increase if no 
other shareholder holds more than a 10% participating interest in the offeree company. 
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5.2.2 Definition of acting in concert 
A significant issue. The issue of acting in concert is relevant for calculating the 
control threshold. In a significant number of member states, the definition of 
‘acting in concert’ and the question as to whether persons were acting in 
concert, and were thus committed to a mandatory takeover bid, has frequently 
been discussed and has led to various law suits and enforcement decisions by 
supervisory authorities.  
The main definitions. Art. 2.1(d) of the Directive defines “acting in 
concert” as follows: “‘persons acting in concert’ shall mean natural or legal 
persons who cooperate with the offeror or the offeree company on the basis of 
an agreement, either express or tacit, either oral or written, aimed either at 
acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful 
outcome of a bid”. 
According to Art. 10(a) of the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC),22 
acting in concert involves “a third party with whom that person or entity has 
concluded an agreement, which obliges them to adopt, by concerted exercise of 
the voting rights they hold, a lasting common policy towards the management 
of the issuer in question”. 
The concept of acting in concert is also included in the Acquisitions 
Directive (2007/44/EC), although the very broad definition provided in level 3 
guidance of the Acquisitions Directive is not used by member states in 
connection with mandatory takeover bids. This may reflect a willingness of 
member states to use a narrow definition for the purpose of greater clarity and 
foreseeability.  
Two possible approaches. Member states take two different approaches 
with respect to the definition of acting in concert: they either retain a definition 
that is very close to the one in the Takeover Directive or add to this definition 
the concept of concert as defined in the Transparency Directive.  
The Transparency Directive definition does not specifically refer to 
acquisition situations, but envisages concerts relating to the (long-term) 
strategy of the offeree company. In this context, the concert would be the 
exercise of voting rights with a view to applying a certain policy and 
influencing the management and strategy of the offeree company. 
                                                        
22  Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ L 390/38, 31.12.2004. 
60 | CLERC & DEMARIGNY 
Consequently, a concert within this meaning can also occur independently of 
an acquisition, if shareholders already holding shares agree on the strategy. 
Conversely, in member states (such as the UK or Italy) that have opted for the 
definition provided by the Takeover Directive, such concerted parties must 
also acquire additional shares in order to trigger a mandatory bid. Investors 
acting in concert are thus more likely to find themselves in a situation where 
they need to launch a mandatory bid in member states that combine the two 
definitions, such as France, Germany or Spain. 
Shareholder engagement or activism. Some concern has been raised that 
excessively broad definitions of acting in concert may lead to undue 
restrictions on shareholder engagement or activism or other forms of collective 
shareholder action. This issue has been addressed recently in both the UK and 
Italy. The positions these countries have taken serve a similar goal (easing the 
way for collective shareholder action), but the measures chosen are different.  
In the UK, the Takeover Panel has issued a broad statement revolving 
around the key concepts outlined below. 
 Only ‘board control-seeking’ resolutions should be addressed. 
 A resolution is not normally board control-seeking if the directors to be 
appointed are either independent directors or non-executive directors 
appointed to improve the company’s corporate governance.  
 No mandatory bid will be imposed if the parties acting in concert have 
taken steps not to acquire shares, or if they have acquired shares, they 
undertake to dispose of them within an appropriate time period. 
 The following factors would not of themselves lead the Takeover Panel 
to conclude that a concert party had come together: i) discussions among 
shareholders about possible issues that might be raised with a 
company’s board; ii) joint representations by shareholders to the board 
and the agreement by shareholders to vote in the same way on a 
particular resolution at a general meeting.  
In Italy, new Consob regulations exclude a certain number of cases of 
cooperation from the scope of actions in concert. Such cases include 
coordination regarding the appointment of less than half of the board 
members. 
The UK system is thus based on a soft concept (independence of 
directors) whereas the Italian one has chosen a hard notion, which leaves no 
room for interpretation (the proportion of appointees to the board).  
Sales between concert parties. Another difficult issue is the question of how 
to address sales between concert parties. To determine whether this sale 
should trigger a mandatory bid, a fact-intensive analysis is typically 
undertaken, including such issues as whether the member with the largest 
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individual shareholding has changed and whether the balance among the 
holdings in the group has changed significantly. 
5.2.3 Exemptions from the mandatory bid rule 
A high number of exceptions. There are a large number of exemptions to the 
mandatory bid rule that differ significantly among the member states. The 
purpose of these exemptions is to find a balance among diverging interests. 
Some exemptions are discretionary: they may be granted by supervisory 
authorities (acting either pursuant to specific regulations or following a self-
asserted extension of power) or by shareholders pursuant to a whitewash 
procedure. Other exemptions are precisely defined by the applicable laws and 
regulations and they fall within four categories: technical exemptions, 
protection of the interests of the offeror or the controlling shareholder, 
protection of creditors, and protection of other stakeholders. Table 15 
summarises the main applicable cases and provides examples of their use. 
Rationale. Each exemption category has its rationale and its debatable 
cases. For instance, some exemptions, meant to protect the acquirer in 
connection with a real change of control, are debatable, in particular those 
applicable to free transfers within a family or indirect transfers of holdings. 
Mechanisms providing for the protection of creditors may also lead to 
potential circumventions of the mandatory bid rule. Where exemptions 
relating to companies in financially distressed situations are obviously 
necessary, those relating to certain types of corporate transactions require a 
closer review, as their rationale is ultimately linked to the corporate interest of 
the underlying transaction, which is always difficult to assess ex ante. How the 
interests of shareholders are taken care of in these cases should be closely 
reviewed (whitewash procedure, ex ante approval by a supervisory authority 
or by competent courts, etc.). Finally, exemptions that are part of a strong 
defensive mechanism or linked to the protection of a member state’s interest 
should be assessed in light of the pros and cons of the principle of the free 
contestability of control and the specificities (or lack thereof) applicable to 
public entities.  
A specific issue: The voluntary bid exemption. Art. 5.2 of the Directive states 
that the mandatory bid rule is not applicable where control has been acquired 
following a voluntary bid made in accordance with the Directive to all holders 
of securities. The conditions under which member states apply this exemption 
vary. 
In certain member states, any voluntary bid for all the shares of the 
offeree company may qualify (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
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In other member states, only a voluntary bid complying with certain 
requirements may qualify for the exemption, for instance,  
 in Italy, the provisions regarding mandatory takeover bids do not apply 
if the shareholding is acquired as a result of a cash or exchange takeover 
bid on at least 60% of the securities in each category and certain 
conditions are met,23 including a whitewash procedure; 
 in Germany, Greece and Romania, the voluntary bid must be launched 
in accordance with the equitable price rules; and 
 in Spain, an equitable price has to be offered or the bid has to be 
accepted by shareholders (other than the offeror) representing at least 
50% of the voting rights targeted by the bid.  
It is noteworthy that the differences among these requirements are partly 
caused by diverging conditions and requirements for voluntary bids among 
member states.  
Finally, the issue created by the combination of the voluntary bid 
exception and the absence of ‘creep-up’ thresholds between 30% and 50% 
creates a risk of circumvention: an offeror may launch an offer at a low price, 
obtain between 30% and 50% of the offeree shares and then buy additional 
shares up to 51% (or more). The offeror is thus able to acquire the control of the 
offeree without triggering a mandatory bid and at a low price. The Hochtief 
case has illustrated this risk in Germany. This risk may be avoided if applicable 
regulations provide for a compulsory, minimum acceptance condition 
stipulating that, if the offeror does not hold more than 50% of the shares after 
the offer, the offer is deemed unsuccessful. 
  
                                                        
23 In Italy, the conditions are as follows:  
i) the offeror and persons acting in concert with the offeror have not acquired 
shareholdings exceeding 1% (including shares acquired under forward contracts 
maturing at a later date) either in the 12 months preceding the notice to Consob 
disclosing the takeover bid or during the bid period; and 
ii) the bid has been approved by a number of shareholders who jointly own the 
majority of the relevant securities excluding securities held by the offeror, by the 
majority (or relative majority) shareholder if that shareholding exceeds 10%, and by 
persons acting in concert. 
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Exemptions applicable to foundations. In Belgium, exemptions apply to 
foundations acquiring shares for free24 or the acquisition of certificates. In this 
respect, Belgian law provides that if a person acquiring more than 30% of the 
securities carrying voting rights of a company is i) a legal person (e.g. stichting-
administratiekantoor), who is ii) issuing in exchange, with the cooperation of the 
listed company, certificates that entitle the former owner of the securities to all 
future revenues arising therefrom, such legal person does not have to launch a 
bid to the extent that such certificates, within three years of their issuance, can 
at all times and under all circumstances be re-exchanged against the initial 
securities (Art. 52 § 1, 12° Decree). If such free exchange is no longer possible 
within the three-year period, the legal person must launch a bid immediately 
at the conditions (price and so forth) prevailing at that time (Art. 52 § 4 
Decree). 
In the Netherlands, the mandatory bid requirement does not apply to i) 
an independent foundation that acquires control after the announcement of a 
hostile bid as a protective measure for a maximum period of two years, or ii) 
an independent trust office (administratiekantoor) that has issued depositary 
receipts. Although no voting rights are attached to depositary receipts, the 
holders of such receipts may ask the independent trust office (stichting 
administratiekantoor) to give a proxy to vote. The independent trust office may 
refuse to grant a proxy if a public bid has been announced or is made in respect 
of a share in the capital of the company. In the event that an independent trust 
office gives a proxy to vote and (consequently) a holder of depositary receipts 
is able to use at least 30% of the voting rights, it becomes obligatory to launch a 
mandatory bid. The independent trust office itself is exempted from the 
obligation to launch a public bid. 
Main use of exemptions. It is difficult to assess precisely the use of 
exemptions that have been granted, as the information is not always public. 
Based on declarations by supervisors and stakeholder perception, it seems that 
the most commonly used exceptions are voluntary bids, specific transactions 
(such as capital increases or mergers), acting in concert without acquisition, 
absence of real change of control and financially distressed companies. It 
should be noted that acting in concert without acquisition may be considered 
either an exemption to the mandatory bid rule or not being addressed by the 
mandatory bid rule, depending how this rule is interpreted. 
                                                        
24 If the person acquiring more than 30% is a public utility foundation (stichting van 
openbaar nut/fondation d’utilité publique) subject to the Law of 27 June 1921 and is 
acquiring such securities for free (Art. 52 § 1, 10° Decree). 
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Table 15. Exemptions  
 Discretionary exemptions 
1 Exemptions are decided by the supervisory authority. (The change of control was 
linked to exceptional circumstances or it would be inappropriate or unduly 
burdensome to apply the mandatory bid rule under the circumstances.) a) 
2 Exemptions are decided by shareholders (whitewash procedure). b) 
 Defined exemptions 
 Technical exemptions  
3  Certain offeree companies are exempt (e.g. open-ended collective investment 
scheme) 
4  Exclusion procedures c) 
5  Controlling agreements d) 
 Protection of the offeror or the controlling shareholder 
6  There is no real change of control 
7 - The change of control is only temporary 
8 - The change of control was the result of a mistake and/or there was no 
intention to take control 
9 - Existence of a larger shareholder 
10 - Intra-group transaction (no change of the ultimate controller)  
11 - The transaction takes place within the same acting-in-concert group  
12 - The acquisition is small e) 
13 - Financial derivatives f) 
  There is a real change of control 
14 - The change of control did not result from a voluntary act 
15 Disposal of shares by another investor 
16 Changes in the total number of shares or voting rights not caused by the offeror  
17 - The change of control is the result of a voluntary takeover bid 
18 Any voluntary bid for all the shares of the offeree company may qualify 
19 The voluntary bid must comply with certain requirements (for instance regarding 
its price) 
20 - The acquisition is indirect and a ‘substance test’ is applied 
 - The change of control results from a personal event 
21 Inheritance, donation, marriage, divorce  
22 The transaction takes place within the same family group  
23 - A concert is formed but no shares are acquired 
 Protection of creditors. (The acquisition is made upon exercising a financial 
security, such as a pledge.) 
24  Without any other conditions 
25  The acquirer needs to sell the acquired shares within a certain time period 
 Protection of other stakeholders 
26  The offeree company is in a financially distressed situation g) 
  Control was acquired pursuant to specific types of corporate transactions 
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Table 15 cont’d 
27 - Capital increases (with or without preferential subscription rights) or capital 
reductions 
28 - Mergers 
29 - Divisions 
30 - Reorganisations 
31 - Contributions in kind 
32 - Distributions of company assets to shareholders 
33 - Schemes of arrangement h) 
34  The rule is not applicable to certain entities that have acquired control (e.g. 
foundations or issuers of sponsored depositary certificates) i) 
  Protection of state interest and public order 
35 - Privatisation exemption or other state interest j) 
36 - Need to meet statutory obligations k) 
a) For instance, these exemptions may be found in the UK or in Poland. 
b) Some countries take the view that shareholders should be authorised to waive the mandatory bid rule, 
since the rule seeks to protect shareholders. Yet, since controlling shareholders may overrule minority 
shareholders, a whitewash only protects majority shareholders, unless majority or interested 
shareholders are excluded from the vote. A whitewash procedure exists in the UK, subject to approval 
by the Takeover Panel. 
c) Such an exemption applies when the acquirer has acquired enough shares to be allowed to proceed 
with the squeeze-out of minority shareholders, provided that the latter are sufficiently protected by the 
relevant exclusionary rules. 
d) This exemption applies to acquisitions by a person who entered into a controlling agreement or a 
profit transfer agreement with the company, provided that such person effects a buyout of the minority 
shareholders (Germany, Czech Republic). 
e) For instance, the acquisition concerns less than 1% of the voting rights (Cyprus). 
f) In Italy, for instance, if the thresholds are crossed as a consequence of a purchase of financial 
derivative instruments, the purchaser may be exempted if it undertakes i) to transfer the derivatives or 
the securities in excess to non-related parties within six months, and ii) not to exercise, during the same 
period, the voting rights in excess of the crossed threshold. 
g) This category includes all kinds of financial distress. Accordingly, any capital increase, merger, 
reorganisation or contribution in kind (etc.) applied in connection with a financially distressed situation 
may fall within this ‘financially distressed’ category. 
h) In the UK and Ireland, a scheme of arrangement is a compromise or arrangement between a company 
and its members and is therefore generally only used in recommended bids where there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a competing bid. Court-sanctioned schemes of arrangement bind all the 
shareholders within a class and have stamp duty and tax advantages over a public bid. Schemes require 
approval by a majority in number representing at least 75% in value of the shareholders voting at the 
relevant meeting. 
i) This exemption may be found in Belgium and in the Netherlands. 
j) An example of such an exemption exists in Greece, where a person investing in the privatisation of a 
state-owned company may be exempted. This exemption enables the Greek State to benefit from the full 
control premium without sharing it with minority shareholders. 
k) When a transaction is completed in order to meet specific statutory obligations, the acquirer may be 
exempted from the requirement to launch a mandatory bid (Czech Republic). 
Source: Authors. 
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5.2.4 Price determination 
Principles set forth in the Directive. The mandatory bid must be launched at an 
equitable price as defined in Art. 5.4 of the Directive. The following principles 
apply to the equitable price: 
 Minimum price. As set out by Art. 5.4 of the Directive, this price must 
correspond to  
[t]he highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or 
by persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period, to be 
determined by member states, of not less than six months and 
not more than 12 before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
be regarded as the equitable price. If, after the bid has been 
made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the 
offeror or any person acting in concert with him/her purchases 
securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall 
increase his/her offer so that it is not less than the highest price 
paid for the securities so acquired.  
 Potential adjustments. According to Art. 5.4 of the Directive, member 
states may authorise their supervisory authorities to adjust the price 
referred to in the first paragraph of Art. 5.4 in certain circumstances and 
in accordance with criteria that are clearly determined. 
 Type of consideration. The offeror may offer consideration in cash, 
securities or a combination of both. Where the consideration offered by 
the offeror does not consist of liquid securities admitted to trading on a 
regulated market, it shall include a cash alternative. The obligation to 
provide a cash alternative also applies where the offeror has, during a 
reference period of not less than 6 and not more than 12 months, 
purchased cash securities carrying 5% or more of the voting rights in the 
offeree company. 
 General transposition. Art. 5.4 of the Directive (equitable price criteria) has 
been transposed in all the member states. Differences exist, however, in 
connection with the price determination. Such differences relate to the 
reference made to previous acquisitions and to additional criteria used to 
determine the equitable price. 
Reference period. The criterion used by the Directive is the highest price 
paid for previous acquisitions by the offeror or other concerted persons during 
a reference period that may not exceed 12 months. Certain member states (for 
example the UK, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, France, Romania and Austria) 
refer to a 12-month period, whereas a minority of member states (Finland, 
Germany, Greece and Portugal) refers to a 6-month period. 
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Weighted averages. Several member states25 use an additional criterion for 
the determination of the equitable price, which is the (weighted) average stock 
exchange price of the shares of the offeree company during a reference period 
varying from 30 days (Belgium) to 12 months (Romania). The weighted, 
average stock exchange price takes into account the volumes of securities 
traded.  
Indirect acquisition. There is no obvious method to determine the 
equitable price when the mandatory bid is triggered by an indirect acquisition. 
If the acquired holding company has no assets other than the listed shares, the 
price may be calculated on an implicit and transparent basis, i.e. by dividing i) 
the total price paid by the offeror for the securities of the acquired holding 
company by ii) the number of securities of the offeree company held by the 
acquired holding company.  
Multi-criteria approach. Where there has been no previous acquisition by 
the offeror, a multi-criteria approach makes sense, as used for instance by 
Spain. Yet such a method may also be used for all mandatory bids, in which 
case it is a means to secure a higher price for minority shareholders. 
Adjustment of the price by supervisory authorities. Art. 5.4 of the Directive 
provides that member states may authorise their supervisory authorities to 
adjust the mandatory bid price in accordance with criteria that are clearly 
determined. To this end, they may determine a list of circumstances in which 
the highest price may be adjusted either upwards or downwards. Art. 5.4 of 
the Directive provides for four examples:  
 where the highest price was set by agreement between the purchaser and 
a seller; 
 where the market prices of the securities in question have been 
manipulated; 
 where market prices in general or certain market prices in particular 
have been affected by exceptional occurrences; and 
 to enable a firm in difficulty to be rescued. 
Most countries have not transposed all cases, but only some of them. 
Still, this does not appear to have raised specific issues. 
Post-bid adjustments. Some member states, such as Germany, extend the 
automatic bid adjustment to a post-bid period. This rule may disadvantage 
certain shareholders (for instance, hedge funds) who take a position just above 
                                                        
25 For example, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Italy 
(only under certain circumstances). 
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the squeeze-out threshold to prevent its success in an attempt to negotiate with 
the offeror, post-bid, a higher price for the purchase of their shares. This rule 
makes such a post-bid purchase so costly for the offeror that any strategy 
based on such a purchase becomes highly uncertain.  
5.3 Comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions 
Overview. There is no mandatory bid rule in the US. Major non-EU jurisdictions 
that have adopted mandatory or equivalent takeover bid rules have selected a 
variety of thresholds. In some cases, a single threshold is applicable (20% for 
Australia and Canada, 30% for China and Hong Kong, one-third for Japan and 
Switzerland); other countries may apply several thresholds, such as India (15%, 
55% and 75%) and Russia (30%, 50% and 75%). A minority of major non-EU 
jurisdictions have, in addition, applied anti-creeper provisions that allow a 
person to increase his or her holdings by a limited percentage within a 
specified time frame: 2% (Hong Kong), 3% (Australia) and 5% (Canada, India 
and Japan, subject to specific conditions). Some major non-EU jurisdictions 
provide for additional triggers, such as the acquisition of control (India) and 
specific exemptions (such as block transactions in Canada, when the price paid 
does not exceed 115% of the market price).  
Whitewash procedure. A majority of the major non-EU jurisdictions that 
have adopted mandatory takeover bid rules provide for so-called ‘whitewash 
procedures’ permitting shareholders’ meetings to waive the obligation to 
launch a mandatory takeover bid. Such waivers are permitted in certain 
limited circumstances, such as capital issuances (China, Hong Kong), financial 
difficulties (China) or the acquisition of control (India).  
Price. Seven out of eight major non-EU jurisdictions (the US does not 
have mandatory takeover bid rules) set the minimum mandatory takeover bid 
price by reference to the highest price paid by the offeror over a specific pre-
bid time period, ranging from 3 to 12 months (interestingly, Switzerland only 
requires the bid price to be at least equal to 75% of the highest price paid). In 
Japan, there is no requirement to set a minimum price.  
India, Russia and Switzerland in addition refer to some sort of weighted 
average price of the securities over a 60-day to 6-month pre-bid time period. 
Without referring to such a weighted average in the first instance, China 
provides that if the bid price (determined based on the highest price rule) is 
less than the average of the daily weighted average price over the 30 trading 
days preceding the bid announcement, the offeror’s financial adviser must 
justify the offered price. 
Schemes of arrangement. In major non-EU jurisdictions that have been 
exposed to the UK legal system (India, Australia, Canada and Hong Kong), so-
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called ‘schemes of arrangement’ represent an effective alternative to 
recommended voluntary and mandatory takeover bids in order to obtain 
control of a listed public company. They can be described as follows: 
 Description. A scheme of arrangement is a court-approved agreement 
between a company and its shareholders (or creditors, such as lenders or 
debenture holders). Depending on the relevant major non-EU 
jurisdiction, a scheme of arrangement may provide for almost any type 
of transaction or combination of transactions, such as share purchases, 
amalgamations, share redemptions, transfers of assets or share issuances. 
In Hong Kong, for instance, the statutory procedure in practice usually 
involves either the cancellation of all the existing offeree company shares 
and the subsequent issue of new offeree company shares to the offeror (a 
cancellation scheme) or the transfer of all the existing offeree company 
shares to the offeror (a transfer scheme), in return for the issue of either 
cash or offeror shares to the former shareholders of the offeree company. 
 Voting requirements. Schemes require the offeree company to put in place 
a proposal to its shareholders and it must be passed, 
- in India, by a majority in number representing at least 75% in value 
of the shareholders;  
- in Australia, by a majority in number representing at least 75% of the 
votes cast; 
- in Hong Kong, by a majority in number representing at least 75% of 
the votes cast by disinterested shareholders; and 
- in Canada, by a 66% to 75% majority of the votes cast.  
Once approved by the court, the scheme is binding on all shareholders. 
Such court approval usually involves a hearing on the fairness and 
reasonableness of the transaction. Interestingly, in Hong Kong, a scheme 
of arrangement only becomes binding when the number of votes cast 
against the scheme at the court hearing does not account for more than 
10% of the votes attaching to all the disinterested shares. 
The Indian takeover regulations grant an exemption for any transfer or 
acquisition of shares or control over the offeree company that takes place 
pursuant to a scheme of arrangement or reconstruction, including 
amalgamation or merger or demerger under any law or regulation, 
Indian or foreign.  
 Advantages. There are a number of advantages of using a scheme instead 
of a (recommended) takeover bid, particularly 
- the flexibility in structuring a takeover;  
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- the certainty of obtaining 100% of shares on a specified date, 
provided the requisite majority and the court approve the scheme;  
- the threshold for a successful scheme is lower than that for a 
takeover bid (which usually requires between 90% and 95% 
acceptance in the relevant major non-EU jurisdictions before the 
offeror can compulsorily acquire the remaining offeree company 
shares); and  
- a court approves the scheme, which may repel challenges to the 
transaction. 
 Downsides. There are also certain downsides of using a scheme: 
- the duration of the process (lengthy due diligence and negotiation 
phases, mandatory shareholder disclosure, convening of a 
shareholders’ meeting and the application to court); and 
- unlike a formal bid, a scheme does not allow the offeror to adjust the 
terms of the bid quickly. 
US procedures. In the US, several procedures are noteworthy:  
 One-step mergers. A one-step or statutory merger is one in which the 
offeror and offeree company enter into a merger agreement subject to the 
approval of the owners of a majority (or super-majority if required by 
state law or the offeree company’s incorporation documents) of the 
outstanding shares of the offeree company. Rule 14d-1026 does not apply 
to one-step mergers. Yet, to the extent that minority shareholders believe 
that the price being offered by the offeror is below the fair value of the 
shares, but the majority of shareholders nevertheless accepts the bid and 
the merger takes place, state merger statutes give minority shareholders 
(often called ‘dissenters’) the right to petition a court to set a ‘fair value’ 
for their shares. The price set by the court, however, does not necessarily 
need to be the highest price paid by majority shareholders. 
 Two-tier takeover bids. In a two-tier takeover bid, the offeror will make a 
takeover bid to obtain voting control of the offeree company. In a second 
stage or tier, the offeror votes its controlling interest to obtain merger 
approval at a shareholders’ meeting. Typically, the offeree company’s 
shareholders would receive higher compensation for their shares in the 
                                                        
26  Rule 14d-10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that the 
consideration paid to any shareholder for securities must be the highest consideration 
paid to any shareholder for securities tendered in such a bid, and all shareholders must 
have an equal right to elect the type of consideration from among those offered (all-
holders/best-price rule). 
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first tier (takeover bid) than in the second tier (merger). This is the exact 
scenario that is prevented by the mandatory bid rule under Art. 5 of the 
Directive. The corporate statutes of Delaware and most states permit 
majority shareholders to engage in a squeeze-out merger without the 
approval of the minority shareholders. The triggering event for a second-
step squeeze-out merger is that the offeror holds at least 90% of the 
offeree company’s voting shares following a takeover bid or other share 
acquisition programme. 
There are nonetheless some anti-takeover measures that a company can 
use to counter the threat of a two-tier takeover bid. For example, a 
company may add fair price and super-majority amendments to its 
corporate charter. A fair price amendment stipulates that an acquiring 
company must pay a fair price for all of the offeree company’s shares 
that it purchases (although this does not necessarily mean the highest 
price the acquiring company has paid). A super-majority amendment 
increases the necessary majority to approve an acquisition or merger 
from one-half to two-thirds.  
 Appraisal rights. Depending on state law, the offeree company’s 
shareholders who do not tender their shares in a cash takeover bid and 
who do not vote in favour of the merger may have appraisal rights. 
Appraisal rights entitle such shareholders to a cash payment from the 
offeror equal to the value of its shares as determined by a court. It should 
be noted that a court may determine a price lower than the price 
received in the original takeover bid; therefore, even with appraisal 
rights, minority shareholders are not guaranteed a price equal to that 
received during the initial takeover bid. Appraisal rights are rarely 
exercised in the US.  
 Sell-out. In most cases, if an offeror acquires a significant interest in an 
offeree company and has no intention of acquiring the remaining 
interests held by minority shareholders, it is not obliged to do so. A few 
states, however, including Maine, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, have 
‘control share cash-out’ provisions stipulating that if an offeror acquires 
voting shares above a specified threshold, the other shareholders can 
demand that the offeror purchase their shares for cash at a fair price. The 
triggering event for the sell-out procedure is that the offeror has acquired 
at least the following threshold amounts of the offeree company’s voting 
shares: 20% in Pennsylvania, 25% in Maine and 50% plus one voting 
share in South Dakota. 
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5.4 Perception 
Acting in concert (clarity of definition). Stakeholders have diverging opinions 
regarding the clarity of the ‘acting in concert’ definition. Two-thirds believe 
there is enough clarity and one-third is of the opposite view. Disagreement 
also persists on the means to improve the definition. Among the stakeholders 
interviewed, 64% consider that the definition could be improved by redrafting 
the definition contained in the Directive. Most supervisors, however, are of the 
opinion that more guidance should be provided at the EU (86%) level. 
Agreement to create new presumptions of acting in concert. A substantial 
majority of stakeholders suggests that agreements triggering an acquisition of 
control always constitute acting in concert (63%). Also, a majority of 
stakeholders (51%) considers that agreements granting one person a definite 
right to acquire control of an issuer in future should in principle be considered 
acting in concert. There is no agreement among stakeholders as to whether 
agreements granting persons a contingent right to acquire control of an issuer 
in future should constitute acting in concert. In fact, 37% of stakeholders in 
principle favour such a change, whereas 39% are in principle against it. A 
majority of stakeholders believes that three situations should in principle be 
recognised as constituting acting in concert: 
 within the same transaction, if person A and person B act in concert, and 
person B and person C act in concert, all three should be considered to be 
acting in concert (71%); 
 agreements having the effect of replacing board members (57%); and 
 agreements among shareholders that aim at replacing existing board 
members by persons who have a significant relationship with such 
shareholders (70%). 
Easy circumvention of the definition of acting in concert. Although a majority 
of stakeholders considers that the acting in concert rule ‘often’ attains its 
objective (50%), the definition is easily circumvented. A majority of 
stakeholders is of the opinion that the rule is too vague to be enforced (60%). 
This opinion is shared by a majority of supervisors (67%), whereas certain 
issuers state that the rule is too broad and includes situations that should not 
be covered (33%). Finally, investors and intermediaries are generally of the 
opinion that other reasons explain the rule’s failure to reach its objectives. 
Enhanced protection of minority shareholders through the mandatory bid rule. 
A majority of stakeholders agree that the mandatory bid rule protects minority 
shareholders appropriately (56%) and 48% perceived a significant increase in 
the protection of minority shareholders since its transposition.  
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Similarly, stakeholders agree that the discretionary exemptions did not 
weaken the mandatory bid rule and also that the equitable price rule protects 
the minority shareholder interests adequately (59%). The legal remedies that 
are available to enforce the mandatory bid rule are perceived as sufficient by a 
majority of stakeholders (71%). 
Obstacles to acquisitions. Still, 77% of the stakeholders consider that the 
mandatory bid rule constitutes always, frequently or sometimes a real obstacle 
to takeover bids.  
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6. TAKEOVER DEFENCES, CONTROL 
STRUCTURES AND BARRIERS NOT 
COVERED BY THE DIRECTIVE 
This chapter addresses the following questions in particular: 
 Are all defences similar or should they be categorised? 
 How have the board neutrality and breakthrough rules been 
implemented? And how should the change in shareholders’ structure 
affect our understanding of such rules? 
 What types of defences and barriers not covered by the Directive may 
prevent the success of bids? 
 What are the major rules applicable in non-EU jurisdictions?  
Key concepts 
 Defences may be used by managers in a self-serving manner; they may 
also be considered a method to negotiate the bid price. 
 The board neutrality rule is an attempt to prevent such self-serving 
conduct. It is a relative success (15 sample countries out of 22). 
Reciprocity has also been largely adopted. The extension of widely 
dispersed shareholding, the new role of hedge funds and the impact of 
stock options on management call for a fresh view on the relevance of 
the neutrality rule. The breakthrough rule is a failure.  
 Outside the EU, some major markets allow defences to a certain degree: 
mostly the US, but also countries like Canada, Japan and Australia. All 
three of these make use of ‘poison pills’, a defence aimed at avoiding 
value destruction for the company and its shareholders if the bid fails (in 
contrast with such defences as the sale of assets at a discount). If most 
non-EU jurisdictions claim to implement some kind of board neutrality 
rule, the precise meaning of such rule may significantly differ from its 
Directive counterpart.  
 Stakeholders do not consider that the Directive is an obstacle to bids 
with regard to defences. 
In keeping with the findings of the study, Proportionality Between 
Ownership and Control in EU Listed Companies: Report on the Proportionality 
Principle in the European Union, referred to as the ‘One Share–One Vote’ 
study by Shearman & Sterling et al. (2007), pyramids remain a popular 
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mechanism, while cross-shareholdings stay at a low ebb. Both 
mechanisms are perceived as defences not frequently used. 
Other barriers, such as anti-trust or sectoral regulations, remain potential 
obstacles to bids. The situation does not seem to have changed as a 
consequence of the Directive, and non-EU countries have essentially kept 
the same regulations.  
6.1 Objectives and background 
6.1.1 Diversity of objectives 
Various considerations. Reasons to regulate defences include i) their impact on 
the ability to negotiate a higher price; ii) their potentially abusive use by 
managers to protect their own interest without appropriately considering 
shareholders’ interests; iii) their inherent quality (value-destructive or not); iv) 
the role they play in the ability of the board to defend the interests of other 
stakeholders and to prevent team production hold-ups; and v) their potential 
impact on the ‘social control gap’ issue. 
6.1.2 Categorising defences 
Types of defences. One of the key issues in the context of takeover bids is the 
application of takeover defences by offeree companies. These defences may 
prevent a change of control, make takeovers more difficult or costly, or allow 
offeree companies to negotiate higher prices. Takeover defences can be 
classified as ‘pre-bid defences’ and ‘post-bid defences’ as explained below. 
 Pre-bid defences may constitute barriers to the acquisition of shares in 
the company (e.g. share transfer restrictions contained in the company’s 
articles of association) or barriers to the exercise of control at the general 
meeting (e.g. voting restrictions, shares with multiple voting rights).  
 Post-bid defences are put in place once the company has become subject 
to a takeover bid.  
Alternative classification of defences. Another way to classify takeover 
defences is to look, once the bid has failed, at the value of the defence from the 
perspective of the offeree company and its remaining shareholders. Analysing 
the value of takeover defences is relevant in order to assess their impact and 
evaluate how regulation or facilitation of such defences correlate to the 
objectives of the Directive. The categories are identified in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Categories of takeover defences 
Category Examples 
 Value-enhancing  Capital increase, warrants (poison pills) 
 Value-destructive  Crown jewel, a) share buyback 
 Value-neutral 
(no possible ex-ante 
classification) 
 Seeking a white knight, white squire, dividend payout,b) 
sale of treasury shares, Pac-Man defence, c) acquisition of 
assets, bid launched on another company, merger  
a) The crown jewel defence could also be value-neutral depending on the proceeds from the 
sale of the relevant assets.  
b) Assuming that the dividend is substantial enough to discourage the offeror, this defence 
could be value-enhancing for the shareholders and value-destructive for the company, 
resulting in an equilibrium.  
c) So long as the offeror was rational in its decision to launch the initial bid, the Pac-Man 
defence would also be rational. This could potentially result in a value-enhancing merger.  
Source: Authors. 
Value-enhancing defences. A capital increase used as a takeover defence is 
observably value-enhancing for the offeree company and its shareholders, as it 
brings in new cash to the company that may either be used in the company’s 
projects or as distributions to post-bid shareholders. Likewise, insofar as 
issuing warrants (poison pills) gives existing offeree company shareholders the 
right to subscribe to new shares at a discount while also infusing capital into 
the company, such defences are similarly value-enhancing. In addition, poison 
pills are never value-destructive, as their highly deterrent effect results in the 
fact that such warrants are never exercised – their exercise is only threatened. 
Value-destructive defences. Conversely, such defences as share buybacks, if 
they are exercised solely for the purpose of defending against a bid, will likely 
result in a value reduction for the offeree company and its shareholders and 
are thus value-destructive. A crown jewel defence is generally value-
destructive to the extent that the disposed assets were strategic or sold at a 
discount. 
Value-neutral defences. The value of other defences cannot be categorised 
in advance; it depends on an analysis of fact-specific considerations, including 
the economic rationality of the decisions that are made. 
Variables that affect value. Clearly, it is difficult to accurately categorise 
any defence as absolutely value-enhancing or value-destructive because such 
valuations ultimately depend on the outcome of a particular defence for the 
company. In many cases, the overall value of a successful defence may be 
affected by such variables as the rationality of the board, market conditions 
and incentives unrelated to normal business practice.  
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6.1.3 Provisions of the Directive 
Provisions relating to takeover defences. Since member states have traditionally 
had fundamentally differing approaches to takeover defences, the way to treat 
such defences constituted a key issue in reaching a compromise necessary to 
adopt the Directive. The final compromise provides for a board neutrality rule 
(Art. 9 of the Directive) and a breakthrough rule (Art. 11 of the Directive) that 
member states are allowed to apply or not (Art. 12 of the Directive). Even if a 
member state decides not to make these rules mandatory, it cannot prevent 
companies from applying them on a voluntary basis. In this case, the decision 
to voluntarily apply the rules must be adopted in turn by the shareholders’ 
meeting and can be reversed in the same manner. Furthermore, the reciprocity 
exception (Art. 12.3 of the Directive) allows member states to authorise 
companies applying the board neutrality rule and the breakthrough rule to 
cease applying them against an offeror who is not subject to the same rules in 
his or her country, and thus to ‘retaliate’ against such an offeror. 
6.2 Transposition 
6.2.1 Board neutrality rule  
Description. The board neutrality rule (Art. 9 of the Directive) relates to post-bid 
defences. It provides that during the bid period, the offeree company’s board 
must obtain the authorisation of the shareholders’ meeting before taking any 
action that may result in the frustration of the bid. This rule may facilitate 
takeover activity by limiting the board’s power to raise obstacles to hostile 
takeovers.  
Implementation. A large majority of sample countries (15 out of 22) have 
transposed the obligation for companies to apply the board neutrality rule. 
Most of these sample countries already provided for a board neutrality rule 
prior to transposition of the Directive. A majority of the sample countries (12 
out of 22) have also adopted the reciprocity rule. The details of the 
transposition are as follows: 
 Transposition by member states. Among the sample countries, 15 out of 22 
(Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,27  France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania,28 Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK) 
impose the board neutrality rule. 
                                                        
27 The board neutrality rule is transposed in a non-binding legal framework. 
28 The board neutrality rule is only transposed for voluntary bids, not for mandatory 
bids. 
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 Pre-existing board neutrality. In 12 cases, the board neutrality rule pre-
existed the transposition of the Directive (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK). The board neutrality concept was new in three 
countries (Cyprus, Finland and Greece). A few sample countries 
transposing the board neutrality rule (France, Italy, Spain29 and Portugal) 
introduced the reciprocity rule. 
 Reciprocity opt-in. The majority of sample countries (12 out of 22), 
including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, provide for 
reciprocity. Each allows the offeree company not to apply the board 
neutrality rule where the offeror is not subject to these rules. 
 Passivity opt-out with reciprocity opt-in. Seven sample countries do not 
apply the board neutrality rule but provide for reciprocity (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Poland). 
In these member states, the reciprocity rule is rarely used, as only 
companies that have opted-in (a rare occurrence) are subject to the 
reciprocity rule. 
Default neutrality rule with opt-out (Italy). Italy has adopted a specific 
system that is worth mentioning: the default neutrality rule with an opt-out 
option at the company level. Pursuant to Art. 104 of Italy’s Consolidated 
Financial Law, the passivity rule is mandatory for Italian companies except in 
case of express derogation in the articles of association. Apparently, the 
companies in Table 17 have so far used the opt-out option. Most of them are 
controlled by blockholders. 
Table 17. Italian companies that have opted out of the board neutrality rule 
Company name Market value (in € million) 
Fiat S.p.A 8,232 
Banca Carige S.p.A 2,660 
YOOX S.p.A. 510 
Marcolin S.p.A. 273 
Tamburi Investment Partners S.p.A. 202 
AcegasAps S.p.A 190 
EL.EN. S.p.A. 53 
Mondo Home Entertainment S.p.A 11 
Meridie S.p.A. 7 
Nine companies, total market capitalisation  12,137 
Source: Authors. 
                                                        
29 Reciprocity is only enforceable against non-Spanish companies. 
PART I. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND SURVEY | 79 
 
Rationale for the board neutrality rule. The rationale for the board neutrality 
rule is stronger in situations in which the share capital is dispersed among 
several shareholders, as it is more difficult to acquire control of companies in 
which a blockholder holds a substantial proportion of the share capital, at least 
where such a blockholder is not favourable to the bid. A significant increase in 
the number of widely held companies was observed in Continental Europe 
between 1996 and 2006. The UK, historically, has had dispersed shareholdings 
in 90% of its companies. In Germany this figure has increased from 26% to 
48%, in France from 21% to 37% and in Italy from 3% to 22%. In the light of 
these developments, the rationale for reinforcing the board neutrality rule may 
be regarded as stronger today than before. 
The new role of pro-offeror hedge funds. Since the board neutrality rule was 
first proposed as part of the draft Directive, the way in which it was meant to 
be implemented has changed, due to the role hedge funds now play during 
bids. In companies with a dispersed shareholding, the balance of power has 
thus been further shifted in favour of the offeror over the company, which 
might not be in a position to defend itself against the bid. Indeed, “hedge funds 
acting as arbitrageurs will favour the bidder and seek to secure the success of 
the bid, by accepting it and voting against defensive measures, if asked to do 
so” (Davies et al., 2010, p. 2). 
As a result of this unforeseen situation, the price received by the offeree 
company shareholder may not be optimal, and more generally, bids having 
negative economic consequences may succeed more easily.  
This can be remedied through the suspension, in general meetings where 
there is a vote on defences, of voting rights of shareholders who acquired their 
shares after the bid was announced, thus excluding hedge funds that invest in 
companies once a bid has been launched. 
‘Toothless’ defences. It should also be noted that defences requiring 
support by the general meeting of shareholders after the bid has been launched 
significantly weaken the ability of boards to resist a bid. The effect of such a 
requirement is that the success of a bid becomes staked on the question of 
whether shareholders of the offeree company believe that their incumbent 
board can improve on the bid, either by negotiating a higher price or by 
making profitable improvements to the company (which in practice cannot be 
evidenced within the bid period). This effectively renders the defence toothless 
as a mechanism for an offeree company board to resist a hostile bid.  
The impact of compensation. An academic study in the US drafted by 
Professors Kahan and Rock (2002) has examined the impact of management 
compensation packages on bids. It states that “both greater use of stock options 
and greater restrictions on takeover defences make it more likely that an 
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unsolicited bid will be consummated, but managers are likely to favour the 
former over the latter”. When stock options vest upon change of control, the 
management is likely to promote the success of a bid. Such contractual 
arrangements thus create an inherent pro-bid bias. The situation regarding 
neutrality can be summarised as in Table 18.  
Table 18. Neutrality 
 Neutrality 
  Yes No 
 
Yes France, Greece, Italy, a) 
Portugal, Spain b) 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
c) Hungary, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland 
Reciprocity    
 No Austria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
d) Ireland, Romania, e) 
Slovakia, Sweden, UK 
 
a) Subject to the opt-out in the bylaws. 
b) Neutrality applicable to non-Spanish companies not subject to the passivity rule in their 
country of origin. 
c) Modified neutrality rule. 
d) The neutrality rule has not been transposed as such in Finland, as the Finnish Companies 
Act included provisions before the transposition of the Directive that were deemed to be 
sufficient with respect to the passivity rule. Nevertheless, the non-binding Helsinki 
Takeover Code provides further guidance with respect to the passivity rule. 
e) For voluntary bids only, not for mandatory bids. 
Source: Authors. 
6.2.2 Breakthrough  
Description. The breakthrough rule (Art. 11 of the Directive) neutralises pre-bid 
defences during a takeover. This rule reiterates certain restrictions (e.g. share 
transfer or voting restrictions) during the takeover period and allows a 
successful offeror to easily remove the incumbent board of the offeree 
company and to modify its articles of association. Based on the principle of 
proportionality between capital and control, this rule overrides multiple voting 
rights at the general meeting authorising post-bid defensive measures as well 
as at the first general meeting following a successful takeover bid. 
Breakthrough rule. Only one member state in the sample countries 
transposed the breakthrough rule (Estonia), but there is no reported case that 
the rule has been used so far. France and Italy have transposed the 
breakthrough rule partially. In France, the limitation of voting rights provided 
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in the articles of association of a company subject to a takeover bid are 
suspended for the first general meeting following the closing of the bid if the 
offeror, either alone or in concert, holds capital or voting rights in excess of 
two-thirds of the offeree company. In Italy, limitations to voting rights 
applicable to previously state-owned companies are, in certain cases, 
suspended following a bid, and shareholder agreements are restricted. In 
Estonia, the provision transposing Art. 11.5 of the Directive requires the offer 
document to set out the compensation to be offered if the offeror has, at the 
closing of the bid, acquired at least 75% of the share capital carrying voting 
rights.  
Compensation in the event of breakthrough. In some countries, applicable 
provisions require the price paid to the shareholders to be reasonable or 
equitable (such as in Austria, the Czech Republic or Slovakia for example). In 
other countries, such as Hungary, the minimum amount of compensation has 
to be defined in the articles of association of the offeree company. Also, in 
certain EU jurisdictions, the relevant supervisory authority is competent to 
review challenges to the fairness of the price offered in exchange for the 
removed rights or to determine the amount of the equitable compensation (for 
instance in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland or the Netherlands). 
Criticism. It could be argued that the breakthrough rule may violate the 
principle of shareholder decision-making, which is used to validate the 
principle of board neutrality. Furthermore, even if the breakthrough rule were 
to be applied by a company in practice, its authority could be inconsistent in 
that some divergences from the one share–one vote rule are covered, whereas 
others – such as preferred shares, double voting rights, golden shares or 
restricted shares – are not (Geens and Clottens, 2010, p. 21). It has also been 
suggested that if the breakthrough rule were made mandatory, companies 
wishing to keep the same voting structures could simply reorganise their 
corporate structure into a pyramid structure. This is supported by the example 
of Belgium, where following the introduction of the one share–one vote rule in 
1934 there was an increased emergence of pyramids (Geens and Clottens, 2010, 
p. 17).  
6.2.3 Other defences 
Continuing debate on defences. The complexity of takeover defence regulation is 
increased by the continuing debate around defensive mechanisms, which 
remain popular both within and outside the EU as evidenced by the flux of 
new defences being created. Some examples of these new defences are listed 
below. 
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 Defensive measures of formerly state-owned companies. For instance, Italian 
laws authorise state-owned companies to use defensive measures 
including the following: 
- national interest and state participations are protected30 mainly by 
means of i) ‘golden share’ rights and ii) limitations of shareholdings 
held by private entities; and31  
- poison pill-type defences for companies in which the state has a 
qualifying participation.32 In particular, such companies are allowed 
to issue, in favour of one or more shareholders, shares and financial 
instruments granting the right to request the attribution of new 
shares or financial instruments with voting rights.33  
Art. 3 of the Italian Legge sulle Privatizzazioni, however, as amended by 
the Implementation Decree, 34  provides that articles of association of 
formerly state-owned companies (operating in strategic fields) that limit 
holdings are not operative if the relevant limits are crossed following a 
takeover bid that results in the offeror holding more than 75% of the 
voting share capital (thus working on a ‘mini-breakthrough’).  
 Tender offer warrants. Under French law, the issuances of tender offer 
warrants are allowed to create a threat of dilution of the offeror’s equity 
holding and voting interest in the offeree company. The vote of the 
offeree’s general meeting of shareholders deciding the potential issue of 
tender offer warrants may be held prior to the bid. The authority granted 
to the board of directors to issue tender offer warrants is valid for a 
maximum period of 18 months, but may not be applied against an 
offeror who is subject to the board neutrality rule and the breakthrough 
rules in his or her country. The vote may also take place during the bid 
period, however, in which case the authority may be used against any 
offeror, irrespective of whether the reciprocity exception applies or not. 
This mechanism, which is always subject to shareholders’ approval, has 
                                                        
30 Legge sulle Privatizzazioni [Privatisation Law], Law Decree No. 332 of 31 May 1994 
(converted into Law No. 474 of 30 July 1994), as amended.  
31  Such limits have been included, in particular, in the articles of association of 
companies in which the state, also through the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, owns a 
controlling shareholding.  
32 Finanziaria 2006, Law No. 266 of 23 December 2005.  
33 Such a provision de facto grants an offeree company in which the Italian State holds a 
share the right to realise a capital increase through which the public entity shareholder 
can increase its participation. 
34 Legislative Decree No. 229 of 19 November 2007.  
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been designed to empower offeree company boards to negotiate a higher 
bid price.  
 Poison-pills redemption clause. In Finland, a so-called ‘poison-pills 
redemption clause’ may be introduced in the articles of association of an 
offeree company. The articles of association of several listed companies 
contain provisions imposing an obligation to redeem other shareholders’ 
shares when one party has acquired a certain amount of shares, the 
threshold usually being one-third or 50% of the outstanding shares. Such 
a redemption is usually made according to pricing rules that differ from 
those set out for takeover bids. As the threshold triggering the 
mandatory bid has been reduced to 30%, it is typically set as a condition 
for completion in voluntary bids that the poison pill provision (if any) be 
removed from the articles of association before the bid is completed in 
order to prevent conflicting pricing rules from becoming applicable. 
Preference shares approved by shareholders. The European Court of Justice’s 
case law has suggested that certain preference shares may be valid defensive 
mechanisms if these mechanisms are provided for in the company’s articles of 
association. In the Volkswagen case,35 the court in Luxembourg decided on 23 
October 2007 that preference shares allotted to the German government 
contravened the EC Treaty because they had been granted to the government 
under the Volkswagen law (the Volkswagen law provided for the capping of 
voting rights at 20%, the fixing of the blocking minority at 20% and the right 
for the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony each to appoint two 
representatives to the supervisory board). The European Court of Justice 
nonetheless specified that these provisions would not have been contrary to 
the EC Treaty had they been provided for in the company’s articles of 
association. This specific clarification by the European Court of Justice 
indicates that even where such preference shares may act to frustrate a bid, 
they are permitted provided that they have been approved (by a vote required 
to amend the articles of association) or acquiesced to by shareholders (through 
the purchase of shares in a company with a pre-existing preference share 
provision in its articles of association).  
6.3 Control structures and barriers not covered by the Directive 
Cross-shareholdings. Cross-shareholdings refer to the situation that occurs when 
company X holds a stake in company Y, which in turn holds a stake in 
                                                        
35 Case C-112/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany 
[2007], ECR I-8995. 
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company X. This may create specific links between companies that may, in 
certain cases, serve as a basis for defence strategies. Cross-shareholdings are 
efficient in this respect if they are for an amount that is sufficiently significant 
(at least 5%) and if they are part of a larger, strategic alliance. Otherwise, cross-
participations may be unwound if the price offered in the bid is high enough. 
Generally speaking, under most legal systems, refusing to offer shares held as 
cross-shareholdings in a takeover bid offering a reasonable premium added to 
the market price may be deemed contrary to the company interest or the 
fiduciary duties of directors. This is why, where cross-shareholdings may have 
been used in the past, especially in France and Germany, they have become 
much less frequent. 
Pyramid structures. A pyramid structure refers to the situation that occurs 
when an entity (a family) controls a corporation that, in turn, holds a 
controlling stake in another corporation. This process can be repeated a 
number of times. A stake will be deemed to be a ‘controlling stake’ when it 
reaches or exceeds 20% of the voting rights. A pyramid structure may be of 
interest if, through the use of several holdings, the ultimate holder controls the 
final issuer with less capital than it would have required in the case of direct 
control by the issuer. It is a means to keep control with less capital. 
Use. Table 19 shows the percentage of pyramid structures and cross-
shareholdings in the sample countries. It is consistent with the findings of the 
One Share–One Vote study (Shearman & Sterling et al., 2007), which found, on 
average within the EU, that 18% of all sample companies had pyramid 
structures and 2% had cross-shareholding structures. It confirms that on an 
EU-wide basis, cross-shareholdings are not an issue, whereas pyramids remain 
a popular structure. This is consistent with the fact that Continental 
shareholding structures remain to a large extent based on blockholding.  
Table 19. Share of pyramids and cross-shareholding in sample countries (%) 
 Overall Recently listed Total 
Pyramids 18.1 27.5 20.5 
Cross-shareholding 3.5 0 2.6 
Source: Authors. 
Other barriers. Other barriers that have been identified typically include 
anti-trust regulations, sectoral regulations, public funds, co-determination and 
employee ownership. Yet, none of these barriers seems to create strong or 
unjustified obstacles. First, anti-trust regulations deal with competition law 
and the barriers to a bid associated with them are thus justifiable to further 
anti-trust policies and are unrelated to takeover regulation. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that such anti-trust regulations have been used as a takeover 
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defence. Second, although sectoral regulations – such as those relating to the 
banking sector, insurance companies, credit institutions and airline companies 
– can place barriers to a bid, evidence that such regulations have been used for 
this purpose is merely anecdotal. Next, sovereign funds rarely create strong 
obstacles to a bid because the amount of the funds that may be used by 
sovereign funds in this respect is generally too small to significantly affect a 
bid. Finally, instances of employee ownership do not pose a strong obstacle to 
a bid because the level of employee ownership is generally too small to have a 
significant impact. The co-determination model applied, for instance, in 
Germany, Denmark, Finland or Sweden, might eventually also be considered a 
barrier to takeovers. Offerors might indeed fear not being able to control the 
company once it has been taken over and thus be more reluctant to launch 
takeovers on companies organised under a co-determination model. Still, this 
fear is not founded, as in the standard co-determination model, shareholders 
retain the ultimate right to decide. In addition, several studies have found co-
determination to have a positive impact on productivity, which is in the overall 
interest of shareholders. 
Barriers in major non-EU jurisdictions. Many major non-EU jurisdictions 
have adopted specific legislation restricting foreign investments in sectors that 
are considered sensitive, particularly in connection with national security. 
Although major non-EU jurisdictions are tending to loosen restrictions 
applicable to foreign investment, substantial barriers remain in certain 
industry sectors. These sectors include the insurance and banking sector, 
certain commodities, aviation and transportation as well as 
telecommunications, broadcasting and media sectors. In some cases, foreign 
share ownerships exceeding specific thresholds are made subject to prior 
authorisation by a government agency.  
6.4 Comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions 
Defences in major non-EU jurisdictions. The main takeover defences used in the 
major non-EU jurisdictions do not differ significantly from those in the 
member states. In general, most of the major non-EU jurisdictions have some 
form of shareholder rights plan (poison pill) defence to takeovers. In the US, 
the use of traditional defensive measures has declined in the last five years 
because, upon pressure from institutional investors and other activist 
shareholders, a number of US public companies have revoked or purposefully 
let (or both) existing defensive measures expire. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that such defences, even when revoked, may be re-instituted on very 
short notice, at any time, by the board. 
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The board neutrality and breakthrough rules in major non-EU jurisdictions. All 
major non-EU jurisdictions (other than the US) purport to have an equivalent 
rule on board neutrality to some extent, although the meaning and scope of the 
neutrality requirement varies among major non-EU jurisdictions (in Japan, for 
instance, a board may take defensive measures if the offeror is abusive) and the 
neutrality concept differs from the one of the Directive. Some major non-EU 
jurisdictions set out a catalogue of measures that a board may not take, 
whereas others set out such a list in respect of actions that need to be approved 
by shareholders. 
There is no equivalent to the breakthrough rule in any of the major non-
EU jurisdictions.  
6.5 Perception 
Openness of the EU market. Stakeholders largely acknowledge that the 
restrictions imposed by the Directive on takeover defences have contributed to 
the openness of the EU market for corporate control (89%). Takeover defences 
are perceived as having a dual effect. While they at least sometimes prevent the 
occurrence of hostile takeover bids (70% of the stakeholders interviewed), they 
simultaneously, at least sometimes, lead to higher bid prices (77%). 
No evidence of impact. The existing legislation in member states is not seen 
as a significant obstacle to bids by stakeholders: although a high number of 
pre-bid defences are perceived to be used, only a few post-bid defences are 
perceived to be used (among which seeking white knights is predominant). 
Defences existing prior to the Directive generally continue to be available. This 
includes Finnish-style poison-pill redemption clauses. New defences (such as 
tender offer warrants in France) are also available.  
Frequency of takeover bids. A majority of shareholders did not perceive any 
material increase or decrease in the use of defences since the adoption of the 
Directive. This may be linked to the fact that stakeholders perceived the 
Directive as not having a significant effect on the number of bids (40%). 
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7. SQUEEZE-OUT AND SELL-OUT RULES 
This chapter addresses the following questions in particular: 
 What variations exist in the transposition of the squeeze-out and sell-out 
rules?  
 What are the alternative procedures? 
 What is the perception by the stakeholders? 
Key concepts 
 The Directive provides for squeeze-out and sell-out rules pursuant to 
which member states must ensure that following a successful bid made 
to all of the holders of the offeree’s securities, all remaining securities can 
be purchased by the offeror or sold by the remaining shareholders. The 
right to squeeze out minority shareholders (Art. 15 of the Directive) 
allows an offeror that has acquired a very large portion of the share 
capital to acquire the outstanding shares. The sell-out right (Art. 16 of the 
Directive) provides minority shareholders with a counterpart to the 
squeeze-out right: it allows them to force the majority shareholder to 
purchase their shares at a fair price.  
 A limited number of major non-EU jurisdictions does not provide for 
post-bid squeeze-out or sell-out mechanisms. Major non-EU jurisdictions 
that have squeeze-outs or sell-outs (or both) usually refer to a 90% 
threshold in connection with an ownership or acceptance test (or both).  
 Although the Directive apparently provides for a narrow set of choices, 
there is in fact some diversity in the transposition of the rules due to i) 
the choice of a uniform or dissociated 90% or 95% threshold; ii) the 
choice of the acceptance or ownership test, or a combination thereof; iii) 
the practical application of the fair price rule; iv) the potential extension 
of the three-month period; and v) the application of additional 
protections (such as independent experts). 
 The EU rules apply in addition to procedures that existed in member 
states prior to the Directive. Some of these procedures were close to the 
EU squeeze-out, whereas others – such as the British-type scheme of 
arrangement – provided for much broader possibilities. Another way to 
promote a 100% ownership is the ‘cash-out’ merger; however, it does not 
exist in any member state in its pure ‘exclusionary’ form. Finally, the 
German-type ‘enterprise agreement’ is an alternative means to provide 
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full control to a majority shareholder while protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders. 
 Stakeholders appear generally satisfied with the squeeze-out and sell-out 
rules, although the latter (in contrast to the former) are very infrequently 
used. The variety of rules among member states is often perceived as 
problematic. 
7.1 Objectives 
Squeeze-out as a bid-enhancement mechanism. The squeeze-out rule is intended to 
facilitate and increase takeover activity, since forcing minority shareholders to 
exit the offeree company allows the offeror to avoid costs and risks caused by 
such shareholders. As this rule may only be applied following a bid made to all 
of the holders of the offeree company’s securities for all their securities and at a 
fair price, it does not harm minority shareholders. Still, it should be noted that 
the squeeze-out procedure may lead to value-decreasing takeovers, for 
instance when a 100% post-squeeze-out holding allows the offeror to replace 
equity by tax-deductible debt and thus to obtain a public subsidy for a private 
transaction. 
The sell-out as a minority protection. The sell-out rule is the counterpart to 
the squeeze-out rule, as it protects minority shareholders from possible abuses 
by the majority shareholder of the latter’s dominant position. Furthermore, the 
obligation to provide fair compensation may enable minority shareholders to 
obtain a better price for their shares than the one set by a potentially illiquid 
market. This rule alleviates the pressure to tender, as minority shareholders 
will not be likely, if they do not tender, to become ‘trapped’ in a situation 
where they have low liquidity and a high risk of extraction of private benefits 
of control. This generally promotes investment. 
7.2 Transposition 
Dual system. An overall review of the transposition of these rules shows that 
many member states, prior to the transposition of the Directive, applied 
squeeze-out and sell-out procedures similar to those applicable in takeover bid 
situations. In these countries, the triggering threshold may differ from the one 
provided for by the Directive and the price determination may be specified in 
more detail. In countries that provided few specific rules relating to takeover 
bids prior to the transposition of the Directive, the squeeze-out and sell-out 
rules are, by contrast, innovative. The merit of the Directive has been to 
harmonise applicable rules among member states.  
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Alternative procedures. In practice, such alternative procedures as mergers 
or schemes of arrangement may be preferred by the majority shareholders 
seeking to acquire shares held by a minority of shareholders. 
7.2.1 Squeeze-out and sell-out following a bid 
New rules. In connection with the transposition of the Directive, seven member 
states introduced a takeover-related squeeze-out procedure for the first time 
(Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Spain) and ten 
member states introduced a sell-out procedure for the first time (Belgium, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain). Some of the member states that already 
applied squeeze-out or sell-out rights had to amend the pre-existing 
thresholds. As an example, under Irish law, the threshold was increased from 
80% to 90%. Ireland chose to adopt this increased threshold in respect of 
takeover bids alone; accordingly, the reduced threshold of 80% still applies 
with respect to takeovers (not takeover bids) that are not subject to the 
Takeover Regulations. In Italy, the squeeze-out threshold was slightly 
decreased (from 98% to 95%). 
Ownership and acceptance. According to the Directive, member states must 
ensure that an offeror is able to require all the holders of the remaining 
securities to sell those securities in the following circumstances: 
 where the offeror holds securities representing not less than 90% of the 
capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in the offeree 
company (hypothesis A); or  
 where, following acceptance of the bid, the offeror has acquired or has 
firmly contracted to acquire securities representing not less than 90% of 
the offeree company’s capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the 
voting rights comprised in the bid (hypothesis B).  
Hypothesis A refers to the ownership test, which is based on the shares 
held by the initiator at the end of the bid (whether held prior to the bid or 
acquired during or pursuant to the bid). Hypothesis B refers to the acceptance 
test, which is based on the shares acquired (or acquisition of which is firmly 
contracted) in the bid. 
Under hypothesis A (and not hypothesis B), member states may set a 
higher threshold of up to 95% of the capital carrying voting rights and 95% of 
the voting rights. The same threshold applies, mutatis mutandis, to sell-out 
procedures. 
Can the thresholds for sell-outs and squeeze-outs differ? The Directive does 
not specify whether the thresholds for the sell-out and squeeze-out rights have 
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to be identical. The wording of Art. 16 of the Directive is ambiguous and states 
that i) holders of remaining securities after a bid shall be able to require the 
offeror to buy those securities “under the same circumstances as provided for 
in Article 15.2” of the Directive, and ii) that Arts. 15.3 to 15.5 of the Directive 
“shall apply mutatis mutandis”. Art. 16 of the Directive could be read to mean 
that the threshold set by the member states for the squeeze-out must be 
identical to the threshold set under Art. 15.2 of the Directive, or on the 
contrary, to mean that the threshold to be set for the sell-out right must be 
fixed within the same thresholds as laid down in Art. 15 of the Directive, but 
does not have to be identical. As such, it is unclear whether the Directive 
allows member states, for instance, to set the squeeze-out threshold at 90% and 
the sell-out threshold at 95%. As a result, only three member states have 
decided to set different thresholds for sell-outs and squeeze-outs. Table 20 
shows the thresholds that member states have decided to apply. 
Table 20. Squeeze-out and sell-out rules 
 Squeeze-out 
90% 
Squeeze-out 
95% 
Different threshold 
for sell-out 
Ownership Austria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Sweden 
Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, 
Slovakia 
Romania (95%), 
Luxembourg (90%), 
Italy (90% if low 
liquidity) 
Acceptance [Romania],* Spain, 
UK 
[Romania]  
* Romania provides for a squeeze-out threshold of 95% of the voting rights or 90% of the 
share capital and a sell-out threshold of 95% of the voting rights.  
Source: Authors. 
Enhanced protection when there is low liquidity. Italian law provides an 
additional protection for minority shareholders: it allows a sell-out right if the 
offeror holds 90% of the share capital (instead of 95%) in the context of low 
liquidity (unless a float sufficient to ensure regular trading performance is 
restored within 90 days).  
Fair price. The transfer of the minority holdings must take place at a fair 
price (Arts. 15.2 and 15.4 of the Directive). The price shall take the same form 
as the consideration offered in the bid or shall be in cash. Member states may 
provide that cash shall be offered at least as an alternative. Following a 
voluntary bid, in both situations mentioned in Art. 15, the consideration 
offered in the bid shall be presumed to be fair where, through acceptance of the 
bid, the offeror has acquired securities representing not less than 90% of the 
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capital carrying voting rights comprised in the bid. The legal presumptions 
provided by Art. 15.5 of the Directive have been transposed by most member 
states without deviation. In addition, some member states request that either 
the independent directors mandate an independent expert to prepare a fairness 
opinion in relation to the evaluation of the offeree company (Belgium) or that 
in case of a conflict of interest an appraiser be appointed by the offeree 
company (France). 
Enforcement. No specific issues appear to arise in connection with the 
enforcement of the squeeze-out or sell-out rights, other than the evaluation of 
the price and the attempt to extract higher value.  
 Litigation. When the consideration offered in the bid is in cash and the 
squeeze-out or sell-out price is consequently paid in cash, for the same 
amount, within three months of the end of the bid, there is little room for 
litigation. In other cases, however, there is room for discussion and, 
considering the amounts at stake, a high incentive to litigate. This is all 
the more true given that it is not possible to attribute a single price to a 
company – only a price range makes sense. In this respect, under French 
law, the offeror provides the French regulatory authority with an 
independent expert valuation, except if the squeeze-out is made 
following a standard cash takeover bid. The requirements for the expert 
to be deemed independent are high and the work to be performed is 
extensive. 
 Attempts to extract higher value. In certain circumstances, speculative 
investors may acquire a holding just above the 5% or 10% threshold 
(corresponding to the 95% or 90% squeeze-out threshold) to prevent a 
squeeze-out unless they are purchased at a higher price. In such cases, 
the German-type top-up clause for this may provide a solution. 
7.2.2 Alternative procedures 
General squeeze-out and sell-out rules. About half of the member states dispose of 
a general set of rules regarding squeeze-out procedures. In most cases, this 
legal framework existed before the transposition of the Directive. These 
squeeze-out rules provide for a threshold that is often similar to the threshold 
chosen in connection with the transposition of the Directive. Yet, in some 
countries, there may be differences in terms of the characteristics of the shares 
(share capital or voting rights), the level of the threshold (for instance, in 
Ireland, 80% ownership or if the initial holding exceeds 20%, then 75% of the 
outstanding shares) and the procedure. Sell-out rights independent of takeover 
bids also exist in some member states. In Hungary, for instance, a general sell-
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out rule is applicable when an investor acquires 75% or more of the entity 
rights of a company.  
Alternative procedures. In most countries, procedures existed prior to the 
transposition of the Directive, the effects of which were similar to the squeeze-
out or sell-out rule (or both). These include general squeeze-out and sell-out 
rules that are not linked to acquisition of control, along with schemes of 
arrangement, cash-out mergers and (to some extent) enterprise agreements. 
 Schemes of arrangement. A scheme of arrangement is a court-approved 
agreement between a company and its members that can be used to 
effect, among other things, a recommended takeover. This scheme of 
arrangement is available in the UK and Ireland. In both countries, it 
requires court approval and approval by at least a majority in number, 
representing 75% in value, of the members of each class present and 
voting in person or by proxy at the meeting(s) convened to approve the 
scheme.  
 Cash-out mergers. Traditionally, mergers were viewed as a stock-for-stock 
transaction subject to shareholder vote. In effect, they were essentially a 
combination of three transactions: the dissolution of the absorbed 
company, the contribution in kind of its assets by the former 
shareholders of the dissolved company to the absorbing company and 
the issue of shares by the absorbing company to such shareholders as 
consideration for their contribution. This traditional view long ago 
disappeared in the US, where today mergers are seen as shareholder-
approved transactions that may be almost freely structured (leading to 
‘triangular mergers’ and ‘reverse triangular mergers’). In the EU, the 
rules have not evolved in the same way and only a few member states 
provide for ‘cash mergers’. Still, in principle, such mergers may not lead 
to a full payment in cash to the shareholders of the dissolved company 
without their consent. 
 Enterprise agreements (Germany). Under German law, a parent company is 
permitted to enter into an enterprise agreement with its subsidiary, 
pursuant to which the parent company i) issues certain instructions to 
the subsidiary’s management, including instructions that are detrimental 
to the subsidiary, provided such instructions are in the interest of the 
parent group (domination agreement); and/or ii) receives all or a portion 
of the subsidiary’s profits (profit-sharing agreement). The German Stock 
Corporation Act provides for a detailed procedure (including an 
approval by the subsidiary’s shareholders by a 75% majority) and 
various provisions to protect minority shareholders of the subsidiary. 
Minority shareholders of a stock corporation that is a party to an 
enterprise agreement have the right to offer their shares to the parent 
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company at a pre-determined price, for two months as of the date of the 
enterprise agreement. The adequacy of the exit consideration is 
determined on the basis of a valuation involving, among other things, a 
form of discounted cash-flow analysis, the subsidiary’s liquidation value 
and its market price. 
7.3 Comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions 
Overview. Three out of nine major non-EU jurisdictions (China, Japan and the 
US) do not provide for an option to squeeze out minority shareholders 
following a successful takeover bid. Yet, two of such jurisdictions provide for 
alternative mechanisms permitting the exclusion of minority shareholders: in 
Japan, callable shares may be used, while in the US, second-step cash-out 
mergers are also available. Alternative squeeze-out mergers are also available 
in other jurisdictions, such as Switzerland. Major non-EU jurisdictions that 
contemplate squeeze-outs usually refer to a 90% threshold (although this is 
95% and 98% for Russia and Switzerland, respectively) in connection with an 
ownership or acceptance test (or both). Five out of nine major non-EU 
jurisdictions (India, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US) do not provide for 
a minority shareholder right to force the majority shareholder to sell out its 
shares. The threshold taken into account in sell-out procedures is the same as 
that considered for squeeze-outs in the relevant jurisdiction. Such a threshold, 
however, is only taken into account under the ownership test, since the 
acceptance test is not used for sell-outs. In major non-EU jurisdictions, 
squeeze-outs and sell-outs must be performed within a relatively short time 
frame following the bid (usually four months). 
7.4 Perception 
Use of squeeze-outs and sell-outs. The Directive rules on squeeze-out and sell-out 
procedures appear to be clear (68%). The right to squeeze out minority 
shareholders is perceived to be frequently used (60%), whereas use of the sell-
out right is considered less frequent (12%). The fair price rule is seen as 
working adequately in practice (76%). The choice of thresholds is approved 
(82%) with a preference for the 90% threshold (75%). The squeeze-out rule is 
seen as promoting bids significantly (32%) or slightly (53%), while the squeeze-
out rule is not seen as having a significant impact in this respect.  
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8. OTHER ISSUES 
8.1 Disclosure of information 
This section addresses the following questions in particular: 
 What issues are raised by the disclosure regime? 
 Is there a call for improvements?  
Key concepts  
 Disclosure of information is a key component of the Directive. The 
Directive provides for such disclosure in three main forms:  
- pre-bid general disclosures (Art. 10 of the Directive) relating to share 
and control structures that are compulsory for all publicly traded 
companies, irrespective of whether they are presently engaged in a 
takeover bid; 
- bid-related disclosures (Arts. 6, 8, 9.5 and 14 of the Directive) made 
by the offeror or the offeree company (including the opinion of the 
offeree company’s board on the bid) that are triggered by the launch 
of a takeover bid; and 
- country-specific additional disclosures (Art. 13 of the Directive) 
relating to additional disclosures required by a member state beyond 
those articulated in the Directive. 
 Although some of the main disclosure issues in this respect are 
addressed in the Transparency Directive (currently under revision), it is 
worth taking note of some issues regarding i) harmonisation of 
disclosures (including with respect to fairness opinions issued by 
financial advisers to the offeree’s board), ii) the call for an extension of 
the scope of disclosures and iii) compliance, especially in connection 
with issues that are not seen as critical by the markets, but which are 
important to employees.  
8.1.1 Objectives  
Aims of the disclosure requirements. The disclosure requirements aim at enabling 
parties affected by a takeover to make informed decisions. Most of the 
disclosure requirements seek to provide clarification about the ownership and 
control structures of both the offeree company and the potential offeror. 
Information on ownership may be useful for both the offeror and the offeree 
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company, as the offeror can discover barriers to a potential takeover that may 
affect its decision to launch a bid and the offeree company can decide what 
strategy to adopt according to the information gained from the offeror. 
Information on control structures can be a useful tool for the offeror in 
assessing barriers to the potential takeover and determining the control 
exercised over the offeree company. 
 Costs. Providing information carries a monetary and time cost that can 
counter the possible benefits of such information to the parties involved 
(Enriques et al., 2011, p. 731). The nature of disclosures requires the 
preparation and provision of information by both the offeror and the 
offeree company. Such cost factors are taken into account in a company’s 
decision as to whether to launch a takeover bid, and may deter potential 
takeovers if the cost is perceived as being greater than the potential 
benefit. Nevertheless, in most cases such costs are likely to be 
insignificant when compared with the total costs incurred by an offeror 
(i.e. mainly the bid price, but also the costs of financial, legal, strategic 
and public relations advisers). As such, their deterrent effect should not 
be overestimated (except perhaps for unsophisticated would-be offerors 
wishing to acquire a small company).  
 Toeholds. This issue is addressed by the Transparency Directive, which is 
currently under revision, and as such is not explored here. It is worth 
noting, however, that this issue is addressed in the Transparency 
Directive study, 36  the final recommendation of which was full 
transparency and aggregation of total share ownership during the bid 
period, including hidden ownership of (cash-settled) equity derivatives.  
8.1.2 Transposition 
Effectiveness of disclosures. The effectiveness of disclosures is difficult to 
quantify. That notwithstanding, it is necessary to consider the incentives and 
interests involved as well as the realistic distribution and use of the 
information provided. 
Limited number of issues. If we exclude the above-mentioned issues, 
disclosures in the takeover context are mostly uncontroversial from a 
theoretical standpoint. A number of items have nonetheless been identified: 
                                                        
36 See section 3.6.3.2 of the Transparency Directive Assessment Report by Marccus Partners 
(2009), pp. 135-139. 
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 Content of disclosures. Although the bid disclosures appear significant 
already, there seems to be strong support from stakeholders for further 
disclosures. 
 Format of disclosure. Disclosures under the Directive are far less 
harmonised than under other Directives, such as the Prospectus 
Directive (2010/73/EU). It has thus been suggested that an improved 
formatting exercise could be contemplated, with specifications regarding 
language. The use of plain wording and the presentation of key 
information could also be better harmonised. 
 Enforcement of disclosures. To the extent that the information disclosed is 
perceived as significant by the market, enforcement appears generally 
appropriate, as both the offeror and the offeree company are under the 
scrutiny of supervisors and plaintiff shareholders. By contrast, 
information less sensitive for the market may be addressed with less 
care, for instance when such information concerns employment or the 
location(s) of business. ‘Boilerplate’ disclosures tend to become the norm, 
revolving around the idea that no decision has been taken. This 
approach, when it becomes market practice, is a circumvention. 
 Timing of disclosures. According to employee representatives and 
regulators, in many cases the procedures provided by the Directive were 
not followed where employees were concerned. As well as to the above-
mentioned issue, this is due to a tendency to provide information to 
employees too late for it to be useful. This timing strategy was prevalent 
in the UK for a long time until the recent reform of the UK City Code on 
Takeovers, which revised the rule in this respect. 
Information processing and independent review. The Directive provides that 
the offeree company must disclose its opinion on the bid. Yet, no guidance is 
given regarding the process whereby such disclosure should take place. While 
in most countries it is typical for companies to require the assistance of an 
external financial adviser, this is not always compulsory. In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that almost all major non-EU jurisdictions require the 
offeree company’s board to prepare and disclose an opinion on the bid. This 
opinion is usually prepared, either mandatorily or in market practice, with a 
financial adviser or more rarely by an independent board committee (or both).  
Employee protection. The Directive provides for employee protection by 
requiring the disclosure of information that may affect employees. Still, this 
may not adequately protect the interests of employees, as the ultimate decision 
about the bid lies with the shareholders and the board. The interests of 
shareholders are not particularly aligned with employees in the context of a 
takeover and thus disclosure may not provide adequate protection for 
employees. 
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8.1.3 Comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions 
Comparison. With certain limited exceptions, information to be provided to 
shareholders on an annual basis is globally similar to the information 
requirements existing in member states. Information to be disclosed by the 
offeror in the offer document is otherwise identical to the information set out 
by the Directive.  
In all major non-EU jurisdictions except India, the offeree company’s 
board is required to prepare a document stating its opinion about the bid. This 
requirement is similar to the provision in the Directive requiring the offeree 
company to provide its opinion on the bid. In the Directive, however, there is 
no guidance about the process by which the opinion is issued. In most member 
states, companies usually require the assistance of an external financial adviser 
even though it is not always compulsory. In all major non-EU jurisdictions, 
such an opinion is usually mandatory or based on market practice. Most often, 
the opinion is prepared by a financial adviser; it is rarely prepared by an 
independent board committee. The report prepared by the financial adviser 
must be disclosed to the offeree company’s shareholders throughout the major 
non-EU jurisdictions. 
8.1.4 Perception 
Support for broad disclosure requirements. A majority of stakeholders is very 
satisfied with the disclosure requirements set out by the Directive (58%), since 
the disclosure requirements and their enforcement have led to better informed 
stakeholders. Moreover, the takeover bid procedure is generally perceived as 
being sufficiently clear (71%). Nevertheless, stakeholders still show support for 
the adoption of further disclosure requirements: a majority of issuers believes 
that stakeholders would be better protected with a disclosure requirement 
concerning environmental policy (64%) and local business partners (67%). 
Issuers (77%) along with investors and intermediaries (67%) support disclosure 
of the offeror’s commitments regarding such issues as employment, 
environmental policy, research and development, and the location of the 
offeree company’s place of business.  
8.2 Supervisory authority, enforcement and litigation 
This section addresses the following questions:  
 Is enforcement of takeover bid rules effective, in particular with respect 
to guidance and penalties? 
 Are there some procedural rules in non-EU jurisdictions that could be of 
interest?  
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Key concepts  
 Supervisory authorities have a key function in the current re-regulation 
setting. 
 They find that enforcing the rules is generally ‘easy’, except in 
connection with such issues as neutrality and reciprocity. A wide range 
of sanctions and remedies is available in the event that takeover 
regulations are breached. The UK provides a good example of such 
variety, with interesting procedures like ‘cold-shouldering’. At the same 
time, supervisors seem somehow reluctant to use their own powers: they 
issue penalties only rarely and hold mixed views regarding the 
effectiveness of the sanctions they can impose. This conduct may be 
linked to the current low level of takeover activity or may indicate that 
supervisors lack the means to conduct their enforcement mission. 
 Regarding procedure, an interesting system is the one used, outside the 
EU, by the Swiss supervisory authorities. Upon request, the latter grant 
minority shareholders (holding at least a 2% interest) the right to 
participate in the procedure. 
8.2.1 Objectives 
Key component. There can be no regulation without supervision and 
enforcement. This is especially true with regard to a highly sophisticated, 
dematerialised and international structure such as financial markets. The times 
of ‘light touch regulation’ seem essentially gone and there are widespread calls 
for re-regulation. In this setting, the role given to supervisory agencies is 
expanding. 
Effective application of the Directive requires guidance by the competent 
supervisory authorities regarding the clarification of national transpositions of 
the Directive where necessary, which contributes to making takeover law more 
predictable. Moreover, infringements of the transposing regulation must be 
penalised in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner by the 
competent judicial or administrative national authorities in order to ensure that 
the transposition provisions are, in practice, also enforced at the member state 
level.  
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8.2.2 Transposition 
Guidance by supervisory authorities 
Guidance. Substantial guidance is issued in certain member states, such as the 
UK (where it is provided by the Takeover Panel), Ireland and Finland.37 
Supervisors (such as the AMF in France and the BaFin in Germany) issue 
annual reports describing the most important decisions and issues at stake or 
publish other documentation, such as guidance papers or statistics. Where 
decisions are published (e.g. in France), investors receive additional guidance. 
The level of guidance available depends largely on when pre-existing 
takeover law was introduced in the relevant member state. In member states 
with a relatively new takeover law (e.g. Luxembourg or Greece), there is little 
guidance because only a few decisions currently exist. The level of guidance 
also depends on the size of the takeover markets in the respective countries. In 
smaller countries, few cases are at hand. Some countries, such as Romania, 
thus lack precise guidance. 
Cooperation. The Directive has made cooperation between supervisors 
easier, as supervisors of member states are now working on the basis of a 
common framework. The Network of Takeover Regulators established under 
the auspices of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (now ESMA) 
has also provided an effective and useful forum for discussion and the 
exchange of views on best practice. 
Enforcement by supervisors and courts 
Supervisory practice. Generally speaking, supervisory practice appears to be 
satisfactory and no cases of particular leniency or lack of control by 
supervisory authorities have been reported. There are some exceptions, 
reported by stakeholders: i) in Greece, the current available framework of fines 
is not deemed adequate for protecting minority shareholders; ii) in Poland, the 
mandatory bid rule can be too easily circumvented (e.g. through capital 
contributions); and iii) in Romania, enforcement appears sometimes difficult as 
individuals or entities obliged to initiate mandatory takeover bids fail to 
comply with this obligation. 
In addition, in some countries, the practice of imposing fines does not 
appear to be very harsh. 
                                                        
37 In Finland, there is the particularity that the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority 
issues “Standards”, that is, guidelines that are partly binding and partly 
recommendatory.  
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Specialised courts. The quality of transposition and compliance with 
takeover bid rules depends also on the opportunity to challenge the decisions 
of the supervisory authorities. Some member states have introduced a specific 
competence of a higher civil law court for appeals against decisions of the 
supervisory authority, in order to concentrate specific knowledge on takeover 
bids in one court (e.g. in France, with the Court of Appeal of Paris; in Belgium, 
with the Court of Appeal of Brussels; and in Germany, with the Higher District 
Court of Frankfurt). 
Practice of enforcement. In almost all member states, no increased litigation 
has been observed following the transposition of the Directive. In some 
countries this may be explained by the fact that the takeover law is recent or 
the total number of takeovers is low (e.g. Luxembourg, Estonia, Austria), and 
in others because the Directive did not fundamentally change the existing legal 
framework (e.g. the UK, France, Germany). 
Sanctions 
National sanctions. According to Art. 17 of the Directive, the member states are 
competent to determine the sanctions to be imposed for infringements of the 
national transposing law. Member states must take the necessary steps to 
ensure that the national transposing law comes into effect. The sanctions thus 
need to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The way in which 
enforcement is ensured in the UK is generally given as an example. Box 5 
provides a short description in this respect. 
Box 5. Enforcement in the UK 
If the Hearings Committee finds a breach of the Code or of a ruling of the Panel, it 
may take the following actions:  
 issue a private statement of censure;  
 issue a public statement of censure;  
 suspend or withdraw any exemption, approval or other special status that the 
Panel has granted to a person, or impose conditions on the enjoyment of such 
exemption, approval or special status, in respect of all or part of the activities to 
which such exemption, approval or special status relates;  
 report the offender’s conduct to a UK or overseas regulatory authority or 
professional body (most notably the Financial Services Authority, ‘FSA’) so that 
such authority or body can consider whether to take disciplinary or 
enforcement action; and  
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 publish a Panel Statement indicating that the offender is someone who, in the 
Hearings Committee’s opinion, is not likely to comply with the Code. The rules 
of the FSA and certain professional bodies oblige their members, in certain 
circumstances, not to act for the person in question in relation to transactions 
subject to the Code, including dealings in relevant securities requiring 
disclosure under the Code. This is known as ‘cold-shouldering’.  
In the last five years (2006–11), the Panel has issued three statements of public 
censure and 35 statements of private censure (of which 9 were market-related, 18 
related to the conduct of the persons concerned and 8 related to a failure to consult 
the Panel). One cold-shouldering statement has been issued (in 2010). This is only 
the second time that such a statement has ever been issued by the Panel. 
Available measures. Measures available for private enforcement of the 
transposing law include the voiding of share purchases concluded in breach of 
the transposing law, in particular without launching a mandatory bid; the 
forfeiture of voting rights acquired or held in violation of the mandatory bid 
rule (e.g. Germany, Italy); and damages claims for shareholders or other 
stakeholders. In most member states, administrative sanctions and fines can be 
applied in case of infringement of certain provisions of the transposing law, 
e.g. infringement of the mandatory bid rule, omission (publishing a bid lacking 
content) or failure to respect minimum price requirements. The amount varies 
among the member states. In Germany, fines may amount to €1 million, while 
in Italy, the maximum that may be claimed for failing to launch a mandatory 
bid can equal the entire price that would have been payable under the 
mandatory bid rule. 
Penalties for violation of guidance issued by supervisors. Most supervisors 
state that penalties are never issued (63%). Regarding their deterrent effect, 
50% have no opinion and 38% think that penalties have no such effect. This 
may be linked to the fact that takeover activity has been low, so occasions to 
issue penalties have been few. 
8.2.3 Comparison with major non-EU jurisdictions 
Enforcement in major non-EU jurisdictions. It is in general difficult to assess the 
enforcement of takeover regulation in non-EU jurisdictions. While major 
markets (such as the US) seem to have substantial compliance procedures in 
place, the enforcement of takeover bid rules purporting to protect shareholder 
interests appears in certain non-EU jurisdictions to be unsatisfactory and 
offerors achieve the success of the bid by circumventing such rules or taking 
advantage of rules that are not bid-related. In Russia, for instance, rules that 
are not bid-related but which are applicable to special shareholder meetings 
102 | CLERC & DEMARIGNY 
and insolvency proceedings as well as the scope of business management 
decisions appear to facilitate the circumvention of shareholder-protective 
takeover bid rules.  
Swiss shareholder involvement. In Switzerland, minority shareholders may 
participate in the procedure. Since 1 January 2009, shareholders holding, 
directly or indirectly, 2% or more of the voting rights in the offeree company 
(so-called ‘qualified shareholders’) may be a party to takeover proceedings 
before the Swiss Takeover Board within five trading days of the publication of 
the offer document, or if the first order by the Swiss Takeover Board regarding 
the bid is published before the offer document (for example, orders relating to 
the pre-announcement), after publication of such an order. 
Qualified shareholders, if they have not applied to obtain legal standing 
and have yet to participate in the proceedings, may also file an appeal with the 
Swiss Takeover Board against the first order issued by the Swiss Takeover 
Board on the bid within five trading days of publication of such an order, if 
published prior to or together with the offer document. 
Participation. Upon admittance, qualified shareholders may participate in 
the proceedings, access the Takeover Board’s file and challenge the Takeover 
Board’s order before the FINMA (Swiss Financial Market Supervisory 
Authority). 
8.2.4 Perception 
Competence of supervisors. Most stakeholders consider that it is sufficiently clear 
which supervisor is competent to supervise takeover bids (93%) as well as 
squeeze-outs (84%) and sell-outs (93%). Supervisors mostly agree that the rules 
and principles set out in the Directive are easy – or even very easy – to enforce, 
with some exceptions, such as the rules regarding neutrality or reciprocity. 
No significant increase in litigation. A majority of stakeholders did not 
perceive a significant increase in litigation since the transposition of the 
Directive, and stakeholders who did perceive an increase say that this is linked 
to the enhanced awareness of stakeholders concerning their rights (73%). 
 103 
9. MAPPING THE POTENTIAL REFORMS 
his chapter presents a number of potential reforms that could be 
undertaken to improve the regulatory framework for takeover bids in 
the European Union. It builds on the expertise of the authors and is not 
part of the report delivered to the European Commission. It has been added to 
this edition to stimulate the discussion on how potential reforms could be 
articulated and their likely impact on the market for corporate control in 
Europe. 
Considering the various objectives of the Directive, the conflicting 
economic results of the assorted rules and the diversity of interests to protect, it 
is difficult to propose a single set of well-articulated reforms. Instead, this 
chapter presents a series of proposals based on premises articulated from both 
economic and corporate governance standpoints (giving the broadest possible 
meaning to these terms) and attempts to outline measures that are both precise 
and, when considered separately, consistent. 
The proposals discussed in this chapter may be useful in furthering 
several objectives, among which are EU integration, the promotion of bids, a 
reduction of the ‘social control gap’ and the protection of shareholders’ and 
other stakeholders’ interests, including employees. 
9.1 Major reforms 
9.1.1 Mandate the board neutrality rule or breakthrough rule, or 
both 
Rationale. Making the board neutrality rule and breakthrough rule mandatory 
was the original intent of the European Commission when first proposing the 
Directive. Mandating a single rule would promote unity and market 
integration, although the net economic impact of such a reform is unknown 
and its result could exacerbate the ‘social control gap’ issue. A reform in this 
area may come in a strong form or in three weaker forms.  
Strong form: Remove optionality 
Background. Removing optionality is a proposal that could be based on the 
following premises: i) from a corporate governance standpoint, it is linked to 
the shareholder primacy theory and the finance standpoint; ii) it is based on 
the belief that strong harmonisation would yield better results than freedom of 
T
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contract; and iii) from an economic standpoint, it is based on the premise that it 
is better to have more bids at a lower price than the reverse. 
Debate. Mandating neutrality is likely to reopen the debates that took 
place in 2001, as its premises have not changed. In addition, some critics have 
argued that many member states’ legal systems in place before the Directive 
already prevented directors from acting contrary to the interests of the 
shareholders, and that actually, the board neutrality rule is an unnecessary 
redundancy. This reform is nonetheless supported by the fact that 15 sample 
jurisdictions out of 22 have introduced the neutrality rule. Mandating the 
breakthrough rule appears even more difficult, as almost no member state has 
introduced it. Furthermore, introducing such a rule would also create the risk 
of incentivising companies to make more extensive use of non-regulated pre-
bid defences, such as pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings. Finally, 
there is no obvious appetite on the part of stakeholders of the Directive for 
such a reform, as generally speaking, they believe that boards do not have too 
much power to frustrate bids and that there are sufficient possibilities to break 
through defences. 
Weaker forms  
 The board neutrality rule as the default rule 
Rationale. It has been suggested that the Italian regime be introduced into 
the Directive, thus making the board neutrality rule the default rule 
subject to a periodic opt-out decision by an ordinary majority at the 
general meeting of shareholders.38 This version of the board neutrality 
rule would remove the member states from the decision-making 
process39 and confer the power of making the decision to the general 
meeting. It has been argued that the default rule should favour the party 
for which it is harder to achieve the required vote, therefore the decision 
of opting into the board neutrality rule or not should rest with the 
company. This premise may be the subject of discussion, however. The 
analysis was originally made in the US, where shareholders’ power is 
lower than in the EU. This reform would not be a neutral one, as it 
would set “default rules that tilt on the side of more contestability (in 
management-controlled companies) and on the side of more shareholder 
protection (in companies with a controlling shareholder)” (Enriques, 
2009, p. 16). 
                                                        
38 See Davies et al. (2010), p. 19 and Enriques (2009), p. 16. 
39 Idem. 
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Debate. As a ‘weak form’ of a ‘major reform’, this proposal is likely to 
rekindle the debate of 2001. As stated by its proponents, this reform is 
not neutral: member states that have introduced the board neutrality rule 
are likely to ask for a possibility to opt out from this opt-in rule, so that 
companies within their jurisdiction are not allowed to opt out. The other 
member states may resist this reform as a ‘back door’ introduction of 
neutrality.  
 Remove reciprocity 
Rationale. Another option is to remove the reciprocity exception. This 
rule is not based on a microeconomic basis. As a result, it has been 
criticised for its inconsistency, as the wealth potentially created by a 
combination of two companies does not depend on the application (or 
not) by the offeror of the board neutrality rule.  
Debate. This reform is likely to bring back the 2001 debates, as several 
member states accepted the Portuguese compromise only because of the 
reciprocity exception. The criticism of the rule, based on a 
microeconomic analysis, would be confronted with two concepts: i) 
reciprocity is based on a macroeconomic analysis of the competition 
among countries and regions, a theme whose importance has grown 
since the 2008 crisis and the increasing role played by sovereign funds; 
and ii) reciprocity is also a concept based on fairness, under the 
traditional principle of ‘do not do to others what you do not allow them 
to do to you’. Reciprocity can also be seen as a way to alleviate the 
perception of the ‘social control gap’ issue through a rule of procedural 
fairness among states. 
 Mandate the board neutrality rule with reciprocity at the non-EU level  
Rationale. This reform would see the board neutrality rule applied only to 
offerors from the EU and not to foreign offerors not applying the 
reciprocity rule. This version of the board neutrality rule would have the 
merit of achieving stronger integration of the European Union, since bids 
from European offerors would not face opposition from the board of the 
offeree company.  
Debate. This reform would be consistent with the ‘social control gap’ 
concern and could receive some support on this basis. It has been tested 
in Spain on a reduced scale, as the reciprocity exception is not applicable 
among Spanish companies. This version of the board neutrality rule 
might be perceived as protectionist by offerors from jurisdictions outside 
the EU and raises concerns in this respect. 
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9.1.2 Remove or amend the board neutrality rule 
Remove the board neutrality rule 
Background. At the opposite end of the scale, the board neutrality rule could be 
removed. Offeree company boards would then no longer be restricted from 
applying defences and the price of the shares could rise substantially during 
the bid. This reform could either be linked to the US management-oriented 
model or to the team production model, depending on how it is structured. 
Rationale: The new role of pro-offeror hedge funds. Since the board neutrality 
rule was first proposed as part of the draft Directive, the way in which it was 
meant to be implemented has changed, due to the role hedge funds now play 
during bids. In companies with dispersed shareholdings, the balance of power 
has further shifted in favour of the offeror over the company, which might not 
be in a position to defend itself against the bid. As a result of this unforeseen 
situation, the price received by the offeree company shareholder may not be 
optimal, and more generally, bids having negative economic consequences 
may succeed more easily.  
Amend the board neutrality rule 
Rationale. A useful distinction may be made between value-enhancing, value-
destructive and value-neutral defences. Authorising value-enhancing (and 
potentially, value-neutral) defences may be a way to preserve the offeree 
company’s interest while granting it a negotiating tool to enhance the bid price 
to the benefit of its shareholders. 
Amendment. This reform would require either a generic definition of 
value-enhancing, value-neutral or value-destructive defences (or all of these), 
or more simply, a list of permitted or prohibited defences (for instance, the 
issuance of tender offer warrants could be authorised and the sale of assets at a 
discount could be prohibited). Such a catalogue of prohibited actions, e.g. 
actions that an offeree company board may not take without shareholder 
approval, exists for instance in Switzerland. 
Debate. This reform would open the way for a middle ground between 
shareholder primacy theories (as bid values would potentially be negotiated 
up) and stakeholder theories (as corporate interest would always be defended). 
It would benefit from abundant case law in the EU and the US regarding the 
intrinsic value of defences.  
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9.1.3 Remove the mandatory bid rule or share the control premium 
differently 
Rationale. The mandatory bid rule promotes equality among shareholders. It 
comes with a high cost, however, as it prevents a number of bids from taking 
place. Removing the rule would thus facilitate takeover bids. As an alternative, 
a partial sharing of the control premium could be proposed. 
Background. In most member states, the mandatory bid rule was not a 
feature of takeover bid regulation before the 1990s. In addition, this rule is 
unknown in the largest financial market, i.e. the US. In a conceptual framework 
where shareholders are ‘owners’ of the company, it is consistent to consider 
that holders of controlling blocks ‘own’ their control rights and should not be 
forced to share the control premium with other shareholders – after all, if 
minority shareholders want to benefit from the control premium, it could be 
argued that they can either buy a block or create one through piecemeal 
purchases on the market. 
Debate. This reform would be likely to create a very significant debate. In 
particular, the meaning of the equality principle would be discussed: Does it 
mean that all shareholders should be treated equally, or that only shareholders 
in the same situation should benefit from the rule? The impact of the reform on 
the average share price could also be discussed, more specifically when there is 
no expectation to share a part of a potential control premium, the share price is 
likely to decrease. Yet, the economic impact of this may be subject to debate: if 
prices go down, returns (i.e. dividends/share price) go up, which is a way for 
companies to lower their capital cost. Finally, as the mandatory bid rule is 
likely to have a positive effect on the bid premium, the proposed reform is 
likely to be approved by stakeholders. 
Alternative opt-out approach. Instead of suppressing the mandatory bid 
rule, it would be possible to promote an opt-out approach. The following 
issues would thus need to be addressed: 
 whether the opt-out possibility is granted to all EU companies or if each 
member state is allowed to decide whether companies may opt out; 
 whether companies are allowed to opt out before any bid is announced 
(a ‘cool’ opt-out) or only after such an announcement (a ‘hot’ opt-out); 
 which procedures are applicable (and in particular whether blockholders 
and interested shareholders may vote and at which majority); and 
 whether the opt-out procedure leads to a full or partial exemption or 
sharing of the control premium. 
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On a comparative basis, it may be noted that shareholders of Swiss 
companies have the option to amend the articles of association in order to 
discard the duty to make a mandatory bid. Still, the decisions of competent 
Swiss authorities have clarified that this option may not be used as a 
whitewash procedure by being applied solely in view of a specific transaction 
or shareholder. 
Combining the opt-out procedure with improved regulation of private benefits of 
control (PBCs). According to some studies, PBCs are a significant issue 
(Zingales and Dyck, 2004). PBCs generally come in two forms: one that is 
acceptable (synergies) and one that is not (undue transfers of wealth). It is 
generally acknowledged that PBCs lack in transparency and are therefore 
difficult to assess. One way to address the issue would be to link transparency 
to the PBCs and the sharing of the control premium. The mechanism could 
work as follows: 
 Each year, blockholders could disclose their level of PBCs. This amount 
would be the subject of a special report audited by the statutory auditors 
of both the blockholders and the controlled company. 
 When PBCs are based on related-party transactions (which should 
constitute the majority of all PBCs), appropriate procedures should be 
followed for their approval (as such procedures already exist at the 
national level or could be enhanced pursuant to new EU regulations). 
 When a blockholder has thus disclosed PBCs for a certain period of time 
(for instance, three years), the portion of the control premium 
corresponding to a three-year average of these PBCs could be kept by the 
blockholders when control is transferred to a third party. 
This mechanism would thus enhance transparency and control in the 
interest of minority shareholders. The details of the computation of PBCs 
should obviously be sufficiently specified and harmonised. 
9.1.4 Grant appropriate powers to ESMA 
Rationale. Improved harmonisation of EU legislation regarding takeover bids 
could have an attractive effect on international investors looking for simplicity 
and predictability. In this respect, ESMA could be attributed a broader 
competence, especially regarding “the rulemaking for present blanks” 
(Wymeersch, 2011), (for example Art. 14 of the Directive or the squeeze-out 
and sell-out rights) and the “coordination of national rules and practices” 
(idem). Indeed, similar to the framework put in place with the Directive on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (2011/61/EU), ESMA could be 
awarded the competence to issue guidance and recommendations. ESMA 
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could additionally be attributed the competence to mediate between the 
supervisory authorities. 
Debate. This proposal would re-open a debate that has been recently 
settled, as takeovers were removed from the scope of ESMA powers when the 
agency was created. 
9.1.5 Change the conceptual framework 
Rationale. Further reforms may be based on a change of the conceptual 
framework on which many assumptions are based. For instance, the bid could 
be made subject to shareholder approval at a general meeting of the offeree 
company’s shareholders.40 The interest of this proposal would be to find a 
middle ground between opposite conceptions of companies. In the 
‘shareholders’ primacy’ view, each shareholder, on an individual basis, should 
be free to decide on the merits of the bid. In the ‘corporate interest’ view, the 
company should be involved in the decision. As the general meeting of 
shareholders is one of the governing bodies of a company, and has a collective 
dimension that facilitates the emergence of an open debate, it could be the 
place to reconcile both views. 
Amendment. As a radical change in the overall approach to bids, this 
reform would be complex to adopt. The proposal could come in a variety of 
forms, depending on the position taken on the following issues: 
 The meeting would need to be convened within a specified time period 
following the announcement of the bid. 
 The agenda of the meeting should include the proposal of the offeror and 
any alternative proposals made by other offerors, white knights or the 
management. 
 Only disinterested shareholders should be authorised to vote, leading to 
the disenfranchisement of the offeror and shareholders having acquired 
their shares after the announcement of the bid. This measure is necessary 
to protect the corporate interests of the company. 
 The required majority should probably be the simple majority rule, as 
the vote would not lead to any forced sales. 
 Any shareholder voting in favour of the bid would, at the same time, be 
required to tender his or her shares into the bid. 
                                                        
40  A reform based on a shareholder vote on takeovers has been proposed by US 
scholars. 
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 Shareholders voting against the bid could be offered the possibility, in 
the event the bid succeeds, to tender their shares into the bid during an 
additional period of time. 
 The vote would lead to the following solutions for the offeree company: 
i) a bid could be rejected (in which case it would be terminated), 
approved under the condition that it is improved, pursuant to 
negotiations with the board, or unconditionally approved (in which case 
the offeror will benefit from the shares that are automatically tendered in 
connection with the approval vote); ii) in parallel, defences could be 
rejected (and thus prohibited), approved under certain conditions of use 
(such as fairness opinions on the price negotiated with the offeror), or 
unconditionally approved; and iii) alternative schemes of the 
management could be either approved or rejected. 
Debate. This proposal could renew the debate on takeover bids. It could 
be seen either as a way to replace existing legislation (which would be a highly 
complex task) or as an addition to existing systems, in which case it would fall 
within the category of ‘enabling legislation’ and would be less subject to 
debate. 
9.2 Technical reforms 
9.2.1 Create true neutrality 
Rationale. What is often called the ‘neutrality’ principle is in fact a very limited 
version of what neutrality could be during takeover bids. A comprehensive 
and unbiased view of neutrality would lead to a number of adjustments to the 
existing principle, to remove both pro-bid biases and undue bid obstacles.  
Compensation 
Compensation that is structurally pro-bid. It is of interest to address board 
member compensation and how such compensation facilitates bids. For 
example, in the US, where the existence of defensive mechanisms does not 
prevent the occurrence of takeover bids, it is hypothesised that this stems from 
boards often being compensated in stock options, which gives them an 
independent incentive to not frustrate the bid. Accelerated voting of stock 
options upon change of control, or any other form of compensation triggered 
as a result of a takeover bid, is likely to have a significant impact on the 
opinion of the beneficiaries of such extra compensation. There are three ways 
to address the issue: 
 Disclosure may not be an appropriate remedy, as this specific 
information is likely to be watered down in the flux of disclosures taking 
place when a bid is launched.  
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 Suspending the ability of the beneficiaries to give their opinion on the 
bid may not be appropriate either, as it hands this role over to 
independent directors (who typically do not benefit from such 
compensation packages); as they are outsiders, with less knowledge of 
the company and a lower involvement in its activities, their advice may 
not be as reliable as that of insider directors.  
 Thus, the ultimate (and more drastic) solution would be to prohibit (or 
limit) the use of such compensation mechanisms. The reform would then 
be a specific type of ‘breakthrough’ arrangement, depriving such a 
compensation scheme of any legal effect in the event of takeover bids. 
For a precise analysis of what may be accepted, the framework of the 
European Commission’s recommendation on remuneration could be 
used. 
Reopening the bid and similar concepts 
Reducing pressure to tender through market mechanisms. As discussed above, there 
is the potential for the ‘pressure-to-tender’ effect to be high in all takeover bids. 
Providing the possibility to re-open the bid would reduce this pressure, given 
that, if a certain percentage of shares were tendered, shareholders who did not 
tender their shares previously would be allowed to do so. The shareholders 
would gain the benefit of exiting the company and the offeror would benefit by 
taking over a larger percentage of shares, making it easier to run the company. 
Examples of this system can be found in France and the UK. 
Voting rules 
Removing the ability for incomers to vote during the takeover bid. As discussed 
above, the use of pro-offeror arbitrageurs has significantly changed the 
meaning of decisions made by shareholders during a bid. Whereas it was 
intended to be a means for existing shareholders to provide their opinion on 
the bid, it has become a means for offerors and arbitrageurs to promote the 
bid’s success. To remedy this, the voting rights of shareholders who acquired 
their shares after the announcement of the bid could be suspended in general 
meetings voting on defences.  
9.2.2 Harmonise key concepts  
Rationale. Without going as far as full harmonisation, it is possible to increase 
regulatory convergence through an improved harmonisation of the following 
key concepts: the definition of control, the definition of ‘acting in concert’ and 
the possible exemption of the mandatory bid rule. 
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Control  
Rationale. The Directive has left the definition of control to member states. 
Some convergence has appeared around the 30% and 33% thresholds, but a 
variety of other mechanisms are used, including second thresholds, increases 
between 30% and 50%, de facto control and other criteria. From an economic 
standpoint, it makes sense to keep a certain level of flexibility, as shareholding 
structures differ in each country. Nevertheless, further convergence could be 
encouraged through a series of measures. 
Possibilities to increase convergence. The following issues could be addressed: 
 Harmonising computation (including cash-settled derivatives). The method 
used for the computation could be harmonised. Reference could be made 
in this respect to the Transparency Directive. The specific question of the 
use of derivatives and in particular cash-settled derivatives should be 
addressed: using derivatives when getting closer to the control threshold 
can never be seen as a coincidence; it is typically part of the control-
seeking strategy.  
 Prevent creep-up control. To avoid significant increases of shareholdings 
once the threshold for a mandatory takeover bid has been exceeded (as 
in the Hochtief case), an anti-creep-up provision could be made 
mandatory. Pursuant to such a provision, a person would be permitted 
to increase his or her holdings only by a limited percentage within a 
specified time frame (e.g. 12 months). Such a provision already exists in 
certain member states and major non-EU jurisdictions, and should thus 
be largely acceptable. In addition, references to a second threshold may 
be introduced (typically 50%). 
The issue of de facto control. If the above-mentioned principles are used, it would 
be tempting to recommend a ban on the use of the de facto control criterion, 
which provides little clarity to the market. Yet, some flexibility remains useful 
in this respect, as control may also be taken through preference shares without 
crossing a 30% or 33% threshold. To prevent de facto control, two options 
remain: 
 The Hungarian method. To address the issue of shareholders obtaining the 
control of a company with dispersed ownership without actually 
crossing the applicable mandatory bid threshold, it might be possible to 
rely on the Hungarian method. Any person could thus be required to 
launch a mandatory bid if he or she acquired more than 25% of the 
voting shares or voting rights in an offeree company in which no 
shareholder other than the offeror holds more than 10% of the voting 
rights.  
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 The Australian method. In Australia, subject to certain exceptions, any 
person increasing voting rights in excess of 20% is obliged to launch a 
takeover bid on all of the remaining shares. Thus, this low level 
threshold is an interesting way to prevent the acquisition of de facto 
control. This trigger may be related to the trigger of poison pills in the 
US, which is typically set between 10% and 20%. 
Acting in concert 
Rationale. The definition of acting in concert varies among member states: some 
of them apply the definition set forth in the Takeover Bids Directive, while 
others combine this definition with the one provided in the Transparency 
Directive. In most member states, there is a certain level of vagueness 
regarding the concept. As this issue touches on the ability of cross-border 
investors to coordinate, enhancing harmonisation would be useful. At the same 
time, as any determination of whether a concert action exists is fact-intensive, 
and the potential for fraud and circumvention is high, supervisors must be left 
with enough flexibility. This is why a unified, precise and complete definition 
seems out of reach. Still, some progress could be made through the creation of 
positive and negative rebuttable presumptions. 
Content. A potential reform could be structured as follows: 
 Proposals regarding the content of presumptions should be left to level 2 
legislation, in order to keep sufficient flexibility when market practices 
change. 
 Sufficient discretion should be left to courts and supervisors, in order to 
avoid circumvention. 
 The reform should provide for a principle of full and spontaneous 
disclosure of all relevant facts, by alleged concert parties, including a 
description of all direct and indirect contacts held among them. 
Debate. The main push for harmonisation comes from institutional 
investors wishing to coordinate their action. The debate is thus likely to focus 
on when this coordination results in taking control of the company. The Italian 
position, which provides for a safe harbour when less than half of the board 
members are designated, is an interesting starting point in this respect. It seems 
less prone to circumvention than the UK system, which relies on the notion of 
independent directors to determine whether the appointment of a new slate of 
directors by a coordinated action of shareholders is ‘board control-seeking’. 
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Exemptions to the mandatory bid rule 
Rationale. To the extent that the mandatory bid rule is seen as a significant 
component of the Directive, it would be useful to consider introducing a 
framework for the exemptions that have been adopted by member states. More 
than 35 exemptions exist (the precise count depends on the nomenclature). 
Although most of them appear to be justified, some clarity could be introduced 
through the use of appropriate categories. In addition, a general case of 
exemption could be proposed. 
Proposing a typology. The Directive, through level 2 measures, could 
introduce a list of available exemptions. The list should be based on principles 
in such a way as to leave sufficient flexibility for member states in the 
transposition process, as exemptions may only be granted on the basis of a 
fact-intensive analysis and the potential for circumvention is high.  
Whitewash as a general exemption. A general whitewash exemption could 
be introduced. It would work as follows: to the extent that a majority of 
disinterested and duly informed shareholders approve the granting of an 
exemption at a general meeting of shareholders, such an exemption should be 
automatically granted. Minority shareholders may, in some cases, see an 
interest in the arrival of a new controlling shareholder who can bring value to 
the offeree company. Yet, as this transaction may be impeded by cost reasons, 
only a whitewash procedure could solve the issue. Of course, the new would-
be controlling shareholder should be required to disclose precisely his or her 
intentions regarding the offeree company and any financial (or other) 
arrangements with existing blockholders. 
9.2.3 Enhance protection of various stakeholders 
Rationale. The protection of stakeholders of the Directive may be enhanced, in 
keeping with its objectives and a search for greater harmonisation. 
Enhance disclosure requirements 
Rationale. Stronger disclosure requirements serve the interests of all concerned 
parties – offerors, shareholders, offeree companies and other stakeholders. 
There is thus strong support for further disclosure requirements. The cost of 
such additional disclosures is minimal in the context of a bid. The proposal 
could be structured around amendments to Arts. 6 and 7 of the Directive. 
Addressing enforcement issues. Statements made by the offeror during the 
bid should be adhered to after the bid. There appears to be a general lack of 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms in this respect. This could be addressed 
through three rules: 
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 Requiring a positive answer. Where offerors have a specific intent to act, it 
is already recognised that they should say so. This is not enough, 
however. Where they have no intent, they should also clearly say so. 
 12-month commitments. The statements made by the offeror should be 
valid for a minimum duration of 12 months. Statements for a shorter 
duration, or for an indefinite period of time, are in most cases 
meaningless. Some flexibility should be provided, however, in the event 
that post-bid, new circumstances arise that are material and were not 
foreseeable. 
 Post-bid monitoring of the offeree company. After the bid, the offeree 
company should have a duty to monitor, on an ongoing basis, 
compliance by the offeror with its commitments. As the offeror will at 
this time control the offeree company, the following rules should apply: 
i) the monitoring should be supervised by independent directors, ii) a 
quarterly report should be prepared and publicly disclosed, and iii) 
figures contained in the report (if any) should be subject to an 
independent review by statutory auditors. This self-monitoring process 
under the supervision of independent directors and statutory auditors, 
under the public eye, could be a significant move towards reducing the 
social control gap, which often stems from a disregard by offerors of 
their public commitments. 
New items to be disclosed. Information known to the company regarding 
direct and indirect shareholdings of the company should include any known 
information on long positions, even if such positions result from the use of 
derivatives. 
Enhance protection of minority shareholders 
Rationale. Minority shareholder protection is one of the key stated concerns of 
the Directive. Although the level of protection is already high, it could be 
further enhanced through a series of limited measures.  
Time equality and top-up clauses. After a bid is closed, it does not seem fair 
that an offeror can continue buying shares on the market at a price that may be 
higher than the bid price. As prohibiting such conduct may be considered too 
extreme, an option would be to require the offeror, in such a case and for a 12-
month period, to pay to those shareholders who have tendered the difference 
between the price they received and the price paid after the bid. Such top-up 
provisions exist in some member states (such as Germany) as well as some 
major non-EU jurisdictions (such as Switzerland). 
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Shareholder involvement. Rules favouring shareholder involvement in 
takeover proceedings before supervisory authorities could be introduced. 
Based on the Swiss precedent, shareholders holding a minimum holding in the 
target company could be permitted to become a party in takeover proceedings 
at an early stage.  
Enhance offeree company protection 
Rationale. The Directive acknowledges the need to protect the ability of offeree 
companies to conduct their business without undue disturbances from bids. 
This principle could be enhanced.  
Content. Two measures could be proposed: 
 Maximum duration. The Directive provides for a maximum duration for 
the acceptance of a bid. Yet, offeree companies start being disturbed 
when the bid is announced. This issue may be addressed, as it is in 
certain major non-EU jurisdictions, by setting a maximum time period 
between the announcement of the bid and its opening, thus reducing the 
virtual time period. 
 Put up or shut up. Another option aimed at reducing the ‘virtual bid’ 
period is to introduce a put-up-or-shut-up rule along the lines of those 
existing in the UK or in France. 
Enhance employee protection 
Rationale. Employee protection is addressed in the Directive in a very 
minimalist way and enforcement is poor. A few simple rules could be 
introduced to enhance employees’ rights. 
Content. The following rules could be proposed: 
 Employee representatives. When bodies representing employee 
representatives at group or European levels exist, it is these bodies that 
should be consulted to issue advice, not the employee representatives of 
the holding company. 
 Employee vote. To make sure that employees have the ability to express 
their opinion, employee representatives should be entitled to consult all 
the employees of the offeree company (or group) through an employee 
voting system. 
 Costs. Assessing the bid and its potential impact on an offeree company 
is a complex exercise that requires specific competencies. To the extent 
that employees or employee representatives require expert assistance, 
the associated costs should be borne by the offeree company, insofar as 
these costs are reasonable considering the size of the offeree company. 
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 Consultation process and meeting with the offeror. As bids are always an 
unsettling event for employees, it is better to organise an open debate to 
diffuse fears and address all issues that are on the table. To this effect, i) a 
consultation process could be mandated instead of an information 
process, and ii) employees or employee representatives, such as in 
France, should have the right to hear the offeror before they give their 
opinion (and the offeror should have the obligation to attend the 
meeting). 
 Providing for adequate sanctions. Financial sanctions are a poor deterrent 
when it comes to providing adequate information to employees in the 
context of a bid, as the very high amounts at stake tend to dwarf any 
penalty that may be imposed. In other words, the risk is that companies 
may prefer to pay rather than comply. A solution would thus be to 
provide for i) the nullity of the bid in the event of gross violations of 
employees’ rights in the context of the bid and ii) a quick resolution 
procedure that could take place during the bid to make sure that only 
companies persisting after a court or administrative decision that 
condemns them for their gross violation would suffer the imposition of 
an annulment. Obviously, the nullity sanction could only be used in 
friendly bids, as otherwise the violation of employee rights would be 
used as a defensive tactic. 
 Protecting employees. A more far-reaching reform could be proposed. 
Given that, from an economic standpoint, transferring undertakings or 
acquiring control of a company are similar in many respects, a proposal 
could be made to apply the no-dismissal rules contained in the Directive 
on transfers of undertakings (2001/23/EC) to takeover bids made 
pursuant to the Directive. As a result, a mere reference to the takeover 
could not be used as a legitimate ground to proceed with lay-offs.41  
Debate. This proposal is based on the view that companies are i) legal 
entities where various stakeholders have legitimate interests, and ii) overall 
economic efficiency depends in part on the ability to protect and develop 
investment in firm-specific human capital and avoid ‘hold-up’ problems (as 
described in the team production theory). Those having a different corporate 
governance or economic analysis background may thus oppose the proposal. 
                                                        
41 Art. 4 of Directive 2001/23/EC. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
he Directive has been transposed in all the sample countries and no 
substantial compliance issue has emerged. Although the completion of 
its transposition is recent, and the 2008 crisis makes it difficult to 
compare pre-Directive and post-Directive periods in any meaningful way, 
some conclusions may be drawn from this study.  
10.1 The Directive is at the centre of broader corporate governance 
and economic debates 
Conflicting standpoints. In a reflection on the Directive in a broader perspective, 
the rejection of a first draft by the European Parliament in 2001 may be 
considered a starting point. There are two reasons for this:  
 First, this rejection was the basis on which a compromise was built. The 
compromise is characterised by a high level of optionality, based on i) 
the right for member states to opt out from the board neutrality and 
breakthrough rules (Art. 12), and ii) an extensive right to derogate from 
the Directive (pursuant to Arts 4.5 and 5.4), subject only to compliance 
with a limited number of general principles. 
 Second, the compromise reflected a debate between shareholders’ and 
stakeholders’ positions, as provided for in Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive, 
which states that “an offeree company must act in the interests of the 
company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the 
opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid”. This debate has not 
faded away and is fuelled by corporate governance and economic 
analyses. 
 Before any detailed analysis is carried out, it is therefore critical to 
understand the corporate governance and economic concepts underlying 
the Directive. 
10.1.1 Corporate governance analysis 
Main systems. Three main systems of corporate governance, which basically 
represent three successive stages of corporate governance thinking, are 
relevant when reviewing takeover bid regulations. They are outlined below.  
  
T
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 Traditional view. In the 19th century, when large corporations started to 
develop on a significant scale, there was little debate about corporate 
governance. The relationship between shareholders and employees, 
described as ‘capitalists’ and ‘workforce’, was analysed from a 
philosophical, political and economic standpoint. The main concern was 
the sharing of the surplus, seen as a political issue, not a technical one. 
The time of takeover regulation had not yet arrived. 
 Shareholder primacy view. The ‘agency’ issue in the relationship between 
management and shareholders became a dominant theme of corporate 
governance in the 20th century, with the emergence of a growing number 
of large, listed companies with dispersed shareholders. The main 
question became shareholder control over management – in order to 
prevent the latter, through laziness or theft, from squandering 
shareholders’ wealth. This led to the emergence of the shareholder 
primacy view, which applies a principal/agent theory assuming that 
shareholders are a ‘weak‘ party and is based on the concepts of 
‘alignment of interest‘. Under this theory, pre-bid defences should be 
removed and post-bid defences should be subject to shareholders’ 
approval within the framework of a ‘no frustration’ rule. 
 Team production view. The shareholder primacy view has been criticised 
since the end of the 20th century. At least three criticisms have been 
formulated: i) the shareholder primacy view leads to short-termism; ii) 
shareholders are not in a weak position, especially compared with 
employees; and iii) neglecting other stakeholders creates negative 
externalities. As a result, alternative models have been designed, among 
which the team production theory has emerged. Under this theory, 
shareholders should be prevented from unduly extracting team 
production value in a move that would disincentivise employees from 
making useful firm-specific investments (the so-called ‘hold-up’ 
problem). As a result, management should act as ‘mediating hierarchs’, 
balancing power between shareholders and employees. In the event of a 
takeover bid, the management must be able to act in the interest of the 
company as a whole and, in this setting, to use defences.  
Figure 2 in subsection 3.2.2 encapsulates the views developed above. 
10.1.2 Economic analysis 
Takeovers. The impact of takeovers on the economy is complex and not 
necessarily straightforward. Takeovers can have positive effects on the 
economy by disciplining management and promoting a more efficient 
allocation of resources. Yet, takeovers may also generate negative externalities, 
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due to three economic issues: free-riding, agency conflicts and pressure to 
tender. At the core of these three issues is the problem of asymmetric 
information, and thus the nature of the relationship between offerors and 
shareholders and between shareholders and managers. Still, several aspects of 
the economic theory remain open to different interpretations. Most notably, 
there are conflicting views regarding the question of whether the mandate of 
the management should be shareholder-oriented or company-oriented, in 
other words whether it should maximise shareholder value or protect firm-
specific investments and the long-term value of the company as a whole. 
The Directive. The Takeover Bids Directive strives to balance shareholder 
protection and the protection of long-term specific investments within the 
company. Through its interaction with corporate governance and capital 
market regulations, the Directive has economic effects on multiple areas, such 
as investor protection or the proportionality between ownership and control. 
The specific effects of the Directive, however, crucially depend on the 
prevailing market structure in each jurisdiction, whether concentrated 
(blockholder-based) or dispersed. The effectiveness of regulatory thresholds 
therefore hinges on factoring in these structural elements. Similar takeover 
rules can have diverging effects depending on country-level and company-
level characteristics, which also determine the effectiveness of such rules in 
achieving their original objectives. For instance, diverse legal systems have 
important effects on investor protection and corporate decision-making 
processes. 
Regulatory objectives. In its balancing exercise, the Directive reveals the 
existence of important trade-offs and conflicting objectives. For instance, 
control contestability may induce managers to behave in line with the interests 
of shareholders and maximise share value instead of managerial benefits. At 
the same time, control contestability reduces the incentives of management to 
carry out long-term firm-specific projects, as the pattern of returns may not 
maximise shareholder value in the short term. The contestability of control 
may also reduce the incentives of other stakeholders to commit to the firm, for 
instance in making medium to long-term investments in human capital. 
10.2 Assessing the Directive 
10.2.1 What has changed? 
No radical change. The transposition of the Directive has not led to radical 
changes in the legal framework of most member states. This is due to three 
factors: in a number of countries (e.g. the UK), the Directive prescribed rules 
that had been in existence for a long time; in other countries (e.g. Germany), 
changes were introduced in view of the future adoption of the Directive; and in 
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several other cases (e.g. Italy, Hungary or recently, the UK), the most 
important changes were introduced in reaction to sensitive bids or the 
economic situation, without there being a direct link with the Directive.  
Overall improved harmonisation. Nevertheless, the Directive has led to 
improvements (in view of its stated objectives) that should not be 
underestimated: harmonised rules regarding cross-border bids have been 
adopted; a set of common general principles is applied throughout the 
European Union; a basic set of common disclosure rules applies; and the 
mandatory bid rule, squeeze-out rule and sell-out rule have been introduced in 
all member states. Some smaller member states, which previously had no 
takeover regulations, now have an almost complete set of rules. If 
harmonisation has thus progressed, it should nonetheless be noted that ESMA 
has no coordinating role, which may be seen as an obstacle to more detailed 
harmonisation.  
Overall mapping. A mapping of changes that have been introduced in 
connection with the Directive shows that the legal system is more shareholder-
oriented42 as a result (Table 21). 
Table 21. Mapping the changes introduced by the Directive 
 Significant changes Some changes No significant changes 
More 
shareholder-
oriented 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, [Germany], Greece, 
[Hungary], Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain 
Belgium, Finland  [Germany], 
Romania 
More 
stakeholder-
oriented 
[Hungary], Italy France, Ireland, 
Portugal 
 
Neutral   Austria, 
Denmark, 
Sweden, UK 
Source: Authors. 
 
                                                        
42 Still, whether a system is more or less ‘shareholder-oriented’ is subject to debate. 
Detailed explanations on this table, including as to why some countries appear in two 
different boxes, are provided in chapter 2 of this report. 
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10.2.2 What has worked (or not)? 
Assessment of the main provisions 
Mandatory bid rule. The mandatory bid rule, which is based on UK law, is 
specific to the EU (and to legal systems derived from UK law). It enhances 
minority protection but reduces the number of bids, thus acting as a de facto 
anti-takeover mechanism – a feature that, in the context of concentrated 
shareholding, is in part associated with the existence of private benefits of 
control. 
The mandatory bid rule is perceived as effective, although questions are 
raised regarding some of the (numerous) exemptions that exist, for instance in 
connection with shareholders acting in concert without acquiring shares, 
certain corporate transactions (such as capital increases), and certain entities 
(such as foundations). Stakeholders do not perceive any significant issues 
regarding the exemption for companies in financial distress, which is 
frequently used, or for exemptions coupled with whitewash procedures. Price 
adjustment, although possible, seems to be rare in practice. Some frustrations 
seem to arise from the following areas:  
 the definition of acting in concert, which is viewed as potentially too 
broad by institutional investors; in this respect, it is worth noting the 
detailed rules that exist in the UK and in Italy;  
 the use of cash-settled derivatives to build up an interest in connection 
with a takeover bid – an issue that is currently being addressed in the 
proposed revised version of the Transparency Directive; 
 the propensity to try to obtain de facto control through an interest 
remaining just under the threshold triggering a mandatory bid (e.g. 
29.9% interest), a risk that is specifically addressed by Hungarian 
legislation and is minimised in Australia, where a 20% threshold applies; 
and 
 voluntary bids launched at a low price in order to get slightly above the 
triggering threshold (e.g. 30%), which allows the offeror to increase its 
stake in a second step without triggering a mandatory bid – an issue that 
is addressed in several member states through the use of additional 
thresholds for shares acquired above the threshold triggering the 
mandatory bid. 
Defences. The Directive’s provisions regarding defences present a mixed 
picture: 
 The board neutrality and breakthrough rules are both incomplete rules. 
The former applies only to conduct that is likely to frustrate a bid and 
not to mechanisms that create an inherent pro-bid bias, such as stock 
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options (or other similar types of remuneration) that vest upon a change 
of control, while the latter does not apply to all control-enhancing 
mechanisms, as for instance pyramid structures are outside its scope.  
 The board neutrality rule is a relative success (15 sample countries out of 
22), as is reciprocity (12 sample countries out of 22, with 7 sample 
countries opting out of neutrality and 5 opting in). The breakthrough 
rule, however, is a failure: only one sample country is concerned, and no 
use has been reported. In addition, compensation of ‘broken-through’ 
shareholders remains an issue, as there is no consensus on how such 
compensation should be computed. In addition, some member states, 
such as France and Italy, apply a partial breakthrough rule.  
 The flexibility left to member states on neutrality, breakthrough and 
reciprocity has given rise to creative systems. For instance, in Spain, 
reciprocity exists but is not applicable to bids launched by Spanish 
companies (which raises the ancillary question of what the result would 
be if all member states were to adopt the same rule at the national or EU 
level). In Italy, companies are authorised to opt out from the board 
neutrality rule (which is otherwise mandatory). In France, reciprocity is 
given its full effect through the potential use of tender offer warrants, a 
type of shareholders’ rights plan requiring shareholder approval.  
A comparison of the Directive with legal systems outside the EU shows 
that some major markets allow the use of defences – mostly the US, but also 
countries like Canada, Japan and Australia. All of these countries make use of 
poison pills, a defence for which the interest lies in its effectiveness without 
destroying value for the company and its shareholders if the bid fails (in 
contrast with such defences as sales of assets at a discount).  
In this context, the debates that led to the optionality of the neutrality 
and breakthrough rules have not faded away; the above-mentioned issues 
regarding shareholder value and stakeholder interest, together with the issue 
of the social control gap, remain significant. There is no clear consensus on 
how to move on the optionality and reciprocity issues, and generally speaking, 
there seems to be little appetite to change these rules. This appears to be rooted 
in two factors:  
 At the country level, there seems to be both a fear that there is more to 
lose than to gain as a result of a possible change (this is true for the main 
EU jurisdictions, notably the UK and Germany) and a need to absorb the 
new EU rules stemming from the Directive (this is the case for other EU 
jurisdictions for which the transposition has led to significant changes).  
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 At the level of issuers along with investors and intermediaries, feelings 
regarding defences are mixed. First, such defences are perceived as both 
creating a risk of bid failure and a means to increase bid prices; and 
second, there is a general perception that there are not many possibilities 
for board defences or sufficient means to break through existing 
defences. Regarding barriers to takeovers that are not addressed by the 
Directive, such as pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings, there is 
both a general desire to remove undue obstacles to bids and doubt as to 
whether any measures in this respect would be efficient and not counter-
productive.  
Disclosure regime. A majority of stakeholders is satisfied with the 
disclosure requirements set out in the Directive. This majority also supports 
the adoption of further disclosure requirements. The main concern relates to 
the statements to be made by offerors, particularly, 
 the lack of precision of such statements;  
 the time period during which commitments remain valid; and 
 the absence of appropriate enforcement mechanisms, since typically 
neither the supervisor, the company (or any independent committee 
thereof) nor its stakeholders are in charge of following up commitments 
made by the offeree company. 
Squeeze-out and sell-out rules. The squeeze-out and sell-out rules are 
generally approved. The former are frequently used, while the occurrence of 
the latter seems rare. The 90% and 95% thresholds are generally approved, 
with a preference for the former; in particular, a popular strategy among 
speculative investors seems to be to acquire a 5% (or 10%) interest in order to 
block the squeeze-out and attempt to negotiate a higher price with the offeror. 
Still, solutions exist to limit the risk of not acquiring all shares (an example 
being the German ‘top-up’ rule). The risk may also be avoided by facilitating 
alternative means of acquiring 100% control for cash (such as cash-out mergers 
or schemes of arrangement). 
Overall assessment of the Directive by the stakeholders  
Overall satisfaction. Generally, there is a reasonable level of satisfaction among 
stakeholders regarding the Directive: a majority of stakeholder considers it 
clear, enforcement is not generally deemed to be an issue and the allocation of 
competences between supervisors has not raised practical issues. Furthermore, 
the protection of minority shareholders is seen as having been enhanced by the 
Directive, the disclosure regime is not contested and seems to be essentially 
complied with, and the mandatory bid, squeeze-out and sell-out regimes are in 
substance approved. 
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Employee representatives. Yet one category of stakeholders, employees, is 
not satisfied with the Directive. Employees generally view takeovers as 
creating high risks of lay-offs and voluntary retirements at the level of the 
acquired company, an assessment that is shared by issuers along with 
investors and intermediaries. Employees perceive risks regarding working 
conditions and early retirements, and consider that these risks also exist at the 
level of the acquirer (an analysis that is generally not shared by other 
stakeholders). In addition, they consider that the consultation process is not 
organised in a satisfactory manner and regret the absence of appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms when offerors do not act in compliance with the 
intentions they stated during the bid period. Finally, employees consider that 
the no-dismissal rules contained in Directive 2001/23/EC should be applicable 
to takeover bids, given that from an economic standpoint, transferring 
undertakings or acquiring the control of a company are in many respects 
similar.  
10.2.3 What has been the economic impact of the Directive? 
Assessment of the main provisions of the Directive 
Mandatory bid rule. The mandatory bid rule enhances the protection of minority 
shareholders, particularly in concentrated ownership structures, by forcing the 
offeror to offer the control market premium to all shareholders. The rule may 
have a negative impact on the volume of takeovers, however, as it raises the 
cost of deals ex ante and incentivises incumbent shareholders to increase their 
holdings close to the triggering threshold. Further clarification is needed on 
whether the application of the mandatory bid rule contributes to increased 
shareholder concentration, which would compromise its shareholder 
protection objective. Since the rule shows its effects ex ante, no conclusive 
evidence (ex post) has been found in the empirical analysis regarding the scale 
of the impact of the mandatory bid rule on the market for corporate control. 
Nevertheless, a negative relationship with volumes has been observed and is 
statistically significant. In addition, the harmonisation in the EU of the 
triggering threshold at around 30% has produced a reduction of the average 
size of the initial stake in the company subject to takeover just below this level, 
which suggests a strategic use of the threshold by incumbent blockholders. For 
all these reasons, the effect of the mandatory bid rule in influencing the 
governance and the impact of a takeover can be estimated as ‘high’. 
Ownership transparency. Ownership transparency appears to have a 
beneficial impact on all key objectives of the Directive, and in particular on the 
volume of takeovers and the protection of minority shareholders, since 
potential offerors are able to see the composition of the ownership structure 
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and plan their offer accordingly. This positive effect may disappear where it 
comes to the disclosure of subsequent purchases of shares. The disclosure of 
purchases above a certain threshold makes ‘creeping-in’ takeovers more 
difficult, enhancing shareholder value. At the same time, transparency may 
also discourage takeovers, since it can raise the costs of building up an initial 
stake before launching a takeover bid if the disclosure thresholds are low. 
Overall, the impact on takeover bids of this rule is moderate.  
Squeeze-out and sell-out rules. Owing to their very high thresholds, 
squeeze-out rights and sell-out rights both have a positive but very limited 
impact on the volume of takeovers. The squeeze-out right protects the offeror 
from shareholder free-riding, while the sell-out right strengthens the power of 
minority shareholders, thereby reducing the incentive to increase ownership 
concentration.  
Breakthrough rule. The breakthrough rule could have a substantial 
positive impact on the volume of takeovers and the protection of minority 
shareholders if it managed to eliminate control-enhancing mechanisms. Yet, 
the rule may also create incentives to increase direct control by raising the 
stake in the company, leading to higher ownership concentration. 
Furthermore, it may be arbitraged using alternative mechanisms, such as 
pyramid structures. If coherently devised and consistently implemented, the 
breakthrough rule would produce a very high impact on the ownership 
structure of firms, especially in those jurisdictions where ownership and 
governance are more concentrated. In any case, the limited transposition of the 
rule means that not enough information is available to extract evidence on its 
impact on takeover bids and governance of the company.  
Board neutrality rule. The board neutrality rule may increase incentives to 
launch an offer by removing post-bid defences, thereby increasing control 
contestability, particularly where ownership is dispersed. The empirical 
analysis in this study, however, shows a slight decrease in cumulative 
abnormal returns, which suggests that the board neutrality rule may have 
reduced the potential premium paid by the offeror, since it also reduces the 
extent to which future controlling shareholders may extract benefits from the 
company. Moreover, the board neutrality rule may induce incumbent 
shareholders to entrench before any offer is launched, thereby raising the cost 
of acquiring control for the potential offeror (with an additional impact on 
dispersed ownership structures). The overall impact of the rule is more 
balanced and is thus considered ‘moderate’ (Table 22). 
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Table 22. Impact of takeover regulation (± relationship and intensity) 
Takeover Bid 
Directive rule 
Volume of takeovers Protection of (minority) shareholders 
Disproportionality between 
ownership & control Overall 
impact Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Mandatory bid  – – – + + + + + + High 
Ownership 
transparency 
+ + + 
+ + + – – Moderate 
– – – 
Squeeze-out  + + + – – + + Low 
Sell-out  – – – + + + – – – Low 
Breakthrough  + + + + + + + + + Very high 
Board 
neutrality  + + + + – + + + Moderate 
Source: Authors. 
Overall impact of the Directive 
Empirical analysis. Finally, the empirical analysis performed in this study 
illustrates that the Directive has had an impact on the market for corporate 
control and the economy. Yet, this impact is marginal (with low intensity) and 
is affected by a fragmented transposition across member states and by the 
effects of the still ongoing financial crisis. The market for corporate control 
does not appear to be ‘more contestable’ than before the introduction of the 
Directive. In terms of relations, no overarching conclusions can be reached on 
the basis of this preliminary analysis; however, the results suggest that the 
Directive has had a positive impact on cumulative abnormal returns (and 
indirectly on the volume of takeovers), a positive impact on market 
capitalisation (but no significance), a positive impact on competitiveness and a 
negative impact on financial development. 
Competitiveness. The impact of the Directive on competitiveness and 
growth is limited but consistent with the priorities of the Europe 2020 Agenda. 
A detailed analysis of the contribution of takeovers to competitiveness reveals 
their potential to increase the efficient allocation of resources, but also the 
existence of several market failures and trade-offs. The different provisions in 
the Directive can have mixed effects on competitiveness and growth, calling 
for further reflection as to their individual and joint impact. 
Employment. Ex ante, takeovers have a similar chance of affecting 
employment levels negatively or positively, depending on the business plans 
of the acquirer. Still, in the short term, pressure to recoup the costs incurred in 
the transaction can lead to a reduction of employment levels. The Directive 
protects employees by giving them consultation rights, but the board 
neutrality rule confers the decision-making power on shareholders alone. 
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11. THE ECONOMICS OF TAKEOVER 
REGULATION 
11.1 Introduction 
The second part of this study discusses the economic foundations of takeover 
regulation and the incentives that drive actors along the process, as well as the 
rationales of the Takeover Bids Directive and the role of regulation. In general, 
it illustrates why and when a regulatory framework for takeovers is needed. 
Finally, the study sets forth an empirical analysis of the effects of the Directive, 
done through an econometric analysis. Section 11.2 describes the takeover bid 
process and how transfers of control typically happen. Section 11.3 illustrates 
the market failures that call for regulatory intervention in the takeover bid 
process. The section defines the coordination problems emerging during the 
process and generating failures. Section 11.4 briefly describes the types of 
regulatory tools that can be used to intervene. Chapter 12 goes through each of 
the five key areas of the directive, mapping implementation and showing 
market data, as well as running simple econometric testing to gather general 
evidence on its impact on the market for corporate control. The final two 
chapters (13 and 14) undertake a theoretical assessment of the potential impact 
of takeovers on competitiveness and employment. 
11.2 The takeover bid process 
Takeover. A takeover can be technically defined as a takeover bid to acquire the 
control of a company listed on a public market.43 ‘Control’ is achieved when 
the offeror has acquired enough shares of the offeree company to be able to 
appoint directors to the company’s board (Davies and Hopt, 2004). ‘Control’ 
may therefore be shared by one or more controlling shareholders or exercised 
by the board of directors that represents all shareholders and the company 
(fully dispersed ownership). A transfer of control can be achieved in two ways 
(Bebchuk, 1994; see also Table 23): by means of a private sale of control or a 
public bid to all shareholders. In both cases, the transaction may concern 
shares listed on secondary markets. 
                                                        
43 ‘Public market’ refers here not only to the main market where companies originally 
listed their shares, but also to all secondary markets where shares are actually traded. 
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Table 23. Control transfers 
Sale of control Takeover bid (takeover) 
No coordination problems (bilateral) 
Controlling shareholders–acquirer 
Coordination problems (multilateral) 
Offeror–shareholders–management 
Among shareholders 
Private offer Public offer 
Control premium Market premium 
Low transparency High transparency 
Source: Authors. 
Private sale. A private sale of control is a bilateral negotiation between the 
acquirer and the acquiree (usually the controlling blockholder). Private sales of 
control will take place more frequently in an environment with full or partial 
concentration of ownership and control, where (owing to coordination 
problems) it would be difficult to organise a private sale in a dispersed 
ownership environment. In the case of private sales of control, the acquirer will 
offer a premium that is tailored to the controlling shareholders’ willingness to 
sell the benefits they are able to extract from minorities (so-called ‘private 
benefits of control’ or simply PBCs). 44  PBCs are not necessarily value-
expropriating (e.g. self-dealing); rather, they can also be value-creating, i.e. by 
increasing the utility of the controller without damaging minority shareholders 
or the company’s value (for instance by using otherwise unused internal 
research for productive purposes; Zingales and Dyck, 2004). From a purely 
economic standpoint, PBCs create incentives for value-creating takeovers by 
giving the acquirer additional, measurable benefits from the acquisition 
(Berglöf and Burkart, 2003). Yet the existence of PBCs has led regulators to 
introduce more general principles into the Takeover Bids Directive 
(2004/25/EC), such as the equal treatment of shareholders (Art. 3.1(a)).45  
Public bid. A takeover is a general public bid for all shares of a listed 
company to acquire control of the latter. It is a public bid in which the 
premium over the current share value is the result of market considerations. 
                                                        
44 PBCs are the benefits enjoyed by controllers through the exploitation of corporate 
resources (e.g. self-dealing; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). PBCs can also be calculated as 
the difference between the market price in the tender bid and the price after the 
takeover is completed. In effect, market prices usually go down after a change of 
control as a result of market value discounting the cost of the PBCs that the offeror had 
to pay to the offeree company’s controlling shareholders. 
45  See also the Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe by Winter et al. (2002), p. 1.  
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An additional premium also comes in the form of an “abnormal return”, which 
is the difference between the realised and expected return during the offer 
period (Burkart, 1999). This does not necessarily reflect the market premium, 
but rather the additional benefit brought to the share value by the control 
transfer on its own over a specified time span. Takeovers are intrinsically more 
transparent than private sales of control because the details of the transaction 
are usually disclosed to the market and publicly available to all investors. 
Transparency allows the creation of an implicit auction process, which tends to 
allocate resources to those who value the shares the most. The possibility of a 
competing bid for the offeree company increases gains for offeree company 
shareholders. 
Takeover process  
The takeover process is split into three phases (Tirole, 2006): 
 the building of interest in the company (by purchasing a ‘toehold’) and 
potential set-up of ex-ante takeover defences (by increasing potential 
offerors’ costs); 
 the launch of the takeover bid 
 with a uniform price for all voting shares or a portion of them; 
 with a multi-tiered bid involving different thresholds; 
 reactions to the bid by the offeree company board or shareholders (or 
both) 
 no reactions (friendly takeover); and 
 post-bid defences (hostile takeover). 
In addition to ex-ante and ex-post defences, a public bid may also provoke 
coordination issues among shareholders that may not emerge in a bilateral 
setting. The two main coordination issues are a ‘pressure-to-tender’ problem 
and a free-riding problem.  
11.3 Rationales for takeover regulation 
Rationales 
Takeovers are generally viewed as an important institutional tool to promote 
allocative efficiency through an active market for corporate control (European 
Commission, 2007a; Tirole, 2006; Winter et al., 2002; Burkart, 1999; Romano, 
1992; Manne, 1965). Two classical rationales promote takeovers: 
 the better allocation of resources through the transfer of control to those 
who value the company the most. More allocative efficiency will 
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ultimately reduce the cost of capital. This statement assumes that all 
takeovers are value-increasing, because shareholders will not tender 
shares for a value-decreasing deal; and  
 a tool to address managerial behaviour by threatening managers with a 
change to their status quo (as an alternative to shareholder activism, 
which produces a “disciplinary effect”; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; 
Grossman and Hart, 1982) and the dissemination of good practices and 
know-how. This statement assumes that the market is able to recognise 
poorly performing companies and to replace misbehaving managers 
(even if their failures are only minor), and in particular that share prices 
are always a good proxy of the real value of the company.  
Regulatory framework 
A well-functioning market for corporate control is part of a continuous auction 
process around the company’s value. As a consequence, the regulatory 
framework must create the conditions to stimulate takeovers over time, and so 
lower the costs of capital. Designing a regulatory framework for each phase of 
a takeover transaction may support ex-ante efficiency and the quality of the 
auction process (including the use of defences).  
Market failures  
The negative externalities generated by market failures are another reason to 
regulate takeovers. In practice, market failures stem from the following 
sources: 
 coordination issues among offeree company shareholders (or the 
‘collective action’ problem); 
 empire-building transactions (in which competitors are swallowed); 
 agency problems (shareholders vs. managers, or controlling vs. non-
controlling shareholders); and  
 insufficient investments in firm-specific assets and human capital (Blair 
and Stout, 2005). 
To reduce the negative impact of these failures, corporate governance 
regulation can increase the voice or provide exit rights for those parties 
negatively affected by them. 
11.3.1 Coordination issues 
Coordination among shareholders 
There are two coordination issues among shareholders in a dispersed 
ownership environment: the free-riding problem and the pressure-to-tender 
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problem. Both problems relate to the post-takeover value of the shareholding. 
Figure 6 presents a graphical representation of these. 
Figure 6. Coordination issues among shareholders 
 
Source: Authors. 
Free-riding 
The free-riding problem, first identified by Grossman and Hart (1980; see also 
Cohen, 1991), arises when there is full coordination among shareholders, i.e. 
shareholders have full information about the bid and can coordinate among 
themselves (e.g. because there is a concentrated ownership environment with 
few blockholders) in order to determine ex ante whether the bid will be 
successful. In effect, fully informed shareholders may directly or indirectly46 
coordinate and keep their shares in order to benefit from the ex-post higher 
value, thus increasing transaction costs for the offeror to a level that may 
discourage the launch of a bid (creating a so-called ‘hold-up’ problem). As a 
result, the more shareholders reject the acceptance of the offer, the less benefit 
for the offeror, who may end up with a minority stake in the company. Non-
                                                        
46  Even without talking to one another, shareholders with full information (and 
understanding) will behave in a coordinated fashion in the same direction, since this is 
the best strategy to take with the available information. 
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tendering shareholders thus free ride on the increased post-takeover value that 
the offeror and accepting shareholders are actually generating. This situation 
may discourage any attempt of potential offerors to acquire control. In practice, 
since shareholders cannot be fully informed ex ante47 about the future success 
of a bid (full coordination), the free-riding problem is in fact limited to a 
residual stake of the company, particularly when the offeror has already 
acquired the majority and is looking to take over the remaining stake. Free-
riding can also succeed in a situation where shareholders hold partial 
information; however, the probability that it will succeed is lower, as 
shareholders have fewer chances to coordinate directly or indirectly with other 
shareholders. In such a case, minority shareholders may individually decide to 
hold up the offeror in order to extract a higher payoff. Therefore, in line with 
the principle that shareholders should share the same conditions in a bid (the 
sharing principle, Art. 3.1(a) of the Directive; see also Winter et al., 2002, p. 1),48 
takeover regulation usually applies a squeeze-out rule, which allows the 
offeror to force the remaining shareholders to sell their shares on the same 
terms offered to the other shareholders. Moreover, if shareholders are not fully 
informed, the free-riding problem in the acquisition of a majority stake is less 
significant in an environment in which the private benefits of control are high 
enough to provide incentives for bids with a higher-than-expected market 
premium (see McCahery and Renneboog, 2003). Still, the presence of 
blockholders may facilitate coordination through cooperative behaviour 
practised with a view to extracting greater benefits from the potential bid.  
Pressure to tender 
The second coordination issue, the pressure-to-tender problem, arises in a 
dispersed or concentrated ownership environment when shareholders have 
insufficient or no information at all about the post-takeover value, with no 
opportunity to coordinate their behaviour indirectly or directly. The 
shareholders’ concern is whether to tender, with the risk that a shareholder 
may make a distorted choice and thus suffer unequal treatment. A distorted 
choice would arise in relation to shareholders’ expectations concerning the 
post-takeover value of minority shares (Bebchuk, 1985 and 1987). The causes of 
the problem are twofold. First, pressure to tender may come from insufficient 
information about the bid and the company in question, which may induce 
shareholders to tender because of uncertainty about the post-takeover value of 
                                                        
47 Lack of full information means that shareholders cannot derive from the information 
available the exact probability distribution of future events. 
48 This principle was first elaborated by Jennings (1956) and Andrews (1965). 
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their stake and the impossibility of cooperating. They are only aware of the 
current value of the company and cannot predict the success of a bid with very 
little information. This certainly increases the pressure to tender. Second, a 
distorted choice may result from a partial or two-tier bid (price discrimination), 
which creates uncertainty about the success of the bid and conveys insufficient 
information to produce coordination among shareholders. In effect, a partial 
bid may create a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ for offeree company shareholders 
(Burkart, 1999) and allow the offeror to extract more benefits. Let us take an 
example, which can apply to both a dispersed and concentrated ownership 
environment,49 of when a potential offeror – who may or may not own a small 
non-controlling stake in the company – decides to acquire control of the 
company. The situation is even clearer if we consider that there is no 
controlling shareholder or controlling pact, since otherwise the offeror would 
make a direct bid for the controlling stake. The offeror launches a bid to 
acquire the controlling stake (partial offer), which may be 51% or lower. Let us 
narrow the situation down to two offeree company shareholders (A and B) 
with a non-controlling stake in the company who cannot cooperate. If the bid 
does not succeed, the payoff will be 1 (as the additional, post-takeover, net 
present value (NPV) of future cash flows with no controlling shareholders but 
with increased market appetite after the offer). The bid can only succeed if at 
least one of the shareholders accepts an offer for it, but since the shareholders 
do not have full information, they are not aware and so cannot bargain with 
the offeror (this is particularly likely to happen in a dispersed ownership 
environment). For the sake of simplicity, we consider the marginal 
shareholders, i.e. the last two who are crucial for the transfer of control.50 If the 
bid succeeds, the expected payoff is 2 instead (1 plus an additional market 
premium of 1) for those accepting the bid, and -1 for those who do not tender, 
since the new setting with a controlling shareholder lowers the NPV of future 
cash flows, as we assume the controller will extract benefits from minorities. 
Minorities therefore perceive that the additional 1 is lost, so their payoff is -1. 
Four outcomes will thus emerge: 
                                                        
49  Yet in a more concentrated environment (with blockholders), shareholders may 
cooperate and indirectly share information about the post-takeover value of their stake. 
Therefore, there may be some degree of coordination.  
50 This allows the situation to be illustrated in a less complex fashion; however, the 
results would be the same in the more complex model. 
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1) If shareholder A tenders and B does not, A (first payoff) will get 251 and 
B will get -1, as the additional post-takeover NPV of future cash flows, 
which is negative in comparison with the original payoff when there is 
no controlling shareholder who can extract the private benefits of control 
from minority shareholders.52  
2) If shareholder B tenders and A does not, B will get 2 and A will get -1 
(vice versa). 
3) If both shareholders tender, they will get the premium times the 
probability that their bid will be accepted (p=0.50), as we assume that the 
offeror bids only for what is necessary to gain control. Only one of the 
two will be allowed to tender. If we assume that all shareholders have 
the same information and the same chance to be counted in the takeover 
bid and that no shareholders have a controlling stake, this probability 
should be 50% or below that level for each marginal shareholder.53 
Therefore, p*2 will be 1 or less. Considering that the offeror wants to 
acquire formal control (51%), the expected payoff for both shareholders 
will be p*2 + (1-p)*(-1), which equals 0.50.  
4) If neither shareholder tenders, they will both get 1, as the additional 
post-takeover NPV of future cash flows with no shareholder able to 
extract private benefits of control. 
Therefore, the shareholders need to decide ex ante, with limited or no 
coordination, between ‘tendering’ (T) and ‘not tendering’ (NT). If they 
individually decide to tender, the sum of the two potential payoffs – 
irrespective of the other’s decision – will be 0.50+2, which is higher than the 
potential payoffs if the decision is not to tender (-1+1). Both shareholders will 
therefore choose to tender. As a result, if parties cannot cooperate, they will 
end up with a sub-optimal payoff (TT) (see Table 24). 
                                                        
51 This is basically 1 (50% premium) plus the expected payoff (which the parties do not 
know) of 1. 
52 We do not use expected values for the payoffs ‘tender’ (T) or ‘not-tender’ (NT) 
because we assume, for the purposes of easier illustration, that we are dealing with 
marginal shareholders, i.e. with the decision to tender or not of those two shareholders 
who determine the acquisition of the 51%, whatever stake of the company they own. 
The change of control will occur if at least one of the two tenders. 
53 As mentioned in the previous footnote, to model the game (a prisoner’s dilemma) 
with simple payoffs, we assume that we are dealing with the marginal shareholders, 
i.e. the last two shareholders before the offeror acquires 51% of the company. 
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Table 24. The prisoner’s dilemma 
  A 
  T NT 
B 
T 0.50; 0.50 -1; 2 
NT 2; -1 1; 1 
Note: The first from the left of the two payoffs in each cell is A’s payoff. 
Source: Authors. 
In effect, the dominant decision for both will be to tender anyway and 
therefore the final payoffs will be 0.50; 0.50 (with a total value of 1.00), which is 
a suboptimal equilibrium compared with the common decision ‘not to tender’ 
(NTNT) with a total value of 2. Pressures to tender, in an ‘uncoordinated’ 
environment, lead marginal shareholders (who are determinant for the success 
of the offer) to tender, even when it would be better for them to hold their 
shares in case a chance to access more information arises.  
Solutions 
Solutions to the pressure-to-tender problem can be multiple. First, prohibiting 
partial (or two-tier) bids (e.g. through a mandatory bid rule) will reduce 
pressures, but at a cost. Second, by increasing the flow of information in favour 
of offeree company shareholders, it is possible to reduce pressures to tender 
and thus distortions in the choice of offeree company shareholders. This can be 
achieved in two ways: i) by introducing disclosure requirements to the market 
that would allow shareholders and other investors (who may be interested in 
launching a competing offer) to obtain enough information to make an 
informed choice; and ii) by combining the takeover bid with shareholders’ 
voting on the full proposal submitted directly to shareholders for approval 
(Bebchuk and Hart, 2001). Voting shareholders would then not be able to hold 
up their shareholdings if approved, which would solve the free-riding 
problem. The board may also be required to look for a white knight to launch a 
competing bid and thus provide more choice for shareholders (Mucciarelli, 
2006). This could be costly, however, and would not necessarily be effective, as 
the board would look for someone who would preserve its position of control. 
11.3.2 Agency problems 
Information asymmetry 
As shown earlier, there are situations in which shareholders may have some 
degree of information; this setting applies to a vast majority of takeovers. In 
practice, offeree company shareholders may not have enough knowledge to 
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acquire and process complex information, and thus cannot ordinarily be 
considered to be fully informed about the company’s post-takeover value. 
Conversely, shareholders usually receive some degree of information from the 
offeror to avoid strong pressures to tender. In this case, free-riding and 
pressure-to-tender issues are less frequent, but open up space for other issues 
such as agency costs, i.e. costs that a party will suffer owing to the asymmetry 
of information with the other party (see Ross, 1973; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Information asymmetries may arise among 
shareholders and between shareholders and management, as individuals 
process information differently. With or without a legal mandate in their 
favour, shareholders may experience information gaps with the management 
of the company or the majority shareholders, especially concerning the 
monitoring of both. Monitoring costs may be high enough to create moral 
hazard (Holmstrom, 1979). Agency costs will therefore potentially increase as 
ownership becomes more dispersed (see Figure 7).  
Figure 7. Agency costs and ownership concentration 
 
Source: Authors. 
Agency costs 
In practice, in a fully concentrated environment, the owner is usually 
identifiable with the executive officer (manager) who deals with the company’s 
daily affairs; certainly, management is very loyal to the owner. In contrast, in a 
fully dispersed environment with no corporate governance rules (e.g. general 
meetings and proxy voting), shareholders hold a small stake in the company 
and may be unwilling to participate in the company’s activities (i.e. may 
display ‘shareholders’ apathy’) because it is too costly. Therefore, there will be 
no monitoring of the persons running the company. In addition, two further 
intermediate situations are highly relevant for corporate law and takeover 
regulation (including as a result of interaction with regulation). Each situation 
raises a different conflict. First, with a semi-concentrated ownership structure, 
the agency conflict is between majority shareholders (who control the company 
and appoint the board) and minority shareholders, assuming that there is an 
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indirect mandate by majority shareholders to work indirectly in the minority 
shareholders’ interest. Second, with a semi-dispersed ownership structure, 
clusters of non-controlling shareholders may be interested in monitoring the 
board and management, as well as in steering the company’s strategy in a 
certain direction. Therefore, a conflict may arise between the respective self-
interests of shareholders and managers regarding the way in which the 
company should be run.  
Remedies 
To reduce agency conflicts, mechanisms of voice and exit rights should be 
made available respectively to minority shareholders and clusters of 
shareholders (e.g. proxy voting) in order to lower monitoring costs and give 
investors sufficient incentives to invest in equity ownership. Concerning 
takeovers, agency costs may favour potential offerors who can actually exploit 
the coordination issues among shareholders, for instance by siding with 
management in a dispersed ownership environment, thus minimising the 
possibility of takeover defences from the offeree company launched by the 
management. Overall, the contestability of control is typically higher in the 
case of dispersed ownership structures than in the case of concentrated ones, 
making it easier for blockholders to entrench around their controlling stake. 
Finally, there is also an agency conflict between the offeror and the board of 
the offeree company (since the offeror cannot immediately appoint new 
directors), especially concerning corporate strategy.  
11.3.3 Empire-building transactions 
Business strategies 
Another market failure pertaining to takeovers may come from an attempt to 
monopolise the market and charge a mark-up on competitive prices by 
constraining volumes. A lack of competition may lead a major incumbent to 
launch a takeover of the main competitor (usually a smaller company). After 
the takeover, the company will be ‘swallowed’ by the parent and taken out of 
the market if the sunk costs to integrate the business are too high or merged 
with the swallowing company where the costs to integrate the former 
 
competitor are sustainable. These market operations are thought to be 
frequent, but in many countries competition authorities take steps to neutralise 
such attempts. 
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11.3.4 Protection of company-specific investments 
Company value 
Some authors (including Blair, 1995 along with Blair and Stout (2005) advocate 
a new way of looking at corporate governance and thus takeover regulation. 
Regulation should not focus on a purported mandate to maximise shareholder 
value (Manne, 1965) but rather on the value of the company as a whole, which 
is intrinsically related to the protection of company-specific investments and 
long-term contracts (Williamson, 1979).54 The transaction-cost model disputes 
Coase’s theory that the company is a nexus of contracts used “only” as a point 
of reference to minimise the transaction costs of dealing directly with single 
agents (Coase, 1937, and strengthened by the principal–agent model discussion 
of Jensen and Meckling, 1976), suggesting rather that it is a legal tool to protect 
company-specific assets from being attacked by agents’ creditors. In effect, the 
company’s assets are shielded from shareholders’ (and other agents’) personal 
creditors thanks to the company’s legal entity. Elevating the principal–agent 
problem to the company level, instead of treating it as a specific contractual 
issue, does not give sufficient importance to legal personality. As a result, 
directors and management should maximise the company’s value, which is 
erroneously identified with shareholder value. The value of a company often 
resides in company-specific assets acquired through high ‘sunk’ costs that 
cannot be recovered (i.e. know-how). Employees and creditors are part of those 
company-specific assets, as they cannot switch from one company to another 
in the way investors can switch from one financial instrument to another.  
Value-creating transactions 
The implication of recognising the pre-eminence of the transaction-cost model 
over the contractual approach is twofold: i) the objective of takeover 
regulations would not be the equal treatment of shareholders and 
maximisation of share value, but rather the fostering of value-creating 
transactions; and ii) regulation would then offer greater protection to those 
agents that provide more company-specific capital (human capital, know-how, 
tailored services, etc.), such as employees and creditors. Consequently, the 
monitoring of management results would be carried out not only by 
shareholders (and thus by the market), but also by the entire group of relevant 
stakeholders having direct or indirect participation along with the board. 
Greater protection for employees and creditors means, among other things, 
increasing their voice and exit rights. For employees, for instance, this could 
                                                        
54 In effect, when an offeror launches a bid to gain control of a company, shareholders 
have the most liquid asset in the company (even if it is a partial offer). 
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imply a stronger voice on the board (such as in the German co-determination 
process) rather than the option for a lump sum amount when offeree company 
shareholders decide to accept the offeror’s bid. For creditors, on the other 
hand, greater protection would entail some sort of involvement in the decision-
making process of the company rather than a lump sum for their credit when 
the offeror takes control or the possibility to swap their credit for convertible 
bonds to be exercised when the offeror launches the public bid. 
Consumer protection 
Another company-specific asset may be a set of consumers (with low elasticity) 
that represents a stable client of the company over time. In this respect, greater 
consumer protection would consist of regulation of the offeree company, as 
consumers do not have any means to protect themselves from sudden 
unexpected changes of control. 
Current takeover regulation tries to combine shareholder value 
maximisation and equal treatment with some level of protection for major 
stakeholders, which can lead to conflicting objectives and to potential 
deadlocks. 
Box 6. Control as a ‘corporate asset’ 
A relatively old but nevertheless important theory (Berle and Means, 1932) argues 
that the benefits of a takeover transaction (control premium) should go to the 
company’s corporate treasury, since “control” is a corporate asset. This theory 
advocates an even stronger equal treatment rule than the one proposed by 
Jennings (1956) and Andrews (1965) (see footnote 48), i.e. one that puts all 
providers of inputs (capital, human capital and so forth) on the same level. 
Moreover, in this case, there is no recognition of shareholder supremacy. 
11.3.5 Other relevant issues 
The decision to launch a takeover and its outcome are also affected by other 
relevant variables, which are linked to the structure of corporate governance 
and the rules in place: 
 ownership concentration; 
 governance rules and decision-making models and how they affect 
offerors’ expected profits (control-enhancing mechanisms or CEMs, and 
defensive measures); 
 shareholder/investor protection; and 
 abnormal returns (unpredictable gains). 
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Ownership concentration 
First, the concentration of ownership and control has relevant implications. In 
particular, in an environment with a highly concentrated ownership, a 
potential offeror may be forced to reach an agreement with blockholders and 
provide an additional premium for the private benefits of control that they are 
enjoying. The control premium would not be easy to calculate, as there is no 
clear market benchmark, and it would entail a high risk of free-riding by 
incumbent shareholders by means of ‘acting in concert’ (through disclosed and 
undisclosed agreements). In this context, management is nominated and 
closely monitored by controlling shareholders and the conflict of interest is 
between controlling and minority shareholders. The rationale for regulatory 
intervention in this case would be to protect minority shareholders from 
potential expropriation by managers and large blockholders in the event of a 
takeover.55 In a dispersed ownership structure, on the other hand, there may be 
less room for blockholders’ opportunism and the premium may be more easily 
calculated, as the market price represents a reliable benchmark to start with. 
The difficulty that shareholders have in monitoring management exacerbates 
the conflict among them. Thus, takeover regulation needs to facilitate the 
transfer of control for poorly performing companies and minimise the costs of 
hostile takeovers in order to generate sufficient pressure and to discipline 
management. Addressing this conflict would also improve overall shareholder 
protection.  
  
                                                        
55 As mentioned above, this objective is challenged by a solid stream of literature that 
links the expropriation of minority shareholders and extraction of private benefits of 
control to the overall protection granted to investors by the national legal system, 
rather than to a particular governance culture alone (Zingales and Dyck, 2004). 
Therefore, the best way to tackle ‘expropriation’ would be to reinforce investor 
protection rules throughout the entire legal system, avoiding expensive (in terms of 
efficiency) actions in the framework of takeover regulation. 
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Governance rules 
Second, the statutory rules and self-regulatory actions that govern a company 
have a relevant impact on the offeror’s incentives to launch a bid. In particular, 
the report by Winter et al. (2002) and in part the EU takeover regulation 
endorse the principle of proportionality (i.e. the principle that establishes some 
sort of proportionality between the ultimate risk borne by the shareholder and 
the level of control held over the company). Recognition of the validity of the 
proportionality principle (between ownership and control) would confirm the 
endorsement by the EU takeover regulation of a one share–one vote principle – 
thus setting boundaries to the freedom to contract and to create new 
mechanisms to increase voting power without entailing a proportional 
economic risk (CEMs; see Shearman & Sterling et al., 2007 for a full taxonomy 
of CEMs). CEMs may, in effect, reduce the appetite of a potential offeror for the 
offeree company by worsening the free-riding problem, with relevant 
implications in terms of resource allocation in the economy and hence 
potentially leading to less growth and innovation (see Levine, 1997; Morck and 
Yeung, 2004). At the same time, CEMs can also help distinguish long-term firm 
investments from market ‘short-termism’ and commercial strategies (e.g. 
empire-building transactions). The takeover regulation attempts to find the 
right balance between the freedom to contract and the proportionality 
principle by allowing a flexible approach to CEMs (e.g. the breakthrough rule 
as an option).  
Decision-making models 
Moreover, the established models of decision-making may influence the 
success of a takeover bid and the incentives of a potential offeror to promote 
the bid in the first place. There are two main models (Davies and Hopt, 2004, p. 
164): one is shareholder-oriented and the other management-oriented. The first 
model can be further split into two sub-categories, which are i) legal regimes 
(e.g. the blockholder model in Continental Europe) that grant block 
shareholders the full decision on defences, and ii) other regimes that in 
addition strongly limit ex ante any potential action to frustrate bids (e.g. the 
UK). In effect, the board can engage in a few defensive measures,56 for instance 
by looking for a white knight or simply persuading shareholders not to accept 
the bid. Moreover, there is no ban on pre-bid (ex-ante) defensive measures, 
such as some CEMs. Still, this decision-making model gives almost full control 
                                                        
56  The UK City Code on Takeovers (Rule 21) requires the management to seek 
shareholders’ approval for any action that may result in the frustration of a bid. 
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of the offeree company over the bid process to shareholders, who are usually 
seen as the last claimants of the companies’ assets and thus must benefit from a 
specific mandate to operate in their interest. In cases involving a more 
management-oriented model (widespread in the US and applied, in some 
respects, in EU countries such as Germany),57  the board and shareholders 
jointly decide on defences, as there are supposedly stronger safeguards against 
management skirting its responsibilities owing to the role of fiduciary duties 
(e.g. the US duty of loyalty and care). In this context, the management may be 
authorised to issue ‘poison pills’58 to reduce the post-takeover value of the 
equity for the offeror or even to sell strategic assets to make the offeree 
company less attractive. Rationales for such a model rely on greater control, for 
instance in the US, by judicial review of the actions of the management of the 
offeree company to ultimately protect business. In addition, the clustering of 
offeree company shareholders in a widely dispersed ownership structure may 
be extremely expensive. 
Investor/shareholder protection 
Third, the level of investor/shareholder protection granted by the legal system 
matters for the ownership structure and thus indirectly for a potential offeror. 
In effect, countries with greater investor protection are able to attract more 
capital (La Porta et al., 2000) and thus create better conditions for a more active 
market for corporate control.  
Abnormal returns 
Fourth, abnormal returns are the difference between realised and expected 
returns during the event period (Burkart, 1999; Humphery-Jenner, 2010), i.e. 
the unpredicted returns above the natural benchmark. Abnormal returns are 
typically higher around the announcement date, more specifically when the 
market price gradually begins to discount information about the deal. Timing 
depends on the specific aspects and deal information disclosed, and on the 
previous performance of the company. 
                                                        
57  In Germany, shareholders (at a general meeting) may authorise the board of 
management in advance to use defensive measures for up to 18 months, with a 75% 
majority and the consent of the supervisory board (Section 33(2) Securities Acquisition 
and Takeover Act). 
58  Poison pills are typically special rights of the offeree company shareholders to 
purchase additional shares at low prices or sell shares at higher ones after the raider 
has acquired a stake in the offeree company. 
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Table 25 confirms positive abnormal returns around the announcement 
date for roughly 80% of 991 offeree companies domiciled in the European 
Union subject to takeovers between 2003 and 2010 in which the bidding 
company’s initial stake was below 50%. The calculations are based on four 
different time ranges (days before and after the formal announcement). 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the cumulative sum of the difference 
between the intraday market returns of share prices and the intraday market 
return of related sector indices.59 They are the difference between the expected 
and the effective market return. Abnormal returns decrease as the 
announcement date draws closer and prices become more informative. They 
show the additional impact (on the market premium, i.e. the expected return) 
of the takeover, as some sort of measure of value-increasing deals (in the short 
term). In addition, Figure 8 shows an increase in abnormal returns with the 
transposition of the Directive while Figure 9 presents some descriptive 
statistics. 
Table 25. Abnormal returns around the announcement date 
 [-41;+41] Weighted 
avg. AR 
(%) 
[-10;+10] Weighted 
avg. AR 
(%) 
[-5;+5] Weighted 
avg. AR 
(%) 
[-2;+2] Weighted 
avg. AR 
(%) 
Positive 
AR 
810 17.17 821 13.66 813 11.47 827 10.82 
Negative 
AR 
199 - 188 - 196 - 182 - 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, Datastream and STOXX sector indices. 
Table 26. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Stand.  
deviation 
Min. Max. Median 
AR  
[-41;+41] 0.258916252 0.382896343 -1.351175882 3.305239172 0.200317776 
AR  
[-10;+10] 0.200443098 0.296759647 -0.777467044 2.327778113 0.147980205 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, Datastream and STOXX sector indices. 
                                                        
59 Stoxx supersector and industry sector indices have been used to define a proper 
benchmark for abnormal returns. The formula for the calculation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns for company i is ܥAR୧ = ∑ [(݌௧ − ݌௧ିଵ) −	(ݏ݅ݎ௧ − ݏ݅ݎ௧ିଵ)]௡௧ୀଵ , where ݌௧ 
is the market price at day t and ݏ݅ݎ௧ is the value of the sector index (benchmark) at day t 
(t can be any day before or after the announcement date). 
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Figure 8. Abnormal returns (by period, weighted average) 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, Datastream and 
STOXX sector indices. 
As suggested in Figure 9 for the UK in 2003 and 2004, abnormal returns 
can also be negative, which means that – despite the market premium – the 
takeover deal does not bring additional value to the company if the premium is 
adjusted over a longer time horizon than the announcement date (when the 
market acquires information about the market premium). Additional links 
between abnormal returns and the Directive are further discussed in Box 7 
along with the empirical analysis in Box 8.  
More interestingly, recent research (Bebchuk et al., 2010) suggests that 
abnormal returns decrease when the market is able to price companies’ 
performance better. Therefore, aspects other than company performance (such 
as investor protection rules and the absence of important corporate governance 
requirements) may have less influence on abnormal returns. However, 
improving governance (and thus takeover) regulation would give incentives to 
the market to look better at company performance indicators and increase 
investors’ interest in the governance of the company at the same time, so 
improving the likelihood that market prices will more closely track the 
fundamentals of the company. 
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Figure 9. Abnormal returns in Continental Europe vs. the UK 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, Datastream and 
STOXX sector indices. 
Box 7. Market evolution and the introduction of the Directive 
The market for corporate control has evolved together with the economic cycle in 
Europe. Takeovers experienced an upward trend after 2003, in both number and 
value. In the run-up to the financial crisis, the use of leverage measured as loan 
proceeds grew exponentially to finance ever-larger deals. The collapse of financial 
markets and the global recession had a direct impact on the market for corporate 
control in Europe, leading to complete deleveraging. In 2010, the average value of 
deals was back to the level in 2003 while the number of deals had decreased even 
further. 
Figure B7.1 suggests that debt was used in no more than 25% of deals, but 
reached 70% of the value of takeovers in 2007. Therefore, the availability of credit 
appears to have had a significant impact on the market for corporate control 
between 2005 and 2008. This situation reflects the impact of monetary policies and 
the overall economic situation on this market. The Takeover Bids Directive was 
transposed into national legislation in most member states in 2006 and 2007, just 
before the meltdown in financial markets. The effects of the Directive on the 
market for corporate control in Europe may be difficult to disentangle from those 
of the financial and economic crisis. 
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Figure B7.1 Evolution of takeovers in Europe 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
The most liquid financial market in Europe, the UK, seems to lead takeover 
activities in Europe (see Figure B7.2). Yet this leadership has been challenged since 
the financial crisis, as the number of UK takeovers has declined over the past three 
years while remaining relatively stable in Continental Europe. 
Figure B7.2. Number of takeovers in the UK 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
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Historically, the UK market for takeovers has been over 50% of the entire EU 
market for corporate control. With the financial crisis, however, the number of 
takeovers completed in the UK has consistently shrunk over time, in particular 
during 2008–10. 
The overall intra-EU market for corporate control has consistently shrunk 
since 2007, again owing to the financial crisis as shown in Figure B7.3. 
Figure B7.3. Number of intra-EU takeover deals 2003–10 
 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
The number of deals crossing EU countries is currently low, but the overall 
number of EU deals has continually grown over past years. Still, fiscal and legal 
barriers remain impediments to a fully-fledged European market for corporate 
control. 
 
Box 8. The dataset 
The empirical part of this study builds upon the analysis of a dataset kindly 
provided by Thomson Reuters from its SDC Platinum Database. The dataset 
considers completed deals where the offeree company is domiciled in the EU. The 
geographical scope of the empirical analysis is limited to a selection of member 
states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK). As well as 
excluding those deals where the acquirer held an initial stake in the offeree 
company above 50%, the dataset has also been filtered to exclude deals where there 
was no novel acquisition of control.  
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In terms of the breadth of the dataset, Thomson Reuters provided CEPS with 
deal-level information, both descriptive and quantitative. Information about the 
parties involved in the transaction included name, nationality, industry, and a 
range of financial and stock-market variables. For each deal, Thomson Reuters 
provided information regarding value, stake held and acquired, consideration 
paid, debt proceedings and such elements of the deal history as the 
recommendation of the board or the presence of competing offerors. In addition, 
Thomson Reuters provided information about stock prices from its DataStream 
database, which CEPS used to calculate the offeree company’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (-41, 41) in a trading day window around the date of 
announcement of the deal. A total of 991 takeover transactions are integrated in the 
final dataset used in this empirical analysis.  
To complement the market data provided by Thomson Reuters, and based 
on the legal review by Marccus Partners, CEPS built a series of scores to capture 
the quality of transposition of the main provisions of the Takeover Bids Directive 
by each member state (see Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). The aim of these 
scores is to allow an econometrical analysis of the effects of different transposition 
across countries. CEPS also considered macroeconomic data and competitiveness 
indicators from the World Economic Forum to carry out this analysis. For further 
information, see the appendices. 
The empirical analysis carried out in this study also considers a range of 
stakeholder protection indices. CEPS and Marccus Partners ran a research project 
to survey and score the level of protection afforded to different stakeholders by 
national legislation. The initial findings have been used in the econometric analysis 
conducted for the present study on the Directive. 
11.4 Designing takeover regulation 
Voluntary vs. mandatory rules 
As shown above, takeovers can increase or reduce a company’s value. 
Regulation thus strives to minimise the number of value-decreasing 
transactions and maximise those that do not negatively affect a company’s 
value. Regulation in corporate governance certainly matters in terms of its 
implications for markets and thus ownership structure (and its link to investor 
protection; see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al., 1996, 1997 and 2000; 
Levine, 1999). The design of corporate governance (and takeover) rules has 
typically been an object of discussion, with some advocating a set of voluntary 
rules (self-regulation) and others advocating mandatory ones. Takeover 
regulation tries to find a delicate equilibrium between mandatory EU rules 
(harmonisation) and individual national approaches (through optional 
requirements), which are often supported by self-regulatory actions (Table 27). 
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Table 27. Voluntary vs. mandatory rules 
Voluntary rules Mandatory rules 
High flexibility Low flexibility 
Moral hazard Regulatory capture 
Low compliance costs High compliance costs 
Source: Authors. 
Mandatory rules imply low flexibility (once approved), high compliance 
costs and the risk of regulatory capture by specific market interests. Voluntary 
rules, in contrast, are more flexible and can be easily modified, which results in 
low compliance costs (because they are tailored to market needs); however, 
they may generate moral hazard, as the monitoring costs (for the establishment 
process and oversight) may be too high, resulting in circumvention or 
insufficient application. For takeovers, the EU opted for an intermediate 
solution, which consists of a Directive that grants high flexibility on how to 
apply certain given principles and leaves member states the option to apply 
some of its rules.  
Default rules 
Enriques (2010) argues that, since regulation is not able to distinguish between 
value-increasing and value-decreasing control transactions, takeover 
regulation should follow a different approach based on default rules, i.e. 
regulators should set rules that do not impede or promote takeovers. In 
Enriques’ view, companies should be free to choose how control is reallocated 
and should, in particular, be able to opt out of default rules (e.g. takeover 
rules). Yet this proposal may indirectly leave the achievement of any 
distributional objective (whether equal treatment or other) and other objectives 
(the weight of majority shareholders) to the discretion of some agents within 
the company, depending on the voting mechanism that is set. This voting 
mechanism would need to be designed around specific (and non-conflicting) 
regulatory objectives (e.g. solely shareholders’ or stakeholders’ equal 
treatment). 
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12. THE ECONOMICS OF THE DIRECTIVE 
Objectives 
The Directive represents a European effort to design a common regulatory 
framework for takeovers.60 The Directive tries to find an equilibrium between 
the ability of shareholders to determine the way corporate control is exercised 
and the need to provide effective tools to deal with free-riding, pressure-to-
tender and agency (self-interest) problems, thus increasing shareholder 
protection (Art. 50.2(g), TFEU).61 The legislative text tackles these issues in two 
ways: 
 a minimum harmonisation approach (a level playing field to facilitate the 
restructuring of corporate assets and to lower transaction costs); and 
 equal treatment of shareholders (e.g. the one share–one vote principle 
and protection of minority shareholders). 
Optionality 
Through the use of exceptions and derogations, the Directive aims at achieving 
some level of flexibility and minimum harmonisation in the way both newly 
developed and long-standing governance structures in the European market 
for corporate control should be considered in regulatory terms (Recital 6 of the 
Directive). In its original conception, this approach also sought to limit the 
adoption of protectionist national legislation (which typically protects 
incumbent shareholders and management); to stay in line with the TFEU (Art. 
49); to avoid regulatory competition between jurisdictions (for fear of race-to-
the-bottom incentives); to promote greater economic integration by producing 
greater efficiencies and facilitating merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions; 
and to allow opt-in and opt-out mechanisms to make the text flexible enough 
to suit the peculiarities of different member states. 
  
                                                        
60 For a review of the process that led to the Directive, see Moloney (2004), pp. 810-818. 
61 As mentioned in the earlier section on transaction-cost theory, the Treaty can also be 
interpreted as promoting the protection of all parties who contribute to the company’s 
value (shareholders, employees, creditors, etc.). In that case, the current approach to 
takeover regulation may radically change. 
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Equal treatment 
The Directive advocates the equal treatment of shareholders through greater 
protection of minority shareholders and the removal of voting restrictions, and 
it limits any special rights if not in line with the Treaty (Recitals 9, 19 and 20 of 
the Directive), which are distributional concerns. Additionally, the text 
recognises a greater involvement of employees in the consultation process 
concerning the takeover bid (Art. 14 of the Directive). In practice, despite the 
predominance of the non-frustration model and shareholder supremacy, 
Continental countries like Germany and the Netherlands give the same 
relevance to the role of employees in the takeover process. The Directive thus, 
despite its strong shareholder protection principles, seeks to find a balance 
between these two views by granting some flexibility in applying the main 
parts of the legislative text (e.g. the breakthrough rule) by means of a specific 
clause (Art. 4.5 of the Directive). In general, EU corporate law is a hybrid 
model that tries to balance the interests of all stakeholders (Goergen et al., 
2005). 
Key areas 
The Directive has four main rules: 
1) the mandatory bid rule (MBR), 
2) the board neutrality rule (BNR), 
3) the breakthrough rule (BTR), and 
4) squeeze-out and sell-out rules. 
These four tools, plus important disclosure requirements, were included 
in the Directive to tackle the three major, recurrent economic problems in 
connection with takeovers: free-riding, pressures to tender and agency costs. 
Still, only the first and the fourth rules are mandatory; member states can opt 
out of the second and third rules, in case of reciprocity by single companies. 
As indicated in Figure 10, the mandatory bid rule aims at reducing 
pressures to tender but may also increase opportunistic behaviour (agency 
costs), as it may raise costs for a potential raider. The board neutrality rule 
forces the board to become neutral to takeovers, thus reducing opportunistic 
behaviour. The breakthrough rule levels voting powers among shareholders, 
thus reducing opportunistic behaviour and the risk of free-riding. Finally, the 
squeeze-out and sell-out rules target, respectively, free-riding and pressure-to-
tender problems.  
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Figure 10. The Directive’s tools 
Mandatory Bid Rule
Board Neutrality Rule 
Breakthrough Rule
Squeeze-out Sell-out rule
Free-riding Agency costs Pressures-to-tender
 
Source: Authors. 
12.1 The mandatory bid rule 
Introduction. The mandatory bid rule minimises the coordination issue 
(pressure-to-tender problem) for non-controlling minority shareholders and 
increases investor protection through the equal treatment of shareholders in 
the event of a transfer of control. 
12.1.1 Key elements 
Objectives. The mandatory bid rule (Art. 5.1 of the Directive) provides that 
when a natural or legal person (acting individually or in concert) acquires a 
share of a company above “a specified percentage of voting rights” that may 
give him/her control of the company, such person must launch a bid and offer 
the same terms to all shareholders. The primary economic objective of this rule 
is to minimise the coordination issue (the pressure-to-tender problem) among 
non-controlling minority shareholders, even if a partial bid may occur below 
the triggering threshold (Enriques, 2004). The secondary objective of the rule is 
to increase the protection of minority shareholders (by giving them an equal 
opportunity to participate in a control shift), preventing value-decreasing 
transactions and thus reducing the cost of capital. The literature is divided on 
the question of whether these objectives are actually achieved. It is nonetheless 
united in its suggestion that the mandatory bid rule may potentially have 
negative effects, as it focuses exclusively on distributional concerns rather than 
efficiency. In this respect, inefficiencies increase the overall costs of a transfer-
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of-control transaction, while ‘overprotection’ may end up reducing 
shareholder activism. In effect, despite the fact that the MBR increases ex-post 
shareholder protection (after the launch of the takeover bid, by forcing the 
offeror to offer the same market premium to all shareholders), it also produces 
ex-ante negative effects by reducing incentives for potential offerors to launch a 
bid or (better) a competing one, which would ultimately increase the final price 
of the bid (Figure 11). Paradoxically, the result can be to the detriment of all 
shareholders, including minorities. 
Figure 11. Main trade-off of the mandatory bid rule 
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Source: Authors. 
Key aspects. The Directive specifies four main elements of the MBR: 
 acquisition of shares (e.g. “acting in concert”, Art. 2.1(d)); 
 threshold of voting rights (Art. 5.3);  
 acceptance period (Art. 7); and  
 equitable price (Art. 5.4). 
Circumvention. New shares may be acquired by being purchased directly 
on secondary markets or through cooperation among shareholders to gain 
control of the company. The definition of “acting in concert” leaves space for 
national financial authorities and judicial review to define “cooperation” and 
the existence of an oral or written “agreement” (see Marccus Partners and 
CEPS, 2012). The risk of circumvention and arbitrage among EU countries is 
potentially high, therefore weakening the actual transposition of an absolute 
voting-rights threshold. As shown in Figure 12, the number of mandatory bids 
has remained relatively low since the transposition of the Directive (roughly 
5% of the total bids), although it is still higher than for the preceding period. 
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Even so, this information does not help us to reach any definite conclusion, 
since the MBR typically affects the incentives of potential offerors ex ante. 
Figure 12. Number of mandatory bids (by period) 
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Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
Effectiveness of the rule. Reasons for such a trend may be related either to 
the effectiveness of the rule in ensuring that potential offerors do not violate 
the equal treatment principle or to specific exemptions and the application of 
loose definitions (such as “acting in concert”) in some important countries, 
which may have limited the transposition of the rule. Moreover, the 
mandatory bid rule is most effective ex ante in that it affects incentives to bid. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to measure ex ante potential effects with no real 
indicators. Figure 13 shows that more mandatory bids were launched in 2008 
and 2009, although the proportion was still less than 10%. In 2010, the amount 
was below the number of mandatory bids before the transposition of the 
Directive. This result may be explained by both a transposition that has left 
room for national exceptions and circumvention, and the lower overall number 
of takeover transactions in 2010. For instance, the absence of a common 
definition of when “cooperation” should be considered “concert” is a relevant 
regulatory gap (Papadopoulos, 2007).62 
                                                        
62 The author suggests using the same definition as the UK City Code by looking at 
shareholders’ proposals at the general meeting. If these proposals are “board control-
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Figure 13. Share of mandatory bids (% of total number of takeovers, per year) 
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Threshold. A threshold of voting rights is applied to the acquisition of 
new shares, above which the Directive assumes that some sort of (working) 
control of the offeree company has been reached and that remaining 
shareholders should receive the same treatment. Exceeding the threshold 
triggers the obligation to launch a takeover bid for all shares. As shown in 
Table 28, thresholds are defined on a country-by-country basis and overall the 
threshold, with the exception of three countries, is between 30% and 33%.63 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
seeking”, parties are considered to be acting in concert. Notably, however, this stance 
does not consider the ways in which shareholders can exercise some sort of joint 
control in other EU jurisdictions. It may also discourage shareholder activism if applied 
too strictly. 
63 A few countries have opted for a higher threshold to take into account only those 
acquisitions that ensure full control of the offeree company. 
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Table 28. Thresholds for the mandatory bid rule 
Country (%) Country (%) 
Austria 30  Ireland 30  
Belgium 30  Italy 30  
Cyprus 30  Luxembourg 33  
Czech Republic 50  Netherlands 30  
Denmark 50  Poland 33  
Estonia 50  Portugal 33  
Finland 30  Romania 33  
France 30  Slovakia 33  
Germany 30  Spain 30  
Greece 33  Sweden 30  
Hungary 33  UK 30  
Source: Marccus Partners. 
Ownership structure. ‘Control’, however, changes across countries as the 
ownership structure varies (Burkart and Panunzi, 2003). As a result, in a 
concentrated ownership structure the offeror will be forced to extend the 
market premium bid, including the NPV of the private benefits of control, to 
non-controlling shareholders. Takeovers thus become more expensive, 
reducing the likelihood of both value-increasing and value-decreasing 
transactions (the “chilling effect”; Bebchuk, 1994), in line with the idea that 
pursuing distributional objectives reduces the likelihood that there will be 
gains at all (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1982). In this way, the MBR protects 
minority shareholders ex post, but reduces the likelihood of value-increasing 
transactions (ex ante). Furthermore, it does not provide any incentive to reduce 
the risk of majority shareholders extracting benefits, as this possibility depends 
on the general framework of corporate law and in particular its rules for the 
protection of minorities (Zingales and Dyck, 2004). Additionally, the rule 
incentivises shareholders to cluster and blockholders to adjust their stake close 
to the threshold in order to extract more from potential offerors. The MBR may 
thus promote greater ownership concentration. Ideally, the MBR would be 
most effective in a fully dispersed ownership structure, where the offeror who 
really wanted to gain control and exploit PBCs would pay for them and give 
an exit right to other shareholders, who bought their shares with a completely 
different ownership structure. As an example, let us consider the case of one 
controlling blockholder (with working control) where the remaining 
ownership is mostly dispersed. With no MBR, there are two options: the 
offeror launches the bid for 51% of shares or makes a deal with the shareholder 
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to obtain working control (it is indifferent to the offeror whether he or she has 
working or formal control).64 The offeror has limited contractual power to 
exercise with the controlling blockholder. In effect, it is easier for the offeror to 
ask the blockholder for working control; however, the price that will have to be 
paid can go up to the value of 51% of the shares at market price, which is the 
alternative bid to avoid bargaining with the blockholder. In contrast, with the 
MBR, the shareholding of the blockholder has more value if it is close to the 
triggering threshold, which we assume is 30%. In this case, the offeror can 
certainly bypass discussions with the blockholder; but to gain either working 
or formal control it has to trigger the MBR threshold, particularly if the 
blockholder has acquired a stake of, for instance, 29.9% in the company. The 
alternative is to hold discussions with the blockholder in order to persuade the 
latter to sell his/her controlling stake. In this case, the controlling blockholder 
will be able to ask a price for the control up to the value of 71% of the shares 
(the alternative cost for the offeror that will trigger the mandatory offer). With 
the MBR, blockholders can extract more value from their stake if they increase 
its size close to the triggering threshold. In an ownership structure with few 
controlling blockholders, the value that they can extract is lower, and decreases 
with the level of concentration.  
Static threshold. The use of a ‘static threshold’ certainly comes at the cost 
of not being able to control the effects of a specific ownership structure on the 
acquisition of control. If the threshold does not take into account ownership 
structures, assuming that countries apply the MBR in the same way and with 
the same exceptions, this may give rise to disparities of treatment among 
countries. For instance, in some countries control may be obtained with a 
threshold lower than 30% (the current threshold in many countries, e.g. the 
UK), while in countries with a greater ownership concentration, such as Italy, it 
may most likely be reached only at a threshold well above 30%. This 
potentially makes acquisition of control more expensive in Italy than in the 
UK. In effect, if the threshold is set well above the controlling stake, the rule 
will be ineffective in both dispersed and concentrated ownership structures for 
ensuring equal shareholder treatment in control transfers (Table 29).  
  
                                                        
64 Even if the offeror goes for 100% of the company, the results of the example do not 
change. 
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Table 29. Impact of the threshold level 
Level of threshold MBR effectiveness MBR costs 
Above control stake Low Low 
Equal to control stake High Moderate 
Below control stake High High 
Source: Authors. 
Dynamic threshold. An alternative option to the static approach is to set a 
‘dynamic’ threshold. The threshold could be equal to the national mean for a 
controlling block (Sepe, 2010) or equal to the actual controlling stake in the 
company, as long as the same definition of ‘working control’ is shared among 
member states. In this way, the MBR would certainly be more effective in both 
concentrated and dispersed ownership countries, thereby minimising 
disparities among countries but on average increasing the costs of takeovers 
for all investors.  
Acceptance period. Additionally, Art. 7 of the Directive defines the 
acceptance period that must be specified in the offer document. The period 
should not be less than two weeks or more than ten weeks, which provides 
enough time for shareholders to reflect on the information and for potential 
competing offerors to make a counter-offer. This rule also seeks to reduce 
pressures to tender, as well as to reassure offerors that the acceptance period 
will not last too long, increasing costs for offerors (e.g. the management’s 
search for a white knight). 
Completion time. Figure 14 shows that the average completion time for a 
deal (in the above-mentioned dataset) fell drastically to about 10-15 weeks65 
after member states started transposing the Directive. In the period after 
transposition, this average remained lower in all countries except Spain, 
Belgium and Austria. 
                                                        
65 The execution time is calculated as the difference between the date of announcement 
(first public disclosure) and the date effective, which can either be when all conditions 
of the bid have been fulfilled (for conditional deals) or when the deal has been 
completed (for unconditional deals). 
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Figure 14. Average completion time 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
12.1.2 Other economic issues 
Additional aspects that affect the economic impact of the Directive, and 
specifically the mandatory bid rule, are the ‘toehold’ or initial stake, disclosure 
requirements and the sanctioning mechanisms.  
Initial stake. First, the acquisition of an initial stake by the potential 
offeror in the company increases the likelihood that he or she will obtain 
control of the company, and also incentivises the offeror to overbid because he 
or she may receive a higher price from a competing offeror (for his/her initial 
stake) or more easily obtain control of the company. Still, there are conflicting 
views as to whether a toehold only makes offerors more aggressive (Bulow et 
al., 1999) or induces them to overbid in some instances (Burkart, 1995). There is 
certainly a risk of an inefficient outcome caused by overbidding, i.e. the 
‘winner’s curse’, if the offeror is only interested in provoking a competing bid 
to extract more gains. By being more aggressive, a competing offeror will 
become more conservative and perhaps refrain from raising his/her offer. Yet 
if one considers takeovers as an English or a Vickrey auction,66 the purchase of 
                                                        
66 An English auction is the most common type of auction, in which offerors compete 
with each other by offering subsequent bids, always higher than the previous ones. A 
Vickrey auction is an auction in which the final price is the second highest bid paid by 
the offeror who offered the highest one (also called a ‘second-price sealed-bid auction’). 
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a toehold by an offeror interested in obtaining control of the company is the 
best strategy, regardless of whether in the end he or she succeeds in gaining 
control of the company. In effect, gains obtained through ownership of an 
initial stake are equal to the initial stake multiplied by the difference between 
the share value under current management and the share value under the 
offeror’s control. If the offeror knows that at least his/her takeover bid will 
increase the post-takeover value, irrespective of whether the offeror obtains 
control and assuming that there are no inefficient defences and that offeree 
company shareholders do not know the post-takeover value, the acquisition of 
a toehold is the strategy to pursue. If all competing offerors have an initial 
stake in the company, prices will be higher, but the initial offeror may have a 
greater chance of winning the auction because competitors will behave more 
conservatively (Bulow et al., 1999). 
Figure 15 suggests that in both the period before and after the 
transposition of the Directive, the number of takeovers in which an offeror had 
an initial stake was around 27% (26% in 2003–06 and 27.13% in 2007–10). 
Figure 15. Deals with and without the acquirer’s initial stake 
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Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
As Figure 16 shows, the weighted average size (by deal size) of the initial 
stake dropped from 30.38% to 28.4% in the period after the transposition of the 
Directive, below the lowest triggering threshold applied by member states 
(30%). 
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Figure 16. Weighted average size of the initial stake 
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Sources: Authors, based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
Disclosure threshold. The disclosure threshold of the acquisition of an 
initial stake, on average set by member states between 2% and 5%, may signal 
the potential competing offeror’s attempt to gain greater influence (if not 
control) over the company, thus increasing shareholder value and decreasing 
the potential offeror’s expected profits. At the same time, the acquisition of an 
initial stake in the company increases costs for potential offerors and is a 
primary source of profit for the offeror who knows the post-takeover value of 
the company and stimulates a higher competing bid on his/her own holdings. 
A disclosure threshold set too low may thus reduce the incentives to launch a 
takeover bid. The disclosure of a holding also ensures that investors receive 
more information on who exercises working or formal control of the company. 
Moreover, it reduces incentives for creeping-in takeovers and overbidding 
(Burkart, 1995), as well as opportunistic behaviour by incumbent blockholders 
who try to add unexpected costs and hold potential offerors up. Nevertheless, 
the transparency requirements can be somewhat softened by acquiring call 
options with the strike price just below the price of the takeover bid, which 
increases the possibility of gains from the offeror’s own bid and the possibility 
to minimise the total cost of the takeover.  
Equal treatment. Overall, disclosure requirements foster equal treatment 
among shareholders. In particular, Art. 10 of the Directive requires companies 
to disclose detailed information on key aspects of the company, based on the 
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assumption that capital markets have semi-strong efficiency and are therefore 
able to process past and current material information into prices that 
approximate the present value of future cash flows (Gilson and Kraakman, 
1984, 2003). This assumption would place companies that are not performing 
well (in terms of expected cash flows) under the threat of a change of control in 
favour of parties who expect to obtain a higher cash flow by controlling the 
management of the former. 
Further disclosure. The Directive also prescribes a broader set of 
disclosure requirements regarding the bid (minimum content requirement, 
Art. 6), the disclosure of the bid (Art. 8(e)) and information about listed 
companies governed by the laws of the member states (Art. 10). These rules 
aim at 
 improving price informativeness and stimulating a more efficient market 
for corporate control; and 
 increasing shareholder and investor protection. 
Market efficiency. By providing more information to markets, market 
prices should become more informative with regard to companies’ 
performance. Based on the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency, this 
should stimulate greater contestability of corporate control and more 
competing bids in the bidding process. Yet as suggested in Figure 17, the 
transposition of the Directive seems to exclude an improvement in terms of the 
contestability of control for ongoing bids.  
Figure 17. Number of takeovers with competing bids 
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Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
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The share of deals involving competing bids (of the total per year) 
continually declined (see Figure 18) after the widespread transposition of the 
Directive, showing no or a negative impact. This figure subsequently fell below 
the weighted average for the entire period between 2003 and 2010.  
Figure 18. Share of competing bids (of total deals, per year) 
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Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
Competing bids. The launch of a competing offer is nonetheless primarily 
affected by other important factors, such as credit availability and the 
economic outlook (see Box 8 on the description of the dataset). As a result, the 
impact of the recent financial crisis may certainly be considered greater than 
the impact of applying stricter disclosure requirements, which were already in 
place in some of the member states.  
As indicated in Figure 19, the number of potentially hostile takeovers has 
generally increased since the transposition of the Directive, from 36 in 2003–06 
to 49 in 2007–10. Still, as the increase is so minimal, it would be inappropriate 
to draw any conclusions. 
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Figure 19. Hostile deals 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
Information flow. Greater information about the post-takeover value of the 
company helps shareholders to make more rational and informed choices 
about the bid and therefore reduces information asymmetry. An excessive flow 
of information, however, may undermine shareholder ability to understand 
complex information and therefore make rational choices. Finally, sound rules 
on how the bid should be disclosed (Art. 8 of the Directive) pave the way for 
the fair disclosure of information and help to prevent the creation of false 
markets, i.e. the publication or dissemination of false or misleading 
information (Moloney, 2004). 
Sanctions. Apart from specific exceptions applied to the MBR, the 
Directive does not define any sanctioning mechanisms if companies do not 
comply, which dramatically weakens the effectiveness of the rule. Moreover, 
member states have applied sanctioning mechanisms in different ways, 
perhaps owing to different legal systems and judicial traditions. For instance, 
violating the MBR by not launching the takeover bid for all shares is 
sanctioned differently in Italy from the way it is in Germany (Mangiaracina, 
2010). The Italian financial authority (Consob) can force the offeror to launch a 
mandatory bid on all shares in the case of a violation (with administrative and 
potentially criminal charges), while the German financial authority (BaFin) has 
no such power. Where it is not possible to enforce the mandatory takeover bid 
or where the remedy of selling shares above the triggering threshold is 
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insufficient for those shareholders who have suffered a potential loss,67 in Italy 
a company violating the MBR would be condemned to pay damages to the 
shareholders who have not benefited from the application of the rule. Italian 
jurisprudence seems conflicted on what kind of protection (for damages) 
shareholders should receive (contractual or non-contractual liability; e.g. Sai-
Fondiaria case law; Poliani, 2009; Desana, 2009). In both Italy and Germany, 
voting rights are suspended on the shares above the triggering threshold (Rule 
59, German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act). In Germany, however, 
the only sanction that is immediately applicable is an administrative fine 
(section 60, German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act) equal to 5% 
interest on the price of the takeover bid for the duration of the violation, to be 
paid to all remaining shareholders or only to those who have accepted the 
offer. If the German regulator cannot force the company to launch the 
mandatory offer, the company may simply decide to keep violating the rule as 
long as the benefits of the violation outweigh the costs imposed by the 
administrative fine. Therefore, the mandatory application of the rule may be 
ineffective. Alternatives to the MBR are considered in Box 9. 
Box 9. Alternatives to the mandatory bid rule 
As mentioned above, the mandatory bid rule can be effective but at the same 
time costly. Hence, alternatives to the MBR have been discussed over the years. 
Among others, Bebchuk and Hart (2001) argue that regulation should give 
offeree company shareholders the option to vote on the launch of a takeover bid 
(binding authorisation); if approved, all shareholders would need to tender. This 
solution would solve both the pressure-to-tender and free-riding problems, even 
though it is essential to control what kind of information is disclosed to offeree 
company shareholders (ex ante) to avoid a ‘pressure-to-approve’ issue. Another 
proposal is the extension of the acceptance period if the bid is successful 
(Enriques, 2004), but it is not clear whether this would imply the acceptance of 
partial or two-tier bids, which could cause pressure-to-tender issues for those 
shareholders who would need to decide to tender before the bid succeeds. 
12.1.3 Implementation score 
All member states considered in this study have transposed the mandatory bid 
rule into their legal systems. That being stated, in some countries the real 
transposition of the MBR has been softened by other rules, such as derogatory 
                                                        
67 Such a situation could arise because the company has been acquired anyway or the 
tender bid would affect the current value of the company. 
168 | VALIANTE & DE MANUEL ARAMENDÍA 
powers given to competent authorities, which 
its impact to some extent (Figure 20). 
Figure 20. MBR implementation scores 
Note: For details of the calculation of the scores, see A
terms ‘transposition’ and ‘implementation’ interchangeably.
Source: Authors (see Appendix 3). 
Countries transposing the mandatory bid rule in a more stringent 
manner are mainly southern European countries and 
France, Austria and Poland. A number of other countri
also transposed the rule with an almost full score. The only two countries that 
have transposed the rule in a less stringent manner are Denmark and Estonia. 
Finding #1. Evidence regarding the effects of a mandatory bid rule in 
Europe is mixed. The benefits of greater ex-post
weighed against lower ex-ante incentives to engage in a takeover transaction 
because of the greater costs. The application of the rule has been partially 
watered down by exemptions at the member state level
interpretations of key sections of the Directive (e.g. acting in concert). 
Nevertheless, more mandatory bids have been launched since the Directive 
was transposed, and stakes held before the launch of the bid have de
below 30%. Overall, data used in this study
may ultimately have distorted 
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corporate control has not become more open or contestable since the 
transposition of the MBR. For all these reasons, the impact of the rule appears 
to be marginal and to have different implications across member states. 
12.2 The board neutrality rule  
Introduction. The board neutrality rule limits the capacity of the board to adopt 
defensive measures by shifting decision-making to shareholders. It aims at 
promoting the market for corporate control by enforcing shareholder decision-
making and reducing the scope for takeover defences. The rule reduces agency 
and free-riding problems.  
Objectives. The board neutrality and breakthrough rules in the Directive 
pursue complementary objectives by addressing both post-bid and pre-bid 
defences respectively. These rules seek to facilitate takeovers and promote 
shareholder supremacy. In this regard, the board neutrality rule limits the 
capacity of the board to adopt defensive measures, thereby shifting decision-
making from board members to shareholders. By reducing the scope for 
defences, the Directive seeks to promote an active market for corporate control 
(Kirchner and Painter, 2000). In many member states, board neutrality rules 
existed in one form or another prior to the transposition of the Directive 
(Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). Breakthrough rules, on the other hand, 
were rare and remain an extreme expression of the one share–one vote 
principle (ibid.). 
Context. The board neutrality rule needs to be analysed in the context of 
corporate law at large. The rule does not prohibit defensive measures, but 
simply allocates to shareholders the power to decide whether to adopt any. It 
is therefore not a substantive rule but a procedural provision, which needs to 
be considered in the broader framework of decision-making within the 
corporation (Goergen et al., 2005). Different decision-making arrangements are 
foreseeable to allocate power between management and shareholders when 
approving potential defensive measures. Decision-making power is ultimately 
held by shareholders, but may be delegated to management either temporarily 
or indefinitely. A temporary granting of discretion to management usually 
requires an ordinary resolution (majority voting), while a qualified majority 
may be necessary where discretion is granted on an indefinite basis or 
shareholders relinquish some of their core ownership rights, such as pre-
emptive rights over the issuance of new stock. Management may be granted 
the power to adopt defensive measures either before or after the 
announcement of a takeover bid. The board neutrality rule in Art. 9 of the 
Directive requires the board to ask shareholders for approval of any defensive 
measures following a takeover announcement. Figure 21 presents three 
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alternative procedural arrangements for adopting defensive measures within 
the company. The arrangement set out by the board neutrality rule is 
represented as solution B.  
Figure 21. Procedural arrangements for adopting defensive measures 
  Less restrictive  More restrictive 
Time  Solution A Solution B Solution C 
 
Management 
May request 
powers 
indefinitely 
(modification of 
statutes or 
bylaws) 
May request 
powers for a 
limited period 
May not request 
powers 
 Shareholders Approval by majority 
Approval by 
majority – 
 Takeover announcement 
 
Management 
Not obliged to 
ask permission to 
use powers as a 
takeover defence 
Obliged to ask 
permission to use 
powers as a 
takeover defence 
(board neutrality 
rule) 
May not request 
powers 
 
Shareholders 
May call a 
meeting to revoke 
powers by 
majority voting 
Approval by a 
majority 
May call a 
meeting to confer 
powers (approval 
by a majority) 
 
  
 
Model followed 
by the Takeover 
Bids Directive 
 
Source: Authors. 
Timing. Good timing in shareholder decision-making is a crucial aspect 
of the passivity rule in the Directive. Under solution B, shareholders may grant 
managers discretion at any point in time, although this discretion will need to 
be renewed in the event of a takeover. It overcomes the problem highlighted 
by Davies et al. (2010): “in the absence of a board neutrality rule shareholders 
may have to accept the cost of enhancing managerial discretion in relation to a 
bid in order to reap the benefits arising from management’s increased 
discretion in a non-takeover scenario”. Requiring only pre-bid shareholder 
authorisation as in solution A does not protect shareholder interests 
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sufficiently, because investors face a perception bias and information 
asymmetries before a takeover is announced. Moreover, while shareholders 
may call a meeting in solution A to revoke managerial powers or remove 
management altogether, the board neutrality rule is a more efficient instrument 
to control management during a takeover bid given the practical difficulties in 
reversing any defensive measure already applied as well as the time 
constraints in the conduct of a takeover. Compared with solution C, where 
authorisation to apply defensive measures may only be requested after the 
takeover announcement, solution B remains a better alternative as it affords a 
reasonable degree of flexibility to make defensive measures effective if 
authorised by shareholders. In sum, solution B protects shareholders, 
overcoming their rational apathy before the offer, without disabling takeover 
defences where they benefit from their support. In addition, the rule in the 
Directive is easily applied, since it takes into consideration only the likely effect 
of the defensive measure and not any subjective elements, such as intent or bad 
faith, which would increase the risk of litigation (Davies et al., 2010). 
Availability of defences. There have been extensive discussions in academia 
regarding the practical importance of the board neutrality rule to the extent 
that takeover defences are available and effective in the first place. Gerner-
Beuerle et al. (2011) thoroughly analyse company law statutes and case law in 
the UK, Germany and Italy to assess the availability of takeover defences in 
each of these countries. This research concludes that there is little opportunity 
to effectively apply takeover defences in these jurisdictions to begin with, 
notwithstanding the board neutrality rule (see also Gordon, 2004). While limits 
to defensive measures in general corporate law would result in board 
neutrality not being invoked frequently in practice, it should not be concluded 
that the rule is irrelevant per se. A broad board neutrality rule prevents the 
appearance of new defence mechanisms, for which there might be no specific 
limitation in general corporate law. The discussion on the ex-ante availability of 
defensive measures in company law is pertinent to frame the context of 
takeover regulation. In any case, board neutrality brings in additional value as 
described above, and given its clarity and over-arching scope, makes 
circumvention difficult.  
‘Neutral’ defences. The board neutrality rule does not prohibit defensive 
measures, but prescribes the procedure for their adoption. In some cases, 
however, an outright prohibition of some defensive measures might be 
desirable. The challenge is to distinguish defensive measures that manage to 
neutralise the bid without causing harm to the company from those which 
result in substantive harm, such as some sales of assets. Sjåfjell (2010a) 
considers that only the takeover defences that are destructive for the company 
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should be forbidden by an ex-ante rule, while defences that are neutral for the 
company itself but inhibit the offeror from acquiring its offeree company 
should be left to the discretion of the board, with the consent of shareholders. 
In this regard, Art. 9 of the Directive provides an exception to board neutrality, 
which allows managers to seek a competing offer, given that competition 
among offerors will generally benefit shareholders without any detriment to 
the company (Mucciarelli, 2006). 
12.2.1 Economic impact 
The board neutrality rule aims at protecting shareholders. In this respect, it 
appears to be an effective way to enforce the managerial duty of loyalty to 
shareholders and prevent circumvention of the latter in a takeover. By 
reducing the ability of incumbent management to adopt defensive measures, 
board neutrality reduces managerial entrenchment and makes the threat of a 
takeover more credible, encouraging management to better perform its duties 
vis-à-vis shareholders (Enriques, 2010; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). An active 
takeover market is supposed to result in more efficient companies. Yet, while 
the positive impact of board neutrality in promoting takeovers is apparent, 
there is reason to question the positive economic impact of the rule from two 
angles: first, the level of ownership and control concentration; and second, the 
protection of stakeholder and company interests. 
a) Level of ownership and control concentration. Where ownership and control 
are dispersed, the board neutrality rule helps shareholders overcome 
their collective action problems. In the absence of board neutrality, 
fragmented shareholders would have difficulty in reaching the threshold 
necessary to call a general meeting to revoke the power of management 
to adopt defensive measures (compare solution A with solution B in 
Figure 21 above). The rule also helps shareholders overcome rational 
apathy and perception bias when granting management discretion to 
adopt potentially defensive measures before a takeover is announced. By 
contrast, where ownership is concentrated and blockholders control 
management directly, there is no agency problem between management 
and shareholders that the board neutrality rule might address (Liu, 2010; 
Kirchner and Painter, 2000). Instead, there is an agency problem between 
majority and minority shareholders for which the board neutrality rule 
provides no answer (Ventoruzzo, 2008). Nevertheless, board neutrality is 
also effective when control is held by several large shareholders together, 
so that an alliance between some of them and some minority 
shareholders could win a majority vote (Davies et al., 2010). 
b) Protection of stakeholders and company interest. The board neutrality rule 
places the emphasis on shareholder supremacy to accept or reject a 
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takeover bid. It may not allow for the proper balancing of the interests of 
all stakeholders, including employees but also including customers and 
creditors. Proponents of this view consider that shareholders are not in a 
position to balance the interests of the company as a whole (Davies et al., 
2010; Clarke, 2010b; Kirchner and Painter, 2000). In effect, shareholders 
decide whether to tender their shares in isolation, which exacerbates 
their preference for liquidity (Sjåfjell, 2010a). While the risk of 
managerial entrenchment that the board neutrality rule attempts to 
address is certain, so are the negative consequences of managerial 
rotation and disregard of the interests of stakeholders. Short-term 
management bias reduces the incentives for stakeholders to undertake 
firm-specific investments, and may curtail performance. It is feared that 
these problems are intensified by board neutrality. As an alternative, the 
authors mentioned above propose an increase of the discretion of the 
board to enact takeover defences in the interest of the company as a 
whole, as in solution A in Figure 21 above. Kirchner and Painter (2000) 
believe that allowing ex-post shareholder voting to veto defensive 
measures would be an effective mechanism if expedited through 
electronic means. It is also feared that board neutrality, by reducing 
managerial discretion, may lead to foregone opportunities where these 
require swift action by management (Davies et al., 2010). 
12.2.2 Optionality 
The optionality clause in the Directive grants discretion to member states to 
decide whether to transpose the board neutrality rule into their jurisdictions. 
Notably, however, there is one limit to this discretion: member states that opt 
out must allow companies to be able to opt back into the rule. In addition, 
member states must decide whether to transpose reciprocity. The decision tree 
is represented in Figure 22. Crucially, the introduction of the board neutrality 
rule in countries where it does not apply depends on the initiative of 
shareholders – as opposed to the application of reciprocity, which depends on 
the initiative of management. A company’s decision to apply the board 
neutrality rule is reversible and must be taken following the procedure 
established to modify the company’s articles of association, which usually 
requires the agreement of a qualified majority. In conclusion, the adoption of 
board neutrality at the company level is subject to a number of procedural 
hurdles that add to shareholder coordination problems. In practice, no case has 
been found where shareholders opted back into the board neutrality rule 
(Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012; Davies et al., 2010). 
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Figure 22. Decision tree 
Source: Authors. 
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control and the dispersion of ownership. The evolving nature of control and 
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member state level. In this regard, commentators argue that opti
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by default in all cases given shareholders’ coordination problems (Davies 
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Directive places optionality at the member state level, which opens the door to 
political considerations. In Europe, there is no consensus on the role of the 
board or how best to balance stakeholder interests to maximise company 
performance over the long run. The board neutrality rule is central to this 
divide between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented systems. If board 
neutrality is not to be discarded outright, regulatory coherence in the single 
market may benefit from removing discretion from member states and placing 
it at the company level. The choice then would be whether board neutrality 
should apply by default as proposed above (Davies et al., 2010; Enriques, 2010) 
or whether a corresponding request by shareholders should be required. 
Under these arrangements, the business plan of the incumbent management 
would compete with the plans put forward by potential offerors. The general 
meeting of shareholders would have the power to decide on the application of 
board neutrality, perhaps requiring super-majority approval. Placing 
optionality at the company level would set incentives for management to look 
after the value of the company as a whole, rather than to please only the 
controlling shareholders. 
12.2.3 Reciprocity 
Under the Directive, member states may allow offeree companies to refrain 
from applying the board neutrality rule where the offeror is not subject to this 
rule itself. The reciprocity exception seeks to level the playing field with 
companies from countries within and outside Europe where board passivity 
does not apply. Reciprocity, however, may deter value-creating bids from 
companies established in countries where boards have discretion to adopt 
defensive measures. The economic rationale for reciprocity is therefore difficult 
to justify, since it bears no relation to the economics of the bid. In the words of 
Becht (2003), “reciprocity in takeovers is not desirable since it unduly restricts 
the pool of offerors and reduces the potential benefits of contestable control”. 
Reciprocity is therefore based on industrial policy considerations, given both a 
concern about foreign acquisitions and a desire to protect so-called ‘national 
champions’. While it has been argued that some companies could introduce 
board neutrality to avoid situations where potential offeree companies invoke 
the reciprocity exception (Davies et al., 2010), no evidence has been found of 
companies opting into board neutrality (Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012).68 
                                                        
68 Davies et al. (2010) conducted an in-depth survey of the countries where the board 
neutrality rule applies but reciprocity is left to the discretion of the companies. These 
are France, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain. Only in the case of France is there a 
significant opt-in to the reciprocity provision, namely by about one-fifth of the CAC 40 
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Formulation. There are also concerns about the way reciprocity is 
regulated in the Directive. Shareholders need to approve the application of 
reciprocity at the company level. Yet they cannot simply do this for a single 
specific bid, but rather must do so for all bids during a certain time period. 
Authorisation may therefore be requested where no threat of takeover exists 
and shareholders suffer from rational apathy, cognitive bias and asymmetry of 
information (Davies et al., 2010). On a different note, strict phrasing in the 
Directive may allow offeree companies to invoke reciprocity if the offeror does 
not apply the board neutrality rule but an equivalent provision. Some 
jurisdictions have nonetheless transposed the Directive more leniently and 
consider measures of equivalent effect sufficient to overcome the reciprocity 
test (Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). 
Circumvention. Possible circumvention of the reciprocity provision is also 
a cause of concern. The application of the board neutrality rule by the offeree 
company may be assured, circumventing the reciprocity requirement, by using 
a subsidiary to launch the bid. In this scenario, a parent company that is not 
subject to the board neutrality rule but which retains the economic interest in 
the acquisition would use a subsidiary that is subject to the rule for conducting 
the deal. It is uncertain whether national supervisors monitor the ultimate 
economic interest or entity behind each transaction; but the potential for 
circumvention could undermine the objective of the reciprocity rule in the 
Directive. 
12.2.4 Implementation score 
The transposition of the board neutrality rule has been fragmented across EU 
countries (see Figure 23). While some countries, such as the UK and Sweden, 
have made the rule mandatory with no reciprocity requirement, other 
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, have left companies the 
choice of whether to opt into the rule. The latter countries attain a lower score, 
since it is unlikely that companies in their jurisdictions would opt in given the 
risk that competitors might not choose to do so. 
                                                                                                                                             
companies according to Davies et al. (2010). We would advance several reasons for this 
phenomenon: a) the possibility to issue defensive warrants in France; b) a relatively 
high degree of state intervention and ownership; c) the fact that reciprocity may act as a 
form of commitment by several shareholders; and d) the non-application of the 
breakthrough rule. 
 Figure 23. BNR implementation scores 
Note: For details of the calculation of the scores, 
Source: Authors (see Appendix 3). 
Finally, Italy has adopted board neutrality as a default rule by making 
mandatory but leaving companies the possibility to opt out. It is likely that 
Italian companies would opt out where they face a takeover threat in order to 
raise barriers to the potential transaction or if they fear being more vulnerable 
to potential offerors. 
Finding #2. The board neutrality rule protects shareholders in a pre
situation, when they suffer rational apathy, while allowing them to adopt 
defensive measures once the bid has been announced. The rule addresses 
agency problems where ownership is dispersed. Optional transposition of the 
rule appears beneficial given the diversity of corporate governance structures 
across Europe. That being stated, placing optionality at the 
fails to account for company-specific characteristi
reciprocity is not backed by a straightforward economic rationale. Board 
neutrality reduces the scope to factor the interests of other stakeholders into 
the takeover process.  
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12.3 Taxonomy of defensive measures 
Defensive measures. In an environment with information asymmetry about the 
post-takeover value, defensive actions – aimed at increasing costs for the 
potential acquirer – may be deployed. Defensive measures may be pursued by 
shareholders or directly by management if such parties’ 
information/perceptions about the post-takeover value of the company is 
different from the offeror’s, and they wish to try to extract more value from the 
offeror. Management may also deploy defences to avert a hostile takeover, 
independent of the market premium offered by the offeror. Following Tirole 
(2006), defensive measures (whether statutory or not) can be classified into two 
types: 
 actions expanding control of the company (ex-ante measures); and 
 actions diluting raiders’ equity (ex-post measures). 
Expanding control. First, shareholders exercise defences that aim at 
maintaining greater control of the company. Ex-ante defensive actions include 
the following practices:  
 a staggered board (a practice through which only a fraction of the board 
is elected at a time so that a potential acquirer has to go through several 
proxy fights to gain full control of the company);  
 the super-majority rule (e.g. so-called ‘business combination rules’ 
requiring more than 50% of votes for the approval of a merger or a 
reorganisation); 
 a fair price clause (constraints on voting power if a ‘fair’ price is not 
offered to all shareholders); 
 differential voting rights (privileged voting rights for shares held over an 
extended period); 
 dual-class recapitalisation and other multiple voting shares (which give 
some shareholders more votes than are proportional to their actual share 
in the capital of the company); 
 control acquisition rules (requiring shareholder approval before the 
offeror can exercise its voting rights); 
 other control-enhancing mechanisms (such as pyramid structures and 
cross-shareholdings); 
 disgorgement rules (obliging the offeror to transfer away all profits by 
selling the shares of an offeree company in a failed offer);  
 moving the legal headquarters or place of listing (to benefit from a 
regulatory setting that is less favourable to takeovers); and 
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 conditional sales (sales of company assets that are conditional to the 
success of a takeover bid). 
Diluting equity. Additional defences may be established by management 
(typically approved by the board but not necessarily by shareholders) in order 
to dilute the raider’s equity (ex post) and so push it to retire the bid or cause the 
bid to fail. The following actions fall under this category: 
 scorched-earth policies (selling ‘crown jewel’ assets to reduce the value 
of the company or selling assets that could create valuable synergies 
with the potential offeror); 
 litigation with the raider (to increase its acquisition costs and the time 
needed to complete the offer); 
 poison pills (to reduce the value of the equity by using, for instance, 
equity derivatives; see next section); 
 a white knight strategy (a common management practice that consists of 
looking for an alternative acquirer who is able to offer more or to save 
the management from removal); 
 green mail actions (a management practice that consists of buying, with 
company money, the raider’s block at an additional premium); and 
 buybacks (acquiring shares on the market in order to increase the market 
price and cause the offeror’s bid to fail). 
Despite the Directive’s implicit preference for the one share–one vote 
principle in relation to voting powers (although it contains no mandatory rules 
in this regard), some defensive measures are not prejudicial and may even be 
beneficial for the company (see Table 30). 
Table 30. Defensive measures 
Potential benefits Potential drawbacks 
Protects long-term projects Protects managers’ short-term self-
interests 
Provides greater information to the 
offeror 
Impedes the flow of information into 
market prices 
Solves issues of shareholders’ 
coordination 
Controlled by few 
Promotes competition among offerors Favours specific blockholders 
Source: Authors. 
Benefits. In effect, defensive measures may be used to protect the long-
term projects of the company and to make sure that the offeror is also offering 
a reasonable price for such projects. Furthermore, a defensive measure helps 
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the offeror to obtain more information about the interests and the strategies of 
the company’s management. In countries with a dispersed ownership 
structure, such as the US, shareholders may be too numerous and 
uncoordinated, with the result that managers can negotiate (i.e. leverage their 
power to impose defensive measures) and cut a deal in the interest of 
shareholders (or in the interest of the company). Finally, such defensive 
measures as the white knight strategy may stimulate a competing offer, which 
tends to increase the gains for offeree company shareholders. 
Drawbacks. On the other hand, defensive measures may harbour 
disadvantages, as managers can use them discretionally to protect their 
interests from the intrusion of the acquirer. Defensive measures may impede 
the correct flow of information into prices by affecting them for reasons not 
strictly related to the company’s fundamentals. In addition, governance rules 
may not necessarily require the approval of defensive measures by a majority 
of shareholders, in turn allowing such tools to be used in the interest of certain 
shareholders whose interests may not be aligned with those of general 
shareholders or of the company as a whole. Lastly, in concentrated ownership 
structures, defences may allow controlling blockholders to defend their 
position by building upon complaisant management (nominated by the 
controlling shareholders themselves).  
12.3.1 Shareholder rights plans 
Poison pills. Shareholder rights plans (poison pills) are a type of defensive 
measure frequently used in the US, where shareholders retain the right to 
acquire additional shares at a discount when one shareholder acquires a stake 
overtaking a certain percentage of the capital. They are therefore based on the 
issuance of new stock carrying rights that are only triggered during a takeover 
bid. A poison pill results in “discriminatory dilution” of capital, which 
increases the cost of the takeover for the offeror (Hill, 2010). In the US, poison 
pills can generally be adopted by management without shareholder approval, 
in stark contrast to the board neutrality rule in the Directive. The key 
characteristic of these pills is that they deter takeovers without harming the 
business of the offeree company, unlike for instance the sale of key assets. In 
addition, their effectiveness carries a powerful deterrent effect, which means 
pills are rarely triggered in practice (Davies et al., 2010). 
Taxonomy. There are two main types of shareholder rights plans: flip-in 
pills, which provide options to purchase shares in the offeree company, and 
flip-over pills, which allow shareholders to purchase shares in the offeror after a 
merger (Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2011). An example of a flip-in pill is given by 
Gordon (2004): assuming an offeree company has 100 shares of stock 
outstanding and the offeror acquires more than 15 shares, the remaining 
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shareholders would be allowed to acquire 85 shares at a 50% discount. The 
resulting dilution effect is so strong and creates such an increase in the cost of 
conducting the takeover that a flip-in pill effectively saves the company against 
hostile bids. Boards in the US may also introduce barriers to the redemption of 
the pill through dead hand pills, which can only be redeemed by the directors 
who established the pill, and no-hand pills, which cannot be redeemed during a 
certain period of time.  
Effectiveness. The effectiveness of poison pills relies on two elements of 
the broader corporate governance framework: the existence of a staggered 
board in the offeree company and the right to issue shares and forego pre-
emptive rights without shareholder authorisation (Hill, 2010; Gerner-Beuerle et 
al., 2011). In a staggered board, the removal of every member at a single point 
in time is not possible, except where expressly provided for by law. Under 
these circumstances, the board does not face the risk of dismissal by the 
shareholders due to the application of defensive measures. Conversely, 
without a staggered board, a proxy fight could force the board to renounce 
triggering the pill. Nevertheless, staggered boards are not a feature of 
European company law (Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). As to the right of 
the board to issue shares and forego pre-emptive rights without shareholder 
authorisation, while Delaware Law allows flexibility in this regard, in Europe 
the Second Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC) requires shareholder 
authorisation for any issuance (Art. 25 of the Directive). Furthermore, rules on 
the equal treatment of shareholders do not allow discrimination against the 
offeror. The possibility to launch a poison pill in Europe is therefore very 
limited (Ferrarini, 2000). Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2011) find that there is no legal 
authority in the UK, Germany or Italy to launch a standard poison pill (see 
Table 31). The authors arrived at this conclusion by performing a detailed 
survey of company law and practice in the relevant jurisdictions, without 
considering the application of the board neutrality rule. 
Table 31. Availability of poison pills in key EU jurisdictions 
UK Germany Italy 
- Possible but 
requires ex-
ante 
shareholder 
approval 
- Not available in its standard 
form 
- Convertible bonds (without 
redemption rights) have been 
used; there may have been a 
defensive purpose in some cases 
- Issuance of warrants possible 
- Uncertainty whether the 
offeror could be excluded 
from exercising the warrants 
(principle of equality among 
shareholders) 
Source: Adapted from Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2011). 
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The strength of poison pills combined with staggered boards allows 
managerial entrenchment, which has led to pressure for regulatory reform in 
the US to better protect the rights of shareholders. Hill (2010) reports a sharp 
decrease in staggered boards and poison pills in the US in recent years 
following pressure by institutional investors.  
12.4 The breakthrough rule  
Introduction. The breakthrough rule attempts to introduce the one share–one 
vote principle when shareholders decide upon the adoption of post-bid 
takeover defences. It aims at facilitating takeovers by reducing the scope for 
entrenchment by managers and blockholders, thus reducing agency costs and 
limiting free-riding problems. 
Objectives. The breakthrough rule in the Directive attempts to limit the 
power and use of pre-bid takeover defences. It introduces the one share–one 
vote principle by dissociating control and ownership, moving decisional power 
away from control groups to the wider shareholder base. In the Directive, the 
rule appears together with the board neutrality rule, since any limitation of 
post-bid defences (BNR) introduces incentives to adopt pre-bid defences and 
vice versa (Ferrarini and Miller, 2010). Proportionality between ownership and 
control allows the offeror to overcome possible post-bid defences. The 
breakthrough rule therefore complements the board neutrality rule, which 
limits the capacity of the board to adopt post-bid defensive measures, 
enforcing shareholder supremacy. Both rules are based on the principles of 
shareholder decision-making and proportionality (Mülbert, 2003). While board 
neutrality has been transposed in most member states surveyed in this study, 
the breakthrough rule has only been fully transposed in Estonia (Marccus 
Partners and CEPS, 2012). By reducing the scope for defences, the Directive 
seeks to promote the market for corporate control (Kirchner and Painter, 2000; 
Coates, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006).  
Control-enhancing mechanisms. Ownership and control are dissociated 
through multiple control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class shares, 
multiple voting rights, non-voting shares, pyramid structures, voting rights 
ceilings, golden shares or cross-shareholdings. In 2006, the European 
Commission undertook a study on the proportionality between ownership and 
control in listed companies in the EU (Shearman & Sterling et al., 2007), which 
revealed the widespread use of control-enhancing mechanisms across member 
states. The results of this study, which surveyed the 20 largest listed 
corporations per country and a number of small and recently listed companies, 
highlighted the differences in the use of control-enhancing mechanisms in 
Europe (see Table 32). 
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Table 32. Presence of control-enhancing mechanisms in European companies 
 C
om
pa
ni
es
 
su
rv
ey
ed
 
A
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
C
EM
 
A
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
C
EM
 (%
) 
M
ul
tip
le
 v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 
N
on
-v
ot
in
g 
sh
ar
es
 
N
on
-v
ot
in
g 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
sh
ar
es
 
Py
ra
m
id
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 
V
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
t 
ce
ili
ng
s 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
ce
ili
ng
s 
G
ol
de
n 
sh
ar
es
 
C
ro
ss
-
sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
s 
Sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
’ 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 
To
ta
l C
EM
s 
pr
es
en
t 
To
ta
l C
EM
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 
O
ve
ra
ll 
C
EM
 
pr
ev
al
en
ce
 (%
) 
Belgium 32 16 50 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 0 10 22 288 8 
Denmark 23 8 34 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 8 207 4 
Estonia 14 2 16 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 126 2 
Finland 25 10 40 8 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 11 225 5 
France 40 29 72 23 0 0 7 4 0 0 2 7 44 360 12 
Germany 40 9 23 0 2 5 5 1 0 1 1 0 16 360 4 
Greece 31 16 51 0 0 1 10 2 3 0 0 2 18 279 6 
Hungary 22 13 60 1 0 1 7 4 0 6 0 1 20 198 10 
Ireland 23 9 39 0 1 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 9 207 4 
Italy 39 23 59 0 0 7 11 3 7 6 1 9 44 351 13 
Luxembourg 19 3 16 0 0 1 6 0 1 1 0 0 9 171 5 
Netherlands 23 15 65 10 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 16 207 8 
Poland 40 17 43 10 0 0 2 5 0 5 0 0 22 360 6 
Spain 24 15 62 0 0 0 4 7 1 3 0 3 18 216 8 
Sweden 29 19 65 17 0 0 14 1 1 0 5 2 40 261 15 
UK 40 12 31 1 0 12 1 2 2 0 0 1 20 360 6 
Source: Adapted from Shearman & Sterling et al. (2007). 
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Scope. The scope of the breakthrough rule in the Directive addresses the 
problem of control-enhancing mechanisms partially. It extends to a) multiple-
vote securities belonging to a separate class, b) restrictions on voting rights, c) 
extraordinary rights of shareholders to appoint or remove board members, and 
d) restrictions on the transfer of securities. These control-enhancing 
mechanisms are also subject to disclosure requirements (Art. 10 of the 
Directive), the importance of which for pricing and governance should not be 
underestimated (Ferrarini, 2006). Legal doctrine discusses the extent to which 
the formulation of the breakthrough rule in the Takeover Directive allows for 
circumvention. Bearing in mind that the rule has only been transposed in 
Estonia, lack of practice and case law mean that only theoretical discussion is 
possible. For instance, Papadopoulos (2008) considers that certificates of shares 
and non-voting depository receipts would allow shareholders to circumvent 
the breakthrough rule. Under these financial instruments, voting rights are 
separated from their shares and transferred to an administrator. A certain 
potential for circumvention of the breakthrough rule using these certificates 
arises from the absence of rules requiring detached voting rights to revert to 
the shareholders in the event of a takeover. Even so, disclosure provisions 
apply to the use of depository receipts.  
Formulation. Papadopoulos (2008) considers that the formulation of the 
breakthrough rule is both too wide and too narrow. It is too wide given that 
the rule may encompass neutral and takeover-friendly instruments, such as 
pre-emption rights, option rights, sale agreements with deferred settlement or 
agreements to accept a takeover bid (Sjåfjell, 2010a). It is too narrow given that 
some of its requirements discriminate among instruments with similar 
economic functions but different legal architectures. In this regard, the 
Directive defines shares as carrying voting rights – potentially excluding non-
voting shares – and defines multiple-voting as belonging to a separate class, 
apparently leaving out ceiling and time-lapse shares, which also carry varying 
voting rights but do not formally belong to a distinct class of securities.69 The 
Directive also fails to address the use of proxies by financial institutions, which 
frequently hold interests in the company and therefore face a conflict of 
interest.  
Circumvention. Crucially, the breakthrough rule does not apply to 
pyramid structures or cross-shareholdings, two of the most powerful 
mechanisms to dissociate ownership and control. Pyramids allow end 
shareholders to achieve control in a given company through a chain of 
interposed entities, holding a lower amount of capital overall than would have 
                                                        
69 See Arts. 2.1(e) and 2.1(g) of the Directive. 
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been necessary to achieve the same level of control through direct 
shareholding. Pyramids are relatively opaque structures when compared, for 
instance, with dual-class shares, as they increase the difficulty for outside 
investors to understand, evaluate and monitor control (Coates, 2003). Both 
multiple-vote securities and pyramids fulfil the same economic objective: they 
allow blockholders to enhance control by leveraging more voting power than 
is proportionate to their ownership share. In spite of this, only multiple-vote 
securities are addressed in European takeover regulation. From an economic 
standpoint, it is difficult to justify the selective application of the one share–one 
vote principle only to a selection of control-enhancing mechanisms. Cross-
shareholdings where one company holds a stake in another and vice versa 
should be distinguished, since they not only enhance control but also allow for 
coordination.  
Solutions. Lack of consistency in addressing control-enhancing 
mechanisms would dilute the intended effect of the breakthrough rule if 
transposed by member states. Instead of enforcing the one share–one vote 
principle in a takeover event, as intended by the Directive, the current 
formulation of the rule rather induces blockholders to switch from multiple-
voting shares to pyramid holdings, leaving their status quo intact in the event 
of a takeover (Figure 24). Still, this phenomenon has not been observed 
empirically, as the breakthrough rule has not been fully transposed in any 
country except Estonia and has been partially transposed only in France (see 
Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). According to Shearman & Sterling et al. 
(2007), multiple voting securities are frequent in France, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Finland and Denmark, but are rare in most other 
jurisdictions. Conversely, pyramids are commonly used in Sweden, Belgium, 
Italy, Greece and the Netherlands (see Table 32 above). It follows that the 
application of the breakthrough rule will have dissimilar effects across 
companies in different member states. Yet choosing a regulatory instrument to 
address the use of pyramid structures is not simple. In the 1930s, the US 
introduced double taxation of inter-corporate dividends as a declared policy to 
avoid the use of pyramids (Ferrarini, 2006). The scope for addressing pyramids 
in a simple and effective manner through takeover regulation needs to be 
further researched. The main difficulty lies in distinguishing ordinary 
corporate groups from cases where pyramids are being used. 
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Figure 24. Breakthrough rule 
Source: Authors. 
12.4.1 Economic impact 
Market impact. The breakthrough rule affects companies where there are seve
classes of shares with different voting rights attached. Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2004) studied the effects of this rule on control. They analysed the distribution 
of voting and cash flow rights in more than 1,000 companies with dual
shares in ten European countries. The authors found 3% to 5% of companies 
where controlling owners held more than 50% of voting rights but less than 
25% of the shares, therefore making them subject to a direct loss of control in 
the face of the breakthrough rule in the Directive. The majority of these 
companies were located in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Sweden. In addition, 
11% to 17% of companies were controlled by less than 50% of voting rights and 
less than 25% of shares, and were hence subject to a potential loss of
Meanwhile, according to the authors’ estimations, existing control would not 
be affected by the rule in about 80% of companies. 
Market responses. While the breakthrough rule is meant to reduce the 
costs of the bid and promote takeover activity, 
controlling shareholders owning a disproportionately low amount of 
outstanding shares to acquire a higher proportion of low voting shares 
(Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2004). Bearing in mind that the impact of the rule 
does not depend solely on the existence of dual
disproportion between votes and cash flow, if controlling shareholders 
consolidate their position, the breakthrough rule could result in higher 
ownership concentration. Already, in a large nu
blockholders exercise control by owning the largest share of capital without 
diverging from the one share–one vote principle (
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lead to dispersed ownership. This observation, however, fails to consider that 
it may be cost-efficient for controlling shareholders to top up their ownership 
stake in order to keep their private benefits of control.  
Private benefits of control. Disproportionate control is linked to the 
extraction of private benefits by the controlling shareholder. Here, private 
benefits refer to precisely those benefits that spring from the discrepancy 
between the level of ownership and control held by the incumbent blockholder 
(European Corporate Governance Forum, 2007). From this perspective, 
reducing the disproportion between ownership and control would redistribute 
benefits more uniformly among shareholders. Notably, two caveats apply. On 
the one hand, some of these benefits can be considered compensation for the 
costs involved in monitoring management (Zingales and Dyck, 2004). 
Uncertainty about control rights reduces the incentives for incumbent 
blockholders to perform monitoring and undertake other company-specific 
investments, although the one share–one vote principle provides an incentive 
for institutional shareholders to engage (Becht, 2003). On the other hand, 
private benefits of control also arise where the one share–one vote principle 
applies, to the extent that there is concentrated ownership. For instance, the 
controlling shareholder may capture business opportunities on preferential 
terms through its affiliates. The breakthrough rule therefore only concerns 
private benefits arising from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. 
Economic impact. The breakthrough rule may increase the cost of raising 
capital. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004) suggest that the rule discourages 
companies from issuing new shares to parties other than the controlling 
shareholders, and instead provides an incentive to use more expensive 
channels to raise capital. Alternatively, companies may be prompted to buy 
back their own shares. Still, this effect is unlikely to materialise in practice, 
given that the rule does not apply to pyramids or cross-shareholdings. 
Incumbent shareholders will likely find that it is more cost-efficient to switch 
the mechanism through which they hold control and build up a pyramid 
scheme. Pyramids remain an effective and relatively inexpensive means of 
holding control without owning the majority of the shares in a given company. 
The widespread permissibility of pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings 
brings further uncertainty as to the effect of the breakthrough rule with regard 
to ownership concentration and control. It frustrates the objective of the rule, 
namely to apply the one share–one vote principle in the event of takeover in 
order to facilitate the change of control. Furthermore, the opacity of these 
structures may have a negative impact on capital markets (Coates, 2003). 
One share–one vote. Ultimately, the economic analysis of the breakthrough 
rule reverts to the discussion on the rationale for introducing stricter 
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proportionality between ownership and control. Enforcing the one share–one 
vote principle in a takeover event is separate from its outright enforcement in 
corporate law (Coates, 2003). That notwithstanding, measures affecting 
takeovers have an impact on the use of control-enhancing mechanisms by 
blockholders over the medium to long term. From this perspective, coherency 
among takeover rules within the overall framework of corporate governance is 
desirable. The breadth of that discussion greatly exceeds the scope of this 
study, however (see Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Clottens and Geens, 2010).  
12.4.2 Equitable compensation 
Quantification. The Directive provides for the payment of “equitable 
compensation” to shareholders whose rights are broken through (Art. 11.5). 
This provision is in line with the protection of private property and the 
requirement to compensate the loss of enjoyment in case of expropriation. Yet 
difficulties arise when it comes to applying these principles in practice. 
Appraisal procedures to quantify compensation may delay the takeover 
process, particularly if appeals are permitted and adjudication steps in. 
Papadopoulos (2008) considers that delays in quantification exacerbate the 
pressure-to-tender problem, since shareholders risk seeing the value of their 
shares decrease over time. A straightforward method of quantification should 
reduce delays and make it clear to the offeror ex ante what consideration is 
needed to gain control. Nevertheless, even a straightforward method would 
not afford full certainty to the offeror ex ante, since total compensation will still 
depend on the number of shareholders who refuse to tender – above the 
threshold provided in the Directive. Where no convergence is observed, terms 
for determining compensation and the arrangements for the payment of the 
compensation are left to member states (see Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012).  
Proxy measurement. Ferrarini (2006) assesses the difficulties in pricing 
compensation for preferential voting rights, since the value of the latter 
depends on the private benefits of control derived from their exercise. These 
benefits are intrinsically opaque and difficult to value. Zingales and Dyck 
(2004) compute them as the difference between the price per share paid for the 
controlling block and the market price of a share after the change of control is 
announced. The former would reflect the value of preferential shares, while the 
latter would reflect the value of ordinary shares (Barclay and Holderness, 
1989). This methodology illustrates that an ex-ante calculation is difficult in 
practice. Moreover, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders does not 
allow for a different price to be paid for controlling shares under the Directive. 
If an exact quantification is not possible, two options arise for regulators: either 
to forego compensation altogether or to establish a proxy measurement. A 
proxy measurement should be easy to calculate ex ante to allow potential 
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offerors to factor in the cost of equitable compensation. It could be subject to 
limited adjudication to better protect blockholder rights while preventing 
delays in the takeover process. For instance, restrictions could apply as to the 
timing of adjudication, starting after the takeover deal has been completed, and 
the quantum that might be awarded, limited to a certain percentage of the 
proxy measurement. Additional research would be required to devise a proxy 
measurement applicable throughout Europe. 
12.4.3 Optionality and reciprocity 
Optionality. The Directive grants discretion to the member states as to whether 
to transpose the breakthrough rule. Like the board neutrality rule, member 
states that have opted out of the breakthrough rule must provide the 
possibility for companies to opt back into the rule. In addition, member states 
must decide whether to transpose reciprocity. The decision tree is represented 
in the earlier section referring to board neutrality. All member states of the EU 
surveyed in this study have opted out of the breakthrough rule except Estonia, 
and to a certain extent France (Marccus Partners and CEPS, 2012). Two 
elements are of relevance with regard to optionality: the level at which it is 
placed and the default rule. The Directive places optionality at the member 
state level. While for board neutrality, there are arguments for placing 
optionality at the company level (see the earlier discussion in this study), these 
arguments do not apply to the breakthrough rule. It would be irrational to 
allow blockholders to decide on the limitation of their voting rights in the case 
of a takeover.  
Lack of transposition. Lack of transposition of the breakthrough rule by 
member states highlights concerns about the impact on the structure of 
corporate ownership and the functioning of capital markets. An in-depth cost-
benefit analysis would be required to assess the convenience of removing 
optionality and introducing the breakthrough rule across the Union. As 
stressed before, enforcing the one share–one vote principle in a takeover event 
has an impact on the use of control-enhancing mechanisms by blockholders 
over the medium term. The discussion on the economic costs and benefits of 
proportionality between ownership and control exceeds the scope of this 
study, but it is an open debate where no clear-cut answers have been found 
(Clottens and Geens, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2008). If the one share–one 
vote principle is to be introduced in Europe, this should take place after careful 
consideration of the overall framework for corporate governance. Besides by 
these fundamental concerns, lack of transposition by member states is also 
explained by the current formulation of the breakthrough rule, which only 
partially covers pre-bid takeover defences, as explained above. 
190 | VALIANTE & DE MANUEL ARAMENDÍA 
12.4.4 Implementation score 
Hardly any of the member states have transposed t
Directive. The reasons explaining this situation are twofold. On the one hand, 
the formulation of the rule would render it ineffective in inhibiting the use of 
control-enhancing mechanisms, whereas it might induce companies to switch 
to a different type of control of the governance structure, e.g. from dual
shares to a pyramid structure. On the other hand, there might be no consensus 
among member states on the one share–
overarching consequences for corporate go
organisation. The rule has only been fully transposed in
Figure 25. BTR implementation scores 
Source: Authors (see Appendix 3). 
France has partially transposed the rule, allowing 
some countries (such as the UK) have made it optional for companies to opt 
into the rule, but with no reciprocity. Finally, countries such as Germany, Italy 
and Spain have left it to companies to decide whether to opt in, but with 
reciprocity. 
Finding #3. The current formulation of the breakthrough rule 
encompasses only a restricted number of control
he breakthrough rule in the 
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vernance and industrial 
 Estonia (see Figure 25).  
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inducing regulatory arbitrage and frustrating the objective of the rule. The 
limited transposition of the rule means that there is not enough information to 
draw definite conclusions regarding its impact. The application of the one 
share–one vote principle in company law is a fundamental step, which would 
require an in-depth cost-benefit analysis and consensus among member states. 
12.5 Squeeze-out and sell-out rules 
Introduction. The squeeze-out right allows the offeror to acquire any residual 
shares following a successful offer, with the result that it gains full control of 
the offeree company. It also reduces the incentive for incumbent shareholders 
to hold up their shares (free-riding on other shareholders) and facilitates 
acquisitions. The sell-out right appears as a quid pro quo whereby residual 
shareholders may force the acquirer to buy their shares, thus reducing 
pressures to tender at an inferior price.  
Objectives. The squeeze-out and sell-out rights are similarly structured in 
the Directive, but pursue markedly different objectives. On the one hand, the 
squeeze-out right benefits offerors by mitigating the incentive for incumbent 
shareholders to hold up their shares. In so doing, the right allocates a larger 
portion of takeover gains to the offeror at the expense of some shareholders. 
On the other hand, the sell-out right benefits minority shareholders by 
allowing them to force the acquirer to buy their residual shares. It may 
discourage bids that do not seek to control all the shares of the offeree 
company. Crucially, while the squeeze-out rule reduces the hold-up problem, 
the sell-out rule has the opposite effect. By reducing the pressure to accept the 
tender, the sell-out right may result in higher share prices and a higher overall 
cost of the takeover, allocating a larger share of profits to the incumbent 
shareholders at the expense of the offeror. Table 33 summarises the effects of 
the squeeze-out and sell-out rules considered in isolation. The subsequent 
subsections consider the effects of both of these rights in greater detail. 
Table 33. Impact of the squeeze-out and sell-out rights 
 Squeeze-out Sell-out 
Pressure to tender   
Free-riding   
Total consideration   
Shareholder profits   
Offeror profits   
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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12.5.1 Squeeze-out right 
Full control. Offerors are frequently interested in gaining full control, which is 
commonly considered a basic condition for their acquisition planning. The 
squeeze-out right is an instrument sometimes present in takeover regulation 
that allows the offeror to force residual shareholders to sell their shares and 
gain full control. Evidence suggests that use of the squeeze-out right by 
offerors is widespread (Van der Elst and Van den Steen, 2006; Martinez and 
Serve, 2010). Figure 26 illustrates the extent to which takeover deals lead to the 
acquisition of full control in Europe.  
Figure 26. Stake owned by the acquirer after a takeover transaction 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
Full ownership may have a higher value than majority or large majority 
ownership for a variety of reasons (Van der Elst and Van den Steen, 2006; 
Ventoruzzo, 2010): 
 facilitating the recouping of the costs of the offer; 
 avoiding costs associated with retaining a small number of shareholders, 
in particular transaction costs; 
 aligning the strategy and management of the acquired company with 
those of the parent company within a group of companies; 
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 going private, thereby avoiding the costs of public ownership (the direct 
cost of listing and the indirect cost of complying with the legal 
requirements for listed companies, including transparency provisions); 
 benefiting from accounting consolidation for tax purposes, which in 
some jurisdictions requires full ownership; 
 reducing legal uncertainty in those jurisdictions where minority 
shareholders may claim part of the control premium ex post; and 
 in the case of private-equity leveraged buyouts, replacing all equity with 
debt that is tax-deductible. 
Hold-up. Regardless of whether the offeror discloses the stake it wishes to 
acquire, it faces a problem of hold-up by incumbent shareholders (Van der Elst 
and Van den Steen, 2006; Grossman and Hart 1980). Hold-up by investors has 
three main sources: i) shareholder preferences are not homogenous and thus 
their supply functions have different slopes; ii) shareholders may reasonably 
anticipate that the price offered by the offeror is lower than the value of the 
company; and iii) shareholders may anticipate that the margin of shares 
required to gain full control has a higher value for the offeror. As a result, a 
small number of investors may decide not to tender at the offered price, 
holding up their shares and forcing the offeror to pay a higher premium for the 
residual stake necessary to attain full control. Holding up is therefore likely to 
increase the cost of takeovers and reduce the volume and efficiency of the 
market for corporate control (Burkart and Panunzi, 2003). In addition, when 
holding up, some shareholders free ride on the others, attempting to capture a 
higher fraction of the takeover premium. In sum, holding up and free-riding 
appear together in practice but affect two distinct aspects of takeover 
regulation: balancing the protection of incumbent shareholders against the 
efficiency of control transfers, and ensuring the equal treatment of all 
shareholders.  
Compensation. The squeeze-out right, by forcing residual shareholders to 
sell, reduces the hold-up problem. The rule needs to be understood in 
conjunction with the principles that serve to fix the price that would be paid 
for the residual shares. Broadly speaking, the Directive prescribes 
compensation equal to the price paid to the other shareholders in the case of a 
successful mandatory bid, thereby enforcing the principle of equal treatment 
and avoiding free-riding among fellow shareholders. The determination of the 
squeeze-out price has a direct impact on the economic efficiency of the 
acquisition. Goergen et al. (2005) consider that as long as squeeze-outs do not 
raise the premium for shareholders, they are likely to reduce the overall 
consideration paid in the tender and allocate a larger part of the takeover gains 
to the offeror, increasing the efficiency of the transaction. As they enforce the 
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principle of equal treatment, the rules on price determination in the Directive 
are unlikely to result in an increase of the overall consideration. Where the 
squeeze-out right reduces the overall consideration to a level lower than the 
post-takeover value of the company, offerors will tend to make their 
acquisitions conditional on reaching the squeeze-out threshold (Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2003). 
Threshold. The threshold for exercising the squeeze-out right is also 
important. The optimal threshold depends on the level of shareholder 
concentration in the offeree company (Van der Elst and Van den Steen, 2006, 
2009). Yet, regulators have so far not succeeded in finding a formula to 
determine the optimal threshold at the company level. Instead, a single 
threshold is applied to all companies within the same jurisdiction. This 
solution is simple but sub-optimal, since ownership and control concentration 
are not homogenous even within the same country. Most corporate law 
systems have converged towards a threshold of over 90% using trial and error 
(Van der Elst and Van den Steen, 2006).  
Shareholder rights. At a fundamental level, fixing the threshold needs to 
balance a) the protection of the rights of investors over their shares and b) the 
interest of the offeror in acquiring full control. A low threshold would infringe 
the rights of incumbent shareholders, who legitimately may not wish to sell at 
the price offered by the offeror because they have a low preference for liquidity 
and expect higher value from retaining their shares. In the US, corporate law 
adopts a different perspective and considers shareholding not as a property 
right but rather a financial interest in the corporation that requires a lesser 
degree of protection (Ventoruzzo, 2010). Following this approach, regulation of 
squeezing-out (freezing-out) is more permissive in the US than in a majority of 
EU member states. At a fundamental level, however, the existence of a 
squeeze-out right is based on the assumption that the acquisition of full control 
by the offeror is socially useful and justifies the limitation of shareholders’ 
property rights. Nonetheless, caution is required in this respect, as full control 
may be profitable for the offeror but not always socially useful. For instance, 
full control allows the offeror to recoup more easily the costs of the bid from 
the assets of the offeree company. There is hence a risk that easy squeeze-outs 
may marginally encourage value-decreasing takeovers. 
Practical thresholds. The Directive provides for a threshold above 90% but 
below 95% of the shares/votes, and affords member states some discretion. 
Van der Elst and Van den Steen (2006) assess the practical explanations behind 
these thresholds. On the one hand, a threshold above 95% would make it 
difficult to solve the practical problem of both untraceable and intractable 
shareholders, that is, shareholders who cannot be found or who refuse to 
accept the sale even on reasonable terms. On the other hand, a threshold below 
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90% would disrupt a large number of Continental European companies 
characterised by a high ownership concentration. The authors also point out 
the link between squeeze-out thresholds and the thresholds to obtain tax 
benefits in several member states.  
Scope. Squeeze-out procedures exist in some jurisdictions irrespective of 
how the threshold has been reached. The economic rationales behind full 
control do not depend on the underlying transaction and would justify 
squeeze-outs independent of the way in which the stake had been acquired. 
Nevertheless, coherence between takeover and merger regulations with regard 
to squeeze-outs has not yet been fully achieved in Europe (Papadopoulus, 
2007). Outside a takeover transaction, the determination of an equitable price is 
more difficult given the absence of a reference price for control, such as the one 
offered in the context of a mandatory bid. Appraisal by the courts of justice is 
expensive and dysfunctional (Ventoruzzo, 2010). 
Harmonisation. Differences in the regulation of squeeze-out rights across 
member states are significant (Van der Elst and Van den Steen, 2009). The 
importance of homogeneous squeeze-out rules for achieving consistency 
throughout the single market should not be underestimated. There has been 
little research on squeeze-out rights beyond that by the few academics cited 
here who focus on this issue; yet this is a crucial element for the achievement of 
integrated financial markets and equal shareholder protection in the EU. 
Squeeze-out rules carry significant economic importance given the interest of 
offerors in gaining full control and going private. Facilitating squeeze-outs is 
likely to promote the market for corporate control. Following this rationale, 
Ventoruzzo (2010) considers the thresholds in the Directive too high, arguing 
that they give excessive relevance to a small minority of the minority 
shareholders. Ventoruzzo favours a more pragmatic and simple approach that 
simply sets the threshold at 75% of the shares in order to stimulate activity in 
the market for corporate control. A low threshold, however, would probably 
not suit the level of shareholding and ownership concentration prevalent in 
most European economies. Given uncertainty about shareholder rights, a 
relatively low threshold would likely discourage investment and shareholder 
engagement. It might also exacerbate a short-term focus on investing. Quite 
apart from the level of the threshold, compensation for shareholders needs to 
be equitable to avoid discouraging investment. The level of shareholder 
compensation determines how the benefits of full control are spread, but 
distributional issues affect stakeholders at large. As such, there is no easy 
answer to the question regarding the social desirability of squeeze-outs.  
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Indirect squeeze-out. Finally, an indirect squeeze
statutory mergers or de-listing, which can impose lower valuations on 
remaining shareholders. In practice, the threshold for the approval of such 
deals is far below the squeeze-out threshold (e.g. 75% of voting rights for 
statutory mergers in Germany; Papadopoulos, 2007).
12.5.2 Squeeze-out rule implementation score
The squeeze-out rule has been widely adopted across
Directive, but with some differences. Some countries, such as Spain and 
Sweden, have opted for the least restrictive application of the rule, with an 
eased threshold of 90%. In this case, all kinds of shares may contribute to the 
reaching of the threshold. Other countries, such as the UK, apply a threshold of 
90% as a percentage of shares with voting rights
Figure 27. Squeeze-out implementation scores 
Source: Authors (see Appendix 3). 
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Germany and Italy apply a squeeze-out rule with a 95% eased threshold. 
Finally, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, among others, have adopted a 
squeeze-out rule of 95% as a percentage of shares with voting rights. 
12.5.3 Sell-out right 
Sell-out. The sell-out right of incumbent shareholders is best understood as a 
provision mirroring and balancing the squeeze-out right of the acquirer. The 
latter carries the most economic importance while the former is devised as a 
sort of quid pro quo (Burkart and Panunzi, 2003). As previously mentioned, 
the sell-out rule awards residual incumbent shareholders the right to force a 
successful acquirer to purchase their shares at a fair price. In isolation, the sell-
out right could be an incentive for shareholders to hold up their shares, which 
would increase the cost of takeovers and bring down activity in the market for 
corporate control (Goergen et al., 2005). In combination with the principle of 
equal treatment of shareholders and the squeeze-out right, however, these 
pernicious effects are cancelled out. In the Directive, the sell-out right allows 
residual shareholders to sell their shares to the offeror under similar conditions 
as the offeror is allowed to purchase this residual stake. The economic 
justification of the sell-out right, similar to that of the mandatory bid rule, is to 
protect minority shareholders by giving them exit rights following a takeover. 
It is therefore relevant for the promotion of investment and the development of 
the capital markets. 
Like the squeeze-out right, the effect of the sell-out right depends on the 
principles used to determine the price of the residual shares and the threshold 
required for the exercise of these rights. In the Directive, both factors closely 
mirror the factors governing the squeeze-out. 
Finding #4. The acquisition of full control allows the offeror more easily 
to align the management of the offeree company with its own interest. A high 
threshold for the exercise of the squeeze-out right protects the rights of 
incumbent shareholders, while a low threshold would stimulate the market for 
corporate control. There is no economic rationale to justify different squeeze-
out rights for different underlying transactions. The link between squeeze-out 
and de-listing should be further explored. 
12.6 Empirical analysis 
Regressions. Using 996 observations from the above-mentioned dataset on 
takeover deals between 2003 and 2010 (see Box 8 on the dataset), this section on 
the empirical analysis briefly discusses the results of the econometric 
regression using different regressands. It is important to clarify that this is a 
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preliminary analysis to show whether the Directive has had an impact on the 
market for corporate control and on the economy overall. Additional analyses 
are needed in future to assess the overall impact of the Directive. In any case, 
the lack of harmonisation and the financial crisis further complicate the 
econometric analysis, rendering it inevitably subject to distortions. (For a 
detailed look at the results of the econometric regressions, see Appendix 5.) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). We regressed the CARs (-41; +41) to 
explore the unexpected returns of a takeover transaction. We assume that 
CARs, calculated as the difference between the sector return and the company 
return in real terms (prices) around the announcement date, are a good proxy 
for the unexpected benefits accruing to the offeror in a takeover transaction. 
The higher the value of the CAR, the greater is the incentive of a potential 
acquirer to bid, assuming the offeror compares the market premium calculated 
using a theoretical model with the additional abnormal returns above this 
market premium for that given sector. Overall, a high CAR means that the 
value of the company or of the sector is currently undervalued, so an offeror 
can extract more than what could potentially be expected in a sector with low 
CAR values. CARs not only capture the market premium, but also all the other 
factors that cannot easily be factored in a model but which may be used by the 
incumbent shareholders to bargain for a higher premium. Therefore, by 
extension, if a variable has a positive correlation with CARs, it increases the 
unexpected market returns of a takeover against which the potential offeror 
will benchmark its premium, thereby potentially increasing the incentives to 
launch a bid. 
Other regressions. We have also regressed the market capitalisation, the 
competitiveness index related to the deal (based on the Global 
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum) and the financial 
development index (market capitalisation over GDP).  
Outcomes. Indices of shareholder, employee and creditor protection have 
been added to the model, in particular to control for the other legal 
requirements in place that may affect the dependent variable apart from the 
transposition of the Takeover Directive. In all regressions but the one 
explaining market capitalisation, the introduction of the Directive had an 
observable impact. Still, coefficients suggest that the impact is very low if not 
negligible. In terms of relations, the results cautiously suggest that the 
Directive had a positive impact on cumulative abnormal returns (0.13799; 
p<0.01), a positive impact on market capitalisation (0.00215; but no 
significance), a positive impact on competitiveness (0.01037; p<0.01) and a 
negative impact on financial development (-0.09170; p<0.01). The impact is 
very low for deriving clear-cut conclusions. Greater shareholder and employee 
protection negatively influence CARs, which means fewer unexpected returns 
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and more entrenchment for incumbent shareholders. Reducing, as it does, the 
possibilities for post-bid defences, the introduction of the board neutrality rule 
has had a negative impact on CARs as it narrows the space for unexpected 
defensive actions. The breakthrough rule and the mandatory bid rule are less 
important in this empirical analysis, as their effect relates mainly to ex-ante 
incentives. The index of minority shareholder protection seems to be 
significant in all regressions, thus establishing a definite link between 
takeovers and the promotion of market capitalisation (in line with La Porta et 
al., 1998).  
Overall, it is possible to conclude that the Directive has had an impact on 
the market for corporate control and the economy. At the same time, as could 
be reasonably anticipated the intensity of this impact is marginal. The 
introduction of the Directive appears to be positively related to CARs and thus 
to the volume of takeovers (increasing the weight of unexpected factors, 
perhaps owing to the fragmented transposition of the legal text) and negatively 
related to the broad index of financial development. In effect, in the most 
developed financial markets, price efficiency reduces CARs because investors’ 
expectations reflect that they are already able to price in many factors, which 
may not feed into prices in less developed markets. Additionally, the board 
neutrality rule appears to have a negative impact on CARs, which is 
theoretically related to the prospect that, by reducing the scope for defences, 
incumbent shareholders will be able to extract a lower premium, thereby 
reducing the value of both the CARs and the benchmark employed by the 
potential offeror. The regression shows that the BNR had a positive impact on 
increasing incentives to launch a takeover in the countries where it has been 
fully transposed. That being stated, the impact is low, as the BNR may also 
raise pressures for incumbent shareholders to entrench, therefore raising the 
cost of acquiring control for the potential offeror (with additional effects on 
dispersed ownership structures). 
12.7 Conclusions 
Multiple impacts. Takeover regulation has multiple impacts on the economy. In 
particular, it affects relevant areas like investor protection, ownership and 
control of a company through the crucial role of capital markets, which allow 
the development of an efficient market for corporate control. Depending on the 
characteristics of the company (ownership structure) and the legal system, 
takeover rules can have diverse repercussions and effectiveness in reaching 
their original objectives. Whether the ownership structure is more concentrated 
(with private benefits of control) or more dispersed matters, especially for the 
intensity of the impact of some of the rules on the market for corporate control 
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and on the contestability of control. It is questionable whether private benefits 
of control should be addressed through takeover regulation or whether they 
should rather be the object of broader regulatory action in corporate law. 
Moreover, the legal system matters as well, particularly with regard to investor 
protection and setting the framework for corporate decision-making, whether 
shareholder- or management-oriented. 
Efficiencies and discipline. Transfers of corporate control (takeovers) may 
result in a more efficient allocation of control if the offeror presents a higher 
valuation of control because it is capable of using the pool of assets in the 
offeree company to generate greater value than the incumbent. Takeovers may 
also have disciplinary effects by aligning the interests of managers with those 
of the company. The company’s interests may not necessarily be those of the 
controlling shareholders, and regulation should take into account such other 
aspects as the protection of long-term firm-specific investments, which may not 
be in line with the short-term resolve of incumbent shareholders to tender their 
shares to the highest bid. 
Trade-offs. This study of the Directive reveals three important trade-offs 
and conflicts among regulatory objectives (Table 34).  
Table 34. Trade-offs in takeover regulation 
Trade-offs 
Disciplining management 
(agency problem)  
Preserving long-term firm-specific 
projects 
Controlling contestability  Protecting minority shareholders 
Addressing free-riding  Increasing pressure to tender 
Source: Authors.  
Disciplining management. First, by increasing the contestability of control, 
takeovers induce managers to behave in line with the interests of shareholders, 
reducing agency costs. On the other hand, control contestability reduces the 
incentives of management to carry out long-term firm-specific projects 
precisely because of the possibility of losing control by not performing well in 
the short term and thus not being able to push up share prices. This situation, 
especially in concentrated ownership structures, may ultimately reduce 
shareholder value for minorities who have invested in the firm’s long-term 
projects. The alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests may induce 
short-termist behaviour on the part of management, depending on the 
shareholder structure. The contestability of control reduces the incentives of 
managers and blockholders to undertake firm-specific investments, such as 
investment in human capital, which generate company value over the medium 
to long term.  
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Protecting minority shareholders. Second, strengthening the protection of 
minority shareholders may increase takeover costs, thereby dissuading 
takeovers and reducing control contestability (as shown in the empirical 
analysis). The intensity of the trade-off critically depends on the company’s 
shareholding structure. Protecting shareholders should be a primary concern 
in the case of concentrated ownership in order to limit expropriation. 
Conversely, in the case of diluted ownership, promoting takeovers may be 
more important than protecting shareholders (Enriques, 2010). Moreover, not 
all measures of shareholder protection necessarily increase takeover costs. 
Free-riding. Furthermore, by addressing free-riding issues and reducing 
hold-up by shareholders, takeover rules may increase the influence of the 
potential offeror, thus creating pressures to tender and vice versa. Table 35 
summarises these trade-offs by presenting the objectives in conflict. 
Table 35. Impact of takeover regulation (± relationship and intensity, shaded areas 
illustrate an outcome opposed to the objectives of the Directive) 
 
Volume of takeovers Protection of (minority) shareholders 
Disproportionality 
between ownership 
and control 
Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Concentrated 
ownership 
Dispersed 
ownership 
Mandatory 
bid rule – – – + + + + + + 
Ownership 
transparency 
+ + + 
+ + + – – 
– – – 
Squeeze-out 
rule + + + – – + + 
Sell-out rule – – – + + + – – – 
Break-
through rule + + + + + + + + + 
Board 
neutrality 
rule 
+ + + + – + + + 
Note: The positive and negative signs indicate the direction of the effect of each of the provisions on the 
three variables under consideration (volume of takeovers, protection of shareholders and 
disproportionality between ownership and control). The shading indicates whether this effect is in line 
(non-shaded areas) or not in line (shaded areas) with the objectives of the Directive.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Takeover rules. At the rule level, Table 35 reflects the impact of the main 
aspects of takeover regulation on key objectives of the Directive. The major 
components of the Directive are the mandatory bid rule, ownership 
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transparency, the squeeze-out and sell-out rules, the breakthrough rule and the 
board neutrality rule. The key objectives of the Directive are increasing control 
contestability and facilitating takeovers to discipline management, 
strengthening (minority) shareholder protection and reducing the incentives to 
keep ownership concentrated, through both direct incentives (such as control-
enhancing mechanisms) and indirect incentives. Table 35 measures the 
intensity of the impact of these rules by level of ownership concentration, and 
uses two levels of gradation. The same signs across rules do not necessarily 
mean that the rules have the same level of impact on the key objectives of the 
Directive. The two rules that have a broader ‘net’ negative impact on the 
objectives of the Directive are the mandatory bid rule and the squeeze-out rule 
(see the shaded areas in Table 35). In a nutshell, the rules that have a greater 
net positive impact on the key objectives of the Directive are the disclosure of 
ownership structure, the breakthrough rule and the board neutrality rule. The 
negative impact of the squeeze-out rule on the protection of minority 
shareholders and ownership concentration is rather negligible owing to the 
high level of the threshold set in the Directive. The following paragraphs refer 
to each of the provisions in greater detail. 
Mandatory bid. The mandatory bid rule has a negative impact on the 
volume of takeovers because it increases the cost of takeovers ex ante. It also 
has a negative impact on ownership concentration as it incentivises incumbent 
shareholders to increase their holdings close to the triggering threshold. The 
rule has a greater impact on dispersed ownership structures where control 
does not yet lie with only a handful of blockholders. In contrast, the mandatory 
bid rule enhances the protection of minority shareholders, particularly in 
concentrated ownership structures, by forcing the offeror to offer the control 
market premium to all shareholders. Such bold shareholder protection must be 
weighed against the potential adverse affects on the launch of new takeovers. 
Transparency. Ownership transparency has a beneficial impact on all 
three key objectives of the Directive, and especially on the volume of takeovers 
and the protection of minority shareholders, since potential offerors are able to 
see the composition of the ownership structure and plan their bid accordingly. 
This positive effect may disappear when it comes to the disclosure of 
subsequent purchases of shares. In this respect, the disclosure of purchases 
above a certain threshold does not allow ‘creeping-in’ takeovers, which 
enhance shareholder value. This rule may also discourage takeovers, however, 
since it may be more expensive for the potential offeror to build up an initial 
stake before the launch of the bid if the threshold is set too low.  
Squeeze-out. The squeeze-out right may have a positive impact on the 
volume of takeovers. The squeeze-out right protects the offeror from 
shareholders’ free-riding, while the sell-out right has a positive impact on 
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strengthening the power of minority shareholders, thereby reducing the 
incentive to increase ownership concentration. Squeeze-out rules also carry 
significant economic importance given the interest of offerors in gaining full 
control and going private. From this perspective, facilitating squeeze-outs 
helps to make the market for corporate control more ‘contestable’. The impact 
of both rules is nonetheless limited, because of the level of the thresholds set in 
the Directive.  
Breakthrough. The breakthrough rule could have a substantial positive 
impact on the volume of takeovers and the protection of minority shareholders 
if it managed to effectively eliminate all control-enhancing mechanisms. That 
being stated, the rule may also create incentives to increase direct control by 
raising the stake in the company, leading to higher ownership concentration. 
Furthermore, it may be arbitraged using alternative mechanisms, such as 
pyramid structures. If coherently devised and consistently applied, the 
breakthrough rule would produce a very high impact on the ownership 
structure of firms, especially in those jurisdictions where ownership and 
governance are more concentrated. Yet, the limited transposition of the rule 
means that not enough information is available to extract evidence of its 
impact. 
Board neutrality. Finally, the board neutrality rule certainly increases 
incentives to launch an offer, since it constrains the capacity of the board to set 
out impediments and protects minority shareholders, increasing the value of 
their shares by making control more easily contestable. At the same time, it 
may raise pressures for incumbent shareholders to entrench by increasing their 
stake in the company in order to raise the cost of acquiring control for potential 
offerors (with greater impact especially on dispersed ownership structures). 
Still, increasing the ownership stake held in the company may be very 
expensive for incumbent shareholders, which would mitigate the negative 
effect of the board neutrality rule. 
Empirical analysis. In conclusion, according to the empirical analysis, the 
Directive seems to have had an impact on the market for corporate control and 
the economy. The impact seems rather marginal, however, and may be 
significantly affected by the actually fragmented transposition across member 
states. Further analyses of the Directive in the coming years may help to 
strengthen the preliminary results of this study. 
 204 | 
13. IMPACT OF THE DIRECTIVE ON 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Europe 2020 
Fostering competitiveness and growth is a primary concern of the EU in the 
framework of the Europe 2020 Agenda. Competitiveness is a multi-faceted 
concept and so are its links with the market for corporate control. The purpose 
of the present chapter is to shed light on the impact of the Takeover Bids 
Directive on the level of competitiveness and growth of the European 
economy. The scope of the Directive is narrow in comparison with the vast 
number of factors that determine competitiveness in one way or another. To 
best address this mismatch, this chapter follows a methodology based on three 
steps, as illustrated in Figure 28. In sum, this chapter a) sheds light on the links 
between takeovers and competitiveness and b) considers how the Takeover 
Bids Directive affects those links. 
Figure 28. Methodology – Impact of the Directive on competitiveness 
 
Source: Authors.  
13.1 Defining competitiveness  
13.1.1 Definition of competitiveness 
Defining competitiveness at the level of individual countries may prove 
elusive given that it is a multi-faceted concept. Moreover, the number of factors 
that determine the level of competitiveness of an economy and the interactions 
among these factors very likely defies measurement. For instance, the OECD 
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defines competitiveness as a measure of a country’s advantage or disadvantage 
in selling its products in international markets. Traditional competitiveness 
indicators are based on the differential between domestic and competitors’ unit 
manufacturing labour costs and consumer prices. Yet these indicators seem to 
say little about the origin and sources of competitiveness, since they do not 
make explicit the contribution of such aspects as education, training, 
innovation, governance and company sophistication. Therefore, this study 
instead considers the approach followed by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), which assesses multiple factors grouped into 12 pillars to compile its 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). This index places emphasis on the link 
between competitiveness, sustained economic growth and long-term 
prosperity, and therefore represents a useful tool for policy-making. Available 
since 2004, the index covers 139 countries, including most European 
economies. 
13.1.2 Determinants of competitiveness 
Competitiveness is defined by the WEF in the Global Competitiveness Report 
2010-2011 as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the 
level of productivity of a country” (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, p. 4). It is 
the result of the interaction of 12 pillars, which bring together a variety of 
factors, surveyed and scored to compile the index. These pillars are split into 
basic requirements (see the first row in Table 36), innovation and sophistication 
factors, and efficiency enhancers (all other factors).  
Table 36. Competitiveness ‘pillars’ considered by the WEF Global Competitiveness 
Index 
Index pillars 
Institutional 
environment Infrastructure 
Macroeconomic 
environment 
Health and 
primary education 
Business 
sophistication Innovation 
Higher education 
and training 
Goods market 
efficiency 
Labour market 
efficiency 
Financial market 
development 
Technological 
readiness Market size 
Source: Authors based on WEF GCI.  
13.1.3 Economic growth 
The link between competitiveness and growth is well established in economic 
theory, although this link is drawn differently depending on the concept of 
competitiveness that is chosen. Under the WEF definition followed here, 
competitiveness determines productivity, which in turn explains the rates of 
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return of the different factors employed in the economy (Figure 29). Hence, 
given higher rates of return, a country with higher competitiveness and 
productivity would be more prosperous. Competitiveness would therefore 
explain actual and potential economic growth. For economies at an advanced 
stage of development, productivity and growth depend primarily on the 
innovation and sophistication components of competitiveness.  
Figure 29. From competitiveness to growth 
 
Source: Authors.  
13.1.4 Europe 2020 Agenda 
It is worth noting that the pillars postulated by the WEF are in line with the 
vision of competitiveness in Europe embodied by the Europe 2020 Agenda. 
The GCI has been endorsed by the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission as a robust indicator of competitiveness. The Europe 2020 Agenda 
is based on three priorities: 
 smart growth – developing an economy based on knowledge and 
innovation. Policy action is undertaken in the fields of innovation, 
education and digital society; 
 sustainable growth – promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and 
more competitive economy. Action under this heading refers to 
industrial policy, climate change and energy efficiency; and 
 inclusive growth – fostering a high-employment economy delivering 
economic, social and territorial cohesion. Action refers here to the labour 
market, training and poverty. 
The 2020 Agenda also considers other actions in direct relation to the 
pillars of the GCI, such as the strengthening of the single market, the upgrade 
of the institutional setting of the monetary union and the improvement of 
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macroeconomic imbalances. Table 37 summarises the linkages among the 
pillars of the GCI and the priorities of the Europe 2020 Agenda. The next 
section discusses the impact of takeovers on competitiveness.  
Table 37. Linking competitiveness to takeovers  
Europe 2020 Global Competitiveness Index 
Smart growth 
Higher education 
Innovation 
Technological readiness 
Business sophistication 
Sustainable growth 
Infrastructure 
Goods market efficiency 
Inclusive growth 
Health and primary education 
Training 
Labour market efficiency 
Other actions 
Development of financial markets 
Market size 
Institutions 
Macroeconomic environment 
Source: Authors.  
13.2 Takeovers and competitiveness 
13.2.1 Introduction 
Takeover attributes. Research on the effect of mergers and acquisitions on 
company performance does not provide consistent evidence. Instead, results 
vary across studies depending on the country, sector and time span examined, 
rendering any overall conclusion precipitate. Empirical studies consider either 
share prices, under an assumption of market efficiency, or accounting 
information, under an assumption of full disclosure and materiality. With 
regard to offeror performance, studies do not show clear evidence of an 
improvement in performance in either the short or long run (Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007). Similarly, evidence regarding the performance of acquired 
companies is mixed even when controlling for different parameters in the 
transaction (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006, see Table 38). Furthermore, 
these studies do not distinguish between mergers and acquisitions, which 
should be borne in mind given the limited scope of this study. 
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Table 38. Impact on long-term performance 
Parameter 
Expected impact on long-term 
performance* 
Empirical 
evidence found 
in literature*   
Method of payment Cash Stock No impact 
Deal atmosphere Hostile Friendly No impact 
Acquirers’ financial position Leveraged Excess cash flow Inconclusive 
Industry relatedness Same sector Different sector Inconclusive 
Size of the offeree company Big Small Inconclusive 
Geographical focus Cross-border Domestic Inconclusive 
* Adapted from Martynova and Renneboog (2010). 
Sources: Authors; Martynova and Renneboog (2010).  
Stock market returns. Measuring takeover stock market returns is not a 
direct indicator of the impact of takeovers on competitiveness and growth. 
Shareholder gains represent a transfer of wealth from one economic agent to 
another. Instead, the impact of takeovers on competitiveness hinges primarily 
on the realisation of efficiencies and on the balance of these with the costs 
derived from the transaction. 
Efficiencies. Takeovers may induce different kinds of efficiencies, either 
direct or indirect, in the form of synergies and positive externalities. On the one 
hand, direct efficiencies are the result of the application of the business plan of 
the acquirer, meaning that not all takeovers result in the realisation of all 
possible efficiencies. While the existence of exploitable inefficiencies is a 
rational motivation to launch the offer, studies have failed to show the relative 
poor performance of the offeror prior to the takeover (Franks and Mayer, 1996 
in Maher and Andersson, 1999). This result does not in itself negate the 
significance of the realisation of efficiencies by the offeror, but rather puts the 
emphasis on corporate strategy. The acquirer will be able to introduce 
efficiencies into the offeree company depending on its sophistication and 
know-how and its business plan for the acquiree (Andrade et al., 2001; Pyykkö, 
2010). On the other hand, indirect efficiencies may derive from synergies 
between the activities of the acquirer and the acquiree and from the realisation 
of positive externalities, both of which are difficult to measure. For instance, 
research and development may benefit from cooperation between the acquirer 
and the acquiree. Similarly, cooperation may result in the opening up or 
formation of networks and clusters, with positive effects for third parties and 
the economy overall. These effects are thought to be particularly relevant for 
transnational takeovers (Thomsen, 2007). 
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Costs. Takeovers come at a cost, however, including transaction costs and 
the premium payable to shareholders. Among the other transaction costs, 
financing costs and legal and advisory fees represent on average 4% of the 
purchase price, but may be significantly higher at the deal level (Maher and 
Andersson, 1999). The premium paid to shareholders also depends on the 
characteristics of each deal, but on average amounts to approximately 40% 
(Pyykkö, 2010). Under the efficient market hypothesis, the shareholder 
premium will be equal to or lower than the expected increase in cash flows 
realised by the acquisition. Other variables, such as managerial hubris, may 
nonetheless bring the premium paid above expected future gains. Moreover, 
expected gains may not ultimately materialise. 
Recovery. Takeover costs being non-negligible, they may substantially 
affect the financial situation of the offeror. For instance, the offeror may be 
forced to reduce the amount spent on research and development, at least in the 
short term. Alternatively, it may seek to recover some of these costs by 
expropriating rents from other stakeholders, including employees. These 
disruptions stemming from the impact of takeover costs on the financial 
situation of the offeror are likely to be limited to the short term, but 
nevertheless affect competitiveness negatively. 
Distribution. Redistribution concerns also affect the impact of takeovers 
on competitiveness. The question to be asked concerns the origin of the gains 
captured by the takeover premium and advisory fees. Where these gains are 
disproportionately realised at the expense of employees and other 
stakeholders, what may appear as a zero-sum game is unlikely to be 
economically neutral. Expropriating wealth from employees and other 
stakeholders may negatively impact competitiveness by reducing such parties’ 
incentives to undertake firm-specific investments (Maher and Andersson, 
1999). The foregoing assertion is not intended to discredit all forms of 
restructuring arising in the aftermath of a takeover bid. Restructuring can 
streamline procedures, incentivise performance and reduce superfluous costs 
and free-riding (i.e. improve operational efficiencies). It therefore has the 
potential to increase the productivity of the company without reducing the 
incentives of stakeholders to undertake firm-specific investments, thereby 
increasing competitiveness. Still, where the costs incurred in the transaction are 
high, management may face enormous pressure to recoup such costs in the 
short term. Clever restructuring may then turn into predatory cost-cutting to 
the detriment of competitiveness and growth. Redistribution concerns also 
have repercussions on public finances, which may be negatively affected by the 
socialisation of some of the losses realised by restructuring. 
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Time. A further complexity in determining the impact of takeovers on 
competitiveness concerns the time horizon. In this regard, it is worth 
highlighting that the costs involved in a takeover deal are, by their very nature, 
one-off costs, while efficiency gains have the potential to be dynamic and long-
term. Addressing the long-term impact of takeovers on company performance 
is a difficult exercise given the challenges of isolating the effect of the takeover 
from other factors. As such, evidence in this regard is limited (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2006). 
Ownership concentration. On a different note, the level of shareholder 
concentration resulting after a takeover is also likely to have an impact on 
competitiveness and growth (Maher and Andersson, 1999). The absence of 
stable shareholders can curtail the ability of management to pursue long-term 
value creation and induce it to prefer projects with short-term payoffs instead. 
This phenomenon may occur where there is high ownership dispersion and 
managers face a continuous threat of dismissal. Conversely, ownership 
concentration reduces the agency problems between management and 
shareholders, although its effects on performance are unclear given the higher 
risk of extraction of private benefits. National legislation strives to adapt to the 
level of ownership and control the concentration prevalent in the jurisdiction, 
while legislation also shapes it by enforcing such rules as the one share–one 
vote principle. 
The academic literature presents mixed evidence on the link between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance. Distinguishing between 
short-term and long-term performance appears particularly difficult in this 
regard. In a survey of the relevant literature, Maher and Andersson (1999) 
conclude that the results are country- and sector-specific, but that performance 
tends to increase in line with concentration at low levels of concentration. At 
the same time, higher shareholder concentration increases the risk of extraction 
of private benefits, which the literature has found to be significant (Zingales, 
1994; Barca, 1995 in Maher and Andersson, 1999). Private benefits exceeding 
the compensation for control and non-diversification are inefficient and will 
negatively impact competitiveness.  
Stakeholders. Corporate governance is thought to affect performance at 
the level of the company as well as the overall competitiveness and growth of 
the economy (Maher and Andersson, 1999). Balancing the interests of the 
different stakeholders involved appears crucial in this regard. As a 
precondition, shareholder protection is essential to maximise the amount of 
resources invested in the economy. Where shareholders face the risk of 
expropriation by management or controlling blockholders, their willingness to 
invest will be reduced (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). That being stated, 
shareholders are not the only agents who invest in the corporation. Other 
 stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers, also 
specific investments that have a direct impact on company performance and 
competitiveness. The engagement of all stakeholders is of particular 
importance in activities with high asset specificity and added value (
and Andersson, 1999; Mayer, 1996). 
Figure 30. Virtuous cycle of takeovers 
Source: Authors.  
 
Box 10. Method of payment and consideration in takeovers
Figures B10.1 and B10.2 present the payment method and the distribution of the 
consideration paid by acquirers in takeovers in Europe. More than 70% of deals 
are settled using cash alone, which makes up most of the consideration paid 
overall.  
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Figure B10.1 Number of takeover deals by method of settlement 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum.  
Figure B10.2 Consideration paid in takeover deals in Europe 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum.  
13.2.2 Linking takeovers to the pillars in the Global 
Competitiveness Index 
This subsection considers the potential effect of takeovers on competitiveness 
with reference to selected pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index that have 
the most direct connection to takeover activity (see Table 39; Table 47 at the 
end of this subsection also presents a summary). 
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Table 39. Linking the pillars in the Global Competitiveness Index to takeovers 
Global Competitiveness Index Impact on takeovers 
Higher education – 
Innovation Yes 
Technological readiness Yes 
Business sophistication Yes 
Infrastructure – 
Goods market efficiency Yes 
Health and primary education – 
Training – 
Labour market efficiency Yes 
Market size Yes 
Development of financial markets Yes 
Institutions – 
Macroeconomic environment – 
Source: Authors.  
a) Goods market efficiency. Efficient markets are those able to produce the 
right mix of products and services given demand and supply conditions while 
ensuring their effective distribution (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, pp. 5-8; 
see also Table 40). 
Table 40. The determinants of goods market efficiency in the GCI 
Determinants 
Supply 
responsiveness 
Efficient 
distribution 
Healthy market 
competition 
Minimum red tape 
Moderate and 
neutral taxation 
Openness to 
foreign direct 
investment 
Trade openness Customer 
orientation and 
sophistication 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Scale and scope. Takeovers have the potential to increase the efficiency 
and productivity of a company in supplying the goods and services demanded 
by the economy (Thomsen, 2007; Maher and Andersson, 1999). The realisation 
of economies of scale and scope are particularly apt to generate efficiency gains 
that affect not only production, but also research, marketing and distribution, 
with a positive impact on the economy as a whole (OECD, 2001). These effects 
are assumed to be more significant where takeovers are transnational, given 
the increase in market size and trade (OECD, 2001). Company restructuring 
following a takeover also has the potential to streamline procedures, 
214 | VALIANTE & DE MANUEL ARAMENDÍA 
incentivise performance and reduce superfluous costs. Supply responsiveness 
and the efficiency of distribution can therefore be positively transformed as a 
result of takeover activity.  
Competition. The effect of takeovers on competition remains unclear and 
depends on the circumstances of each deal. By increasing concentration, 
takeovers alter the structure of the marketplace and may therefore negatively 
impact competitive dynamics. This is why takeovers are frequently subject to 
screening by competition authorities, as in the EU Merger Regulation 
(139/2004) (Art. 3.1(b)). Takeovers may result in the accumulation of dominant 
positions, which may later be abused, but may also disrupt market structures, 
rendering the latter unable to deliver the benefits that follow from competition 
(Whish, 2009). There is evidence that takeovers may lead to a reduction in 
competition and increased prices, although this evidence does not in any way 
establish a general rule (Thomsen, 2007). For instance, it is important to 
differentiate between horizontal takeovers, involving companies that compete 
at the same level of the production chain, and vertical takeovers, which involve 
companies at different levels and are therefore less likely to reduce 
competition. Moreover, in sectors engaged in transnational consolidation, the 
geographical focus of the marketplace will shift to the international level 
without necessarily reducing competition. Overall, therefore, the impact of 
takeovers on competition is difficult to anticipate. 
b) Market size. Market size allows companies to reach economies of scale, 
thereby increasing productivity (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, pp. 5-8; see 
also Table 41).  
Table 41. The determinants of market size considered in the GCI 
Determinants 
Domestic market 
size Trade openness 
Economic 
integration 
Legislative 
integration 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Efficient scale. Takeovers have the potential to help business gain an 
efficient scale, thereby increasing both business size and productivity 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). In the context of the EU, market size is 
realised through the legislative and economic integration of the national 
markets of member states, which come together to form the single market (see 
Box 11). Transnational takeovers of a European dimension are therefore 
instrumental to the constitution of the single market. An open market for 
corporate control is a useful tool to develop an international production base 
(Maher and Andersson, 1999) and to secure the potential for economies of scale 
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and scope within the single market. In addition, transnational takeovers tend 
to increase trade integration for both the final product and intermediate 
supplies (Thomsen, 2007). Furthermore, by facilitating trade integration, 
transnational takeovers can play a role in fostering political stability (Thomsen, 
2007). A larger market size is expected to increase the mobility of resources and 
boost competition for these resources, thereby directing them towards more 
productive utilisation (OECD, 2001). 
Box 11. Integration of the European market for corporate control 
The number of cross-border takeovers in the EU has increased since 2003, 
although relatively speaking, it was more strongly affected by the financial crisis 
in 2008 and 2009 than takeovers taking place within the same EU country and 
deals involving a non-EU offeror (Figure B11.1).  
In terms of value, the share of EU cross-border deals is very significant but 
has varied widely over time. In 2005, EU cross-border deals accounted for more 
than 50% of the total value of takeovers. This share decreased considerably in 
the following years but recovered in 2010 (see Figure B11.2). 
Figure B11.1 Number of takeovers by location of the parties 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
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Figure B11.2 Value of takeovers by geographical location of the parties 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 
c) Labour market efficiency. Efficient labour markets are those where 
human resources are best allocated and are appraised by their performance 
(Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, pp. 5-8; see also Table 42). 
Table 42. The determinants of labour market efficiency in the GCI 
Determinants 
Allocation 
flexibility Wage flexibility 
Incentives based 
on performance Gender equality 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Human resources. Takeovers have the potential to further the efficient 
management of human resources at the company level, thus increasing 
competitiveness (the effect of takeovers on employment and labour market 
efficiency is the object of a separate chapter in this study). Three main factors 
are involved: i) the presence of exploitable inefficiencies in the offeree 
company and any restructuring plans of the offeror devised to capture the 
benefits available; ii) the business plan of the offeror and the success of the 
deal, which may result in business expansion over the medium term and an 
increase in workforce numbers; and iii) the engagement of employee 
representatives and management to mitigate the effects of restructuring on 
individual employees. There is evidence that acquisitions are used by some 
European companies to reach their optimal employment levels, which they 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU cross-border EU single country Non-EU bidder
PART II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 217 
 
cannot otherwise reach given strict employment protection legislation (Gugler 
and Yurtoglu, 2004).  
d) Technological readiness. Technological readiness is a measure of the 
capacity of the economy to best dispose of technology to enhance productivity 
(Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, pp. 5-8; see also Table 43). 
Table 43. The determinants of business sophistication considered in the GCI 
Determinants 
ICT penetration Technological availability 
Readiness for 
adoption Customisation 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Information and communication technology (ICT). Takeovers may boost the 
development and application of ICT, given that it is instrumental in managing 
bigger or more diversified organisations. ICT allows for more flexible business 
practices, swifter communication and better customisation of products and 
services. It is therefore crucial for the integration of regional and national 
markets, helping to reap economies of scale and scope (OECD, 2001). At the 
same time, organisations with a multi-product or multi-market base are more 
likely to invest in ICT to satisfy their increased need for technology, which 
springs precisely from their presence in different markets. 
e) Innovation. Innovation is measured by the ability to further the frontiers 
of knowledge, beyond the integration and adaptation of exogenous 
technologies (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, pp. 5-8; see also Table 44). 
Table 44. The determinants of innovation considered in the GCI 
Determinants 
Research and 
development 
Public sector 
support 
Quality research 
institutions 
Networks and 
clusters 
Protection of 
intellectual 
property 
– – – 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Transfer of technology. Takeovers are thought to foster the transfer of 
technology between offeror and offeree companies, both internally and by 
enabling access to third-party providers and networks. Transnational 
takeovers are particularly useful in this regard, since they bring together 
providers and experts operating in different markets and jurisdictions (OECD, 
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2001; Sachwald, 2000). Learning effects may have a positive impact in 
increasing the innovative capabilities of actors and economies on both sides. 
Countries at an intermediate stage of development, such as member states that 
have acceded to the EU more recently, are expected to benefit the most from 
technological transfers. Countries at a further stage of development, closer to 
the technological frontier, benefit less from transfers themselves and more 
from positive externalities arising from the formation and consolidation of 
networks (Thomsen, 2007; OECD, 2001; Al Azzawi, 2004). On a different note, 
the distribution of the benefits arising from technological transfers depends to 
a large extent on the location of research and development (R&D) facilities, 
which may be relocated, thus disadvantaging one of the parties involved in the 
takeover. 
Volume of research. Alongside technology transfers, takeovers are also 
likely to affect the volume of research undertaken by both the offeror and 
offeree companies. The amount of resources dedicated to R&D may decrease 
owing to rationalisation and the pooling of programmes and competencies 
following the takeover. Still, such a reduction is unlikely to weaken R&D 
outcomes and may instead strengthen them. It is not possible to advance a 
general rule; rather, it is the business plan of the acquirer that will determine 
the amount of resources that the acquiree allocates to research and 
development. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the costs incurred 
through the takeover deal may result in a reduction of the financial ability of 
both the offeror and the offeree company to invest in R&D, at least over the 
short to medium term. 
Market for corporate control. The level of activity in the market for 
corporate control also has an impact on research and innovation. The evidence, 
however, is mixed. An inactive market for corporate control may incite 
management to stifle innovation in order to avoid stimulating product 
competition and thus “creative self-destruction” (Morck, 2000; Morck and 
Yeung, 2004). On the other hand, it may encourage company-specific 
investments and long-term internal innovation by reducing pressures on 
management and employees to perform in the short term (Hitt et al., 1996). In 
practice, companies that are the object of a continual takeover threat are likely 
to invest less in internal innovation and rely more on external sources (Hitt et 
al., 1996). Furthermore, stimulating product competition may offset any 
reduction in innovation because of the lack of activity in the market for 
corporate control. It is well established that strong monitoring of dominant 
behaviour and anti-competitive practices is necessary to avoid takeovers 
having pervasive effects on the economy, in terms of both higher prices and 
reduced innovation. 
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Ownership concentration. The level of ownership and control 
concentration arising after the bid is not neutral to innovation either. 
Concentrated control of corporate assets may distort capital allocation and 
reduce the rate of innovation (Morck and Yeung, 2004). Yet dispersed 
ownership and control, if coupled with a lack of stable shareholders, may 
induce short-termism in managerial behaviour and also reduce the rate of 
innovation. Balanced ownership structures are likely to avoid the misallocation 
of resources and maximise innovation. 
Box 12. Takeovers by industry subsector 
Figures B12.1 and B12.2 present the distribution of takeover deals and value per 
industry subsector in the sample considered in this study.  
Takeovers occur in all sectors but more frequently in the energy and 
power, financial and materials sectors. The distribution of value follows a 
different pattern, however. Most notably, while the high technology subsector 
attracts only 4% of the deals, these deals are worth 17% of the total value across 
sectors. 
Figure B12.1 Takeovers by industry subsector 2003–10 (value of deals) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum.  
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Figure B12.2 Takeovers by industry subsector 2003–10 (number of deals) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum.  
f) Business sophistication. Business sophistication measures the quality of 
business networks and clusters within an economy (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 
2011, pp. 5-8; see also Table 45). 
Table 45. The determinants of business sophistication considered in the GCI 
Determinants 
Quantity and 
quality of local 
suppliers 
Business networks Business clusters Position in value chain 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Networks and clusters. Takeovers have the potential to result in the 
formation and consolidation of both business networks and clusters. For 
instance, this potential is particularly high in the case of transnational 
takeovers, where there is scope for the creation of networks across markets that 
would otherwise be difficult to achieve. The effect of takeovers on the creation 
of networks and business sophistication is not restricted to the acquirer and 
acquiree, but frequently extends to resource providers that did not previously 
interact. In the context of the EU, establishing business networks across 
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different member states allows actors to reap the potential of the single market 
for competitiveness and growth. 
Vertical spillover. Where takeovers connect companies working at 
different levels of the value chain, they also have the potential to strengthen 
the position of both companies. They may, for instance, allow for more efficient 
sourcing or distribution, resulting in more efficient production processes and 
the better targeting of consumers. At the same time, takeovers result in the 
transfer of know-how and skills that have the potential to raise the level of 
sophistication of the companies involved, together with that of their suppliers 
and distributors. 
g) Development of financial markets. Efficient financial markets channel 
resources to the soundest economic activities (Sala-i-Martin and Schwab, 2011, 
pp. 5-8; see also Table 46). 
Table 46. Determinants for the development of financial markets considered in the GCI 
Determinants 
Depth Access to capital Prudential regulation 
Transparency and 
investor protection 
Source: WEF GCI.  
Equity markets. An active market for corporate control is linked to the 
existence of functioning equity markets. It simultaneously increases the 
efficiency of these markets by providing opportunities for the valuation and 
transfer of control, allowing investors to acquire such control and channel their 
capital towards value-creating investments (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Where 
ownership and control are dissociated, the protection of investors is essential to 
foster their participation in capital markets. In any case, corporate governance 
(and takeover regulation) affects the development of capital markets and 
therefore resource allocation (capital mobility), ultimately affecting 
competitiveness and growth.70  
Capital markets. Despite criticism stemming from the recent financial 
crisis concerning resiliency in distressed times, financial markets 
unquestionably tend to solve problems related to information asymmetries and 
transaction frictions (Levine, 1997). Moreover, they represent the most efficient 
                                                        
70 Certain authors, such as Lucas (1988), argue that the impact of the financial system on 
economic growth is limited and reject the notion of a strong link between finance and 
growth. 
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tool available in promoting the contestability of control, even at the cross-
border level. Following Levine (1997), financial markets address transaction 
costs, which may impede an efficient allocation of resources, by (among other 
things) exerting control over companies’ performance and management. It 
follows that this situation is most likely to favour growth through capital 
accumulation and technological innovation.  
Long-term investments. It is nonetheless crucial to design a financial 
system that creates liquidity around long-term investments, which ultimately 
produce high returns, through the proper mix of financial contracts, markets 
and institutions (Boyd and Smith, 1996). A financial system that is designed 
around the need to increase returns in the short term due to widespread short-
term funding needs may not generate sufficient liquidity for long-term 
investments. This in turn stunts the development of technological changes and 
innovation, and consequently greater competitiveness and growth. This will 
impinge on growth and will potentially push the entire financial system to the 
brink of a broader collapse. A financial system that lowers the monitoring costs 
over the efficiency of investments increases company performance and 
competitiveness. If markets are able to price and provide liquidity for long-
term projects, they will also reduce incentives to increase ownership 
concentration to protect long-term projects.  
Table 47. Competitiveness indicators affected by takeover activity 
Country/ 
economy 
Avg. 
index 
Goods 
market 
efficiency 
Market 
size 
Labour 
market 
efficiency 
Technological 
readiness 
Innovation Business 
sophistication 
Development 
of financial  
markets  
Greece 3.78 3.91 4.52 3.71 4.06 3.00 3.41 3.88 
Romania 3.83 4.08 4.41 4.32 3.82 2.94 3.24 4.01 
Slovakia 4.08 4.34 3.97 4.66 4.48 2.95 3.54 4.61 
Hungary 4.10 4.16 4.27 4.46 4.41 3.55 3.71 4.16 
Italy 4.13 4.16 5.63 3.81 4.12 3.40 4.11 3.70 
Portugal 4.16 4.32 4.34 3.85 4.63 3.77 3.98 4.26 
Estonia 4.22 4.71 2.89 4.91 4.94 3.68 3.90 4.50 
Cyprus 4.22 4.97 2.82 4.64 4.4 3.66 4.07 5.01 
Poland 4.26 4.38 5.08 4.58 4.02 3.31 3.76 4.66 
Spain 4.27 4.20 5.47 3.88 4.64 3.47 3.96 4.28 
Czech Rep. 4.42 4.58 4.47 4.75 4.55 3.92 4.19 4.49 
Ireland 4.53 5.09 4.20 4.87 4.99 4.25 4.55 3.79 
Austria 4.80 5.00 4.59 4.75 5.09 4.48 4.97 4.74 
Belgium  4.84 5.08 4.77 4.64 5.22 4.59 4.91 4.64 
Luxembourg 4.87 5.49 3.16 4.71 6.11 4.53 4.76 5.35 
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Table 47. cont’d 
Country/ 
economy 
Avg. 
index 
Goods 
market 
efficiency 
Market 
size 
Labour 
market 
efficiency 
Technological 
readiness 
Innovation Business 
sophistication 
Development 
of financial  
markets  
France 4.92 4.69 5.76 4.47 5.28 4.48 4.83 4.96 
Denmark 5.06 5.10 4.25 5.47 5.62 4.89 5.15 4.94 
Finland 5.07 4.92 4.15 4.85 5.17 5.56 5.43 5.38 
Netherlands 5.10 5.17 5.10 4.83 5.99 4.77 5.16 4.71 
UK 5.14 4.96 5.80 5.29 5.58 4.65 4.98 4.73 
Germany 5.15 4.97 6.01 4.40 5.36 5.19 5.51 4.62 
Sweden 5.31 5.30 4.58 4.89 6.12 5.45 5.67 5.15 
Source: WEF (2011).  
13.3 The Directive and competitiveness 
Regulatory environment 
The impact of takeovers on competitiveness is strongly influenced by the 
regulatory environment in each jurisdiction. For instance, dysfunctional factor 
and product markets may limit the forecasted efficiency gains, while 
discrimination against foreign companies, as in public procurement, will 
hamper transnational deals and reduce their potential for generating efficiency 
gains. Conversely, well-grounded national policies in the areas of research, 
education and skills will boost the positive effects of takeovers, while at the 
same time diminishing the chances of relocation (Thomsen, 2007). 
Corporate governance 
Takeover regulation needs to be understood as part of the broader system of 
corporate governance, which impacts on productivity and competitiveness. To 
foster productivity and competitiveness, corporate governance must achieve a 
complex balance. It needs to be capable of attracting long-term capital by 
privileging the interests of shareholders, while at the same time taking into 
account the interests of employees and other stakeholders, whose performance 
determines productivity and competitiveness (OECD, 2001).  
Economic integration 
Takeover regulation also needs to effectively take into consideration the 
increasingly international nature of deals, given the growing importance of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (OECD, 2001). In the case of the single 
European market, harmonising takeover regulation appears to be a necessary 
element for the proper governance of deals and the reduction of arbitrage. A 
common set of rules is expected to increase the efficiency of the market for 
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corporate control and have a positive impact on competitiveness. The crucial 
questions, however, are what level of legislative integration is most adequate 
and whether such regulation should be based on full or partial harmonisation. 
As stated in every discussion on the Directive, there is no full harmonisation of 
takeover regulation in Europe. Partial harmonisation is combined with the 
introduction of a number of optional provisions that member states may or 
may not transpose into national law. Notably, the board neutrality rule and the 
breakthrough rule are optional provisions of this kind. 
Harmonisation 
There is a lack of consensus as to the desirable level of harmonisation. 
Homogenous rules can have widely different effects in practice depending on 
the ownership structure prevalent in each country (Ventoruzzo, 2008; Goergen 
et al., 2005). Optional provisions would therefore be a useful approach to 
account for national diversities in the governance structure (McCahery et al., 
2010). Even so, optionality comes at the expense of lower legal certainty and 
higher transaction costs (Humphery-Jenner, 2010; Davies et al., 2010; Clarke, 
2009; Enriques, 2004). Partial harmonisation may even result in a race to the 
bottom in connection with regulatory standards. In this regard, the 
Commission concluded in 2007 that the “number of member states 
implementing the Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly 
large” (European Commission, 2007a). 
Mandatory bid rule 
The level of concentration of ownership and control in the offeree company 
appears to be a main determinant of the impact of the Directive’s provisions. In 
the case of a dispersed ownership structure, the mandatory bid rule protects 
minority shareholders from the entrance of a large blockholder (see Table 48). 
Meanwhile, in the case of concentrated ownership, it also protects the 
incumbent blockholder by making the acquisition more costly due to the fair 
price rule. But if the takeover goes forward, the mandatory bid rule will protect 
minority shareholders in concentrated ownership structures the most, by 
forcing the acquirer to offer the control premium to all shareholders. Higher 
transaction costs are likely to have a negative impact on competitiveness at 
both the company level and throughout the economy as a whole. For instance, 
costs may disrupt research and development in the short term or be passed on 
disproportionately to employees, reducing the incentives to commit to firm-
specific investments.  
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Table 48. Impact of key Directive provisions according to ownership structure 
 Concentrated 
ownership/control 
Dispersed ownership/control 
 Positive 
impact 
Negative 
impact 
Positive 
impact Negative impact 
Mandatory 
bid rule 
 
Protects 
minority 
shareholders 
 
Raises costs of 
takeover 
 
Protects 
minority 
shareholders 
 
Raises costs of 
takeover 
Board 
neutrality rule 
 
None 
 
None 
 
Protects 
shareholders 
 
Does not allow the 
interests of other 
stakeholders to be 
taken into account 
Breakthrough 
rule 
 ? 
May reduce 
extraction of 
private 
benefits 
 ? 
Does not allow 
the interests of 
other 
stakeholders 
to be taken 
into account  
 
None 
 
None 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Board neutrality rule 
Ownership and control concentration also determine the effect of the board 
neutrality rule. In the case of dispersed ownership, this rule addresses the 
agency problem between management and ownership and thus protects 
shareholders. Yet in the case of concentrated ownership, the rule becomes 
irrelevant for the protection of minority shareholders given the alignment of 
interests between blockholders and management. At the same time, the board 
neutrality rule is non-neutral for competitiveness. On the one hand, by 
protecting shareholders, the rule maximises their incentives to invest, therefore 
contributing to the development of capital markets, the links of which with 
competitiveness and growth are well established (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). 
On the other hand, by removing all power of decision from the board, the rule 
may not allow for the proper consideration of the interests of other 
stakeholders, including employees, whose contribution to competitiveness and 
growth is also of great importance. 
Breakthrough rule 
The breakthrough rule likewise affects competitiveness. The rule is tantamount 
to the introduction of the one share–one vote principle on an ex-post basis. It 
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facilitates changes in corporate control where concentration of ownership and 
control diverge owing to the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, notably 
dual shares. By facilitating changes of control where dual-class shares are 
present, the breakthrough rule is likely to deter the use of such shares, which is 
to some extent associated with the exploitation of private benefits of control. If 
rights are altered on an ex-post basis, however, it introduces legal uncertainty 
and can therefore negatively affect the development of financial markets. In 
contrast, the rule is ineffective where pyramid holdings are used, rendering its 
effects less clear. Moreover, it has not been transposed in any member state 
except Estonia. Like the mandatory bid rule, the breakthrough rule may reduce 
the scope for the interests of stakeholders to be factored into the takeover 
process due to the enforcement of the one share–one vote principle. 
Squeeze-out rule 
The squeeze-out right also affects competitiveness by reducing the hold-up 
problem and facilitating changes in control. Most importantly, the squeeze-out 
right affords the offeror the possibility to gain full control of the offeree 
company by excluding residual shareholders, de-listing the offeree company 
and making it a private company. Hence, the impact of the squeeze-out right 
on competitiveness depends on the trade-off between remaining public or 
going private. The strengths and drawbacks of public versus private 
companies is a broad question beyond the scope of takeover regulation and 
hence this study. 
Summary 
Table 49 summarises the discussion above with reference to each of the pillars 
in the Global Competitiveness Index for the mandatory bid rule and the board 
neutrality rule. The former, by protecting minority shareholders, has a positive 
impact on the development of capital markets, in particular where ownership 
is concentrated – by forcing the acquirer to offer the control premium to all 
shareholders. At the same time, by raising the cost of acquiring control, the 
mandatory bid rule may negatively affect the other determinants of 
competitiveness. For instance, it may deter some takeovers with a potential to 
generate efficiencies and increase the geographical scope of good markets. This 
higher cost may also result in a reduction of the funds invested in human 
resources or research and development, at least over the short to medium term. 
As to the board neutrality rule, it is only relevant where the interests of 
managers and owners are not aligned, that is, where ownership is dispersed. 
By granting shareholders full decisional power, board neutrality promotes the 
development of financial markets. Furthermore, since it does not allow 
management to adopt defensive measures, the rule facilitates takeovers, 
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including those with a potential to generate efficiencies and increase the 
geographical scope of good markets. Still, board neutrality limits the extent to 
which stakeholders’ interests are taken into account in the takeover process, 
reducing their incentives to undertake company-specific investments.  
Table 49. Impact of key provisions of the Directive on competitiveness  
 Concentrated ownership Dispersed ownership 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Index 
Mandatory bid 
rule 
Board 
neutrality 
rule 
Mandatory 
bid rule 
Board 
neutrality 
rule 
Goods market 
efficiency     
Market size     
Labour market 
efficiency     
Technological 
readiness     
Innovation     
Business 
sophistication     
Development of 
financial markets     
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WEF GCI.  
13.4 Empirical analysis 
Application. The link between the Directive and competitiveness is difficult to 
establish empirically. An indication may be obtained by mapping member 
states’ transposition and their respective positions in terms of competitiveness. 
Figure 31 compares the scores for implementation of the Directive with an 
indicator of competitiveness based on the average scores for the selected pillars 
of the GCI. There appears to be a positive link between better transposition and 
higher competitiveness for those countries with low to medium GCI scores. 
Notably, however, countries with high GCI scores have transposed the 
Directive in dissimilar ways, achieving both high and low implementation 
scores rather than median ones. Mapping of this kind is illustrative and does 
not allow general conclusions to be drawn. It shows that the impact of the 
Directive on competitiveness and growth is limited. That notwithstanding, it 
provides some indication that transposition close to the mean tends to be 
associated with relatively poor competitiveness. It also shows that poor 
transposition is not necessarily linked to low competitiveness. 
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Figure 31. Competitiveness and transposition of the Directive 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns for offeree company 
shareholders appear to be positively correlated to competitiveness. While this 
result does not reflect the impact of the Directive itself, it shows a link between 
shareholder returns and the level of competitiveness in the country of the 
offeree company. This evidence is consistent with the relevance attributed by 
the academic literature to country-specific variables in the performance of 
mergers and acquisitions (Maher and Andersson, 1999; Pyykkö, 2010). Figure 
32 features the average CARs accruing 41 trading days before and after the 
announcement of a takeover. It considers over 500 takeover deals that took 
place after the transposition of the Directive in each member state until 2011, 
where such takeovers aimed at acquiring control of an offeree company based 
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in the EU.71 Data was kindly provided by Thomson Reuters for the purpose of 
this study from its SDC Platinum and DataStream databases. Cumulative 
returns take as a benchmark the STOXX Europe 600 Index corresponding to the 
sector or industry of the offeree company. A positive trend appears where 
CARs are mapped at the country level and the indicator of competitiveness is 
based on selected pillars of the GCI. Yet given the many caveats discussed in 
the previous sections, the use of stock market returns as an indicator of 
takeover performance needs to be treated with caution. The econometric 
analysis (see Appendix 5) confirms this relationship with significance and 
relevant impact.  
Figure 32. CARs and competitiveness after transposition of the Directive 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum, Datastream and 
STOXX sector indices. 
                                                        
71  Takeovers are filtered according to the stake held by the acquirer before 
announcement. The goal of takeovers is deemed to be acquiring control where the 
acquirer held less than 51% of the shares before announcement. 
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The evidence highlights the link between stock market returns for the 
shareholders of the offeree company and the level of competitiveness of the 
target member state. It does not, however, directly address the question of the 
impact of takeovers on competitiveness. Given the almost infinite number of 
factors that explain the level of competitiveness and growth in an economy, it 
is not possible to isolate the impact of takeovers in an econometric regression. 
Nonetheless, the mapping above represents a valuable indication of the 
relevance of takeover activity to country-wide competitiveness and growth.  
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14. IMPACT OF THE DIRECTIVE ON 
EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEES 
Introduction  
Takeover deals result in a transfer of control that is likely to affect employees in 
diverse ways depending on the business plan of the acquirer. Where a takeover 
is followed by restructuring, collective lay-offs may occur, which worries both 
employees and public authorities. To address the impact of takeovers on 
employment and employees, this chapter follows a methodology based on 
three steps: 1) defining labour market efficiency with reference to the 
flexicurity approach, 2) considering the links between takeovers and 
employment, and 3) referring to the rules in the Takeover Bids Directive (see 
Figure 33).  
Figure 33. Methodology – Impact of the Directive on employment and employees 
 
Source: Authors.  
14.1 Approach to labour market efficiency 
Approach 
Given the many different approaches to employment protection and labour 
market efficiency, considering the effects of the Directive on employment is by 
no means straightforward. Exploiting any inefficiency in the management of 
human resources in the offeree company may constitute part of the economic 
rationale of a takeover. In this regard, the offeror may wish to apply changes in 
employment conditions – such as salary, working schedules or training – that 
will directly affect employees. Similarly, employment levels may be reduced or 
increased depending on the business plan of the offeror and the existence of 
expansion opportunities. Before discussing these effects, it is important to 
clarify the approach to employment protection and labour market efficiency 
that will be followed. 
Approach to labour 
market efficiency
•Defining labour market 
efficiency
•Considering the social 
costs of labour market 
inefficiencies
Takeovers and the           
labour market
•Survey of the scientific 
literature
•Empirical analysis
The Takeover Bids 
Directive and the         
labour market
•Economic analysis of the 
legal provisions
•Conclusion
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Flexicurity 
Modern labour market policy in the EU is built upon the ‘flexicurity’ approach, 
which recognises the need for a flexible workforce given global competition 
and rapidly changing economic conditions. It therefore acknowledges that 
restructuring, such as that which might follow a takeover bid, can have a 
positive effect on productivity and competitiveness within the company and 
the economy as a whole. On the other hand, flexicurity gives equal importance 
to the individual and social costs of changes in employment levels and 
working conditions. To address these costs, the emphasis is placed on the 
effectiveness of active labour market policies and comprehensive, lifelong 
learning strategies, along with modern social security systems. The goal is to 
ensure that human resources are efficiently reallocated so workers do not face 
long periods of unemployment, thereby reducing the risks associated with 
social exclusion and budgetary burdens on the state.72  
14.2 Effects of takeovers on employment  
Available evidence 
Empirical evidence on the effects of takeovers on the labour market is scarce 
owing to insufficient data collection and dissemination. Where data exist, they 
are anecdotal and while indicative, cannot be taken as fully representative. In 
addition, empirical studies face a number of methodological constraints that 
have so far not been overcome: 
 finding control groups of comparable companies where no takeover has 
taken place; 
 disentangling organic job growth from acquisitions and divestitures; 
 taking into account jobs created elsewhere, through outsourcing; 
 measuring efficiency and productivity gains; and 
 accounting for the distributional effects of efficiency and productivity 
gains obtained through collective dismissals and early retirement 
schemes. 
  
                                                        
72 See European Commission (2007b); see also Council of the European Union, Towards 
Common Principles of Flexicurity – Draft Council Conclusions, 15497/07, Brussels, 23 
November 2007. 
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European Monitoring Centre on Change database 
The most useful pan-European database for assessing the overall effects on 
employment levels is compiled by the European Monitoring Centre on Change 
(EMCC), which considers planned job creation and reductions according to the 
type of restructuring: bankruptcies and closures, business expansions, mergers 
and acquisitions, off-shoring and delocalisation, outsourcing, relocation and 
other internal restructuring. The database, however, relies solely on 
information available in public media.73 
Mergers 
The EMCC database considers takeovers not as a separate category, but within 
the category of mergers and acquisitions. In this category, average net job 
creation was negative from 2002 to 2010, except for 2007 where exceptional 
planned creation was registered (see the data summarised in Table 50 and the 
complete table in Appendix 2). To best interpret data for this category, it 
should be noted that the arguably major cause of layoffs in mergers – avoiding 
the duplication of tasks – is by its very nature not present in acquisitions. Net 
job creation is in any case explained by the business plans of the acquirer. It is 
therefore probable that net job creation in takeovers and other acquisitions is 
higher than in the case of mergers. 
Table 50. Planned job creation by year in M&A deals in the EU-27 and Norway 
Year Cases  Job creation Job reduction Net job 
creation 
Average net 
job creation 
2002 21 0 -12,163 -12,163 -579 
2003 17 160 -4,535 -4,375 -257 
2004 35 360 -15,203 -14,843 -424 
2005 55 2,315 -25,303 -22,988 -418 
2006 51 3,170 -27,763 -24,593 -482 
2007 49 69,183 -16,988 52,195 1,065 
2008 38 1,840 -25,772 -23,932 -630 
2009 23 480 -13,229 -12,749 -554 
2010 18 3,950 -10,973 -7,023 -390 
Total 307 81,458 -151,929 -70,471 -230 
Source: EMCC.  
                                                        
73 Media reports have a bias towards reporting restructuring announcements, but rarely 
follow up on the actual measures taken. In addition, there is a national bias towards 
reporting. 
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Abnormal observations 
Average net job creation for mergers and acquisitions is higher than for most 
other restructuring categories considered in the EMCC database for the period 
2002–10. This assertion only holds partially if observations are excluded for 
2007, when abnormal data for planned job creation were recorded. Tables 51 
and 52 make this comparison across headings in the EMCC database for both 
time intervals.  
Table 51. Planned job creation by type of restructuring in the EU-27 and Norway 
(2002–10) 
Type of 
restructuring 
Cases Job 
creation 
% Job 
creation 
Job 
reduction 
% Job 
red. 
Net job 
creation 
% Net job 
creation 
Avg. net 
 job 
 creation 
Bankruptcy/ 
closure 
7,260 71,863 3.17 -3,826,888 52.81 -3,755,025 75 -517 
Business 
expansion 
3,809 2,029,834 90 -1,175 0.02 2,028,659 -41 533 
Internal 
restructuring 
4,774 69,757 3 -2,964,728 40.91 -2,894,971 58 -606 
Merger/ 
acquisition 
307 81,458 4 -151,929 2.10 -70,471 1 -230 
Off-shoring/ 
delocalisation 
558 331 0.01 -180,404 2.49 -180,073 4 -323 
Other 
restructuring 
47 3,605 0.16 -30,880 0.43 -27,275 1 -580 
Outsourcing 61 395 0.02 -33,356 0.46 -32,961 1 -540 
Relocation 231 6,850 0.30 -56,836 0.78 -49,986 1 -216 
Total 17,047 2,264,093 100 -7,246,196 100 -4,982,103 100 -292 
Source: EMCC.  
Table 52. Planned job creation by type of restructuring in the EU-27 and Norway 
(2002–10 excluding 2007) 
Type of 
restructuring 
Cases Job 
creation 
% Job 
creation 
Job 
reduction 
% Job 
red. 
Net job 
creation 
% Net job 
creation 
Avg. net 
 job 
 creation 
Bankruptcy/ 
closure 
1,666 1,495 0 -580,537 17 -579,042 33 -348 
Business 
expansion 
3,038 1,601,320 95 -1,175 0 1,600,145 -91 527 
Internal 
restructuring 
4,165 58,945 4 -2,499,994 72 -2,441,049 138 -586 
Merger/ 
acquisition 
237 12,275 1 -122,778 4 -110,503 6 -466 
Off-shoring/ 
delocalisation 
484 291 0.02 -157,444 5 -157,153 9 -325 
Other 
restructuring 
45 3,605 0.21 -30,560 1 -26,955 2 -599 
Outsourcing 51 300 0.02 -18,153 1 -17,853 1 -350 
Relocation 175 5,590 0 -41,291 1 -35,701 2 -204 
Total 9,861 1,683,821 100 -3,451,932 100 -1,768,111 100 -179 
Source: EMCC.  
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Employment levels 
The tables above show that planned job reductions were higher than planned 
job creation for all restructuring types, except for business expansion. Net job 
creation for mergers and acquisitions was persistently negative except for 2007, 
and still lower than for internal restructuring and other restructuring. In 
consideration of all observations from 2002, average net job creation for 
mergers and takeovers is situated in the lower range of the scale.  
Academic studies 
Besides the EMCC database, there are several scientific studies that consider 
the effects of takeover bids on employment. These studies are based on small 
samples and while they do not arrive at general conclusions, they do find 
evidence that takeovers do not have a straightforward effect on employment. 
Accordingly, the effect on employment may be either positive or negative, 
depending on the business plans of the acquirer. 
Business plans 
A survey of over 26 recent deals conducted in 2007 by Eurofound emphasises 
the link between business plans and employment outcomes. It finds instances 
of both increases and reductions in employment. Nevertheless, the survey, 
which considers mostly acquisitions, finds more examples of employment 
contraction than expansion (Eurofound, 2009a). A summary table of these case 
studies is presented in Appendix 1. 
US 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) consider a large number of mergers and 
acquisitions in the US and Europe between 1981 and 1998. Using empirical 
techniques, the authors find that average demand for labour did not 
significantly diminish in the US while it diminished by almost 10% in Europe. 
They attribute this difference to rigid employment protection legislation in 
Europe. According to the authors, European companies use mergers and 
acquisitions to attain their optimal employment levels, which they cannot 
reach otherwise given the strictness of legislation. In view of labour reforms in 
many EU member states in recent years, these results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Greece 
Other studies have taken place at the national level. The Greek General 
Confederation of Labour surveyed all mergers and acquisitions considered by 
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the Hellenic Competition Commission between 1995 and 2005, before the 
introduction of the Directive. While most of the deals in the sample are 
takeovers, the results of the study once again need to be interpreted with 
caution given that they include mergers. The study finds that the effects on 
employment of mergers and acquisitions depend on the time horizon 
considered. As a general rule, the number of employees decreases in the short 
term but picks up in the medium term. The study finds a strong correlation 
with employment trends in the overall economy (Kouzis et al., 2008).  
France 
Margolis (2006) uses data from the French National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies from the 1990s, referring once more to both mergers and 
takeovers. The author finds that acquired companies are likely to lay off more 
workers than their acquirers in the first three years following the deal. It also 
finds that the characteristics of the workers who are laid off are not associated 
with long-term unemployment. This latter finding is probably significant only 
for France and the period surveyed. 
Spain 
A study by Fradejas and Aguilar (2007) supports the idea that the situation in a 
company before acquisition is a main determinant of the depth of any 
restructuring undertaken by the acquirer. The study surveyed 67 Spanish non-
financial companies that were the object of a takeover bid between 1990 and 
2000, and found that job losses were more frequent in those offeree companies 
having the lowest productivity and return as shown by O’Shaughnessy and 
Flanagan (1998). Fradejas and Aguilar suggest that in countries where labour 
legislation is relatively stricter, takeovers are more likely to involve collective 
dismissals. 
Working conditions 
Besides employment levels, a takeover may also affect employment conditions. 
The existence of inefficiencies in human resource management in the offeree 
company may constitute part of the gains expected by the offeror. In this 
respect, it is likely that changes in working conditions will be directed at 
saving costs and increasing productivity. The list below presents the changes 
most frequently considered by commentators: 
 changes in productivity through the substitution of relatively 
underperforming employees; 
 changes in remuneration through, for instance, the early retirement of 
relatively aged and well-paid employees, who are later substituted by 
relatively younger and lower-paid workers; 
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 changes affecting collective bargaining, such as the individualisation of 
employment relations for new entrants; 
 changes affecting job security, such as the use of temporary contracts for 
new entrants; 
 other changes in the internal management of human resources affecting 
such aspects as working schedule, remuneration mix, training or 
performance evaluation; and 
 changes derived from outsourcing and relocation. 
Social costs 
The social costs of restructuring may be very significant, but lie outside the 
objective of this study. They consist of costs for the individuals involved, local 
communities and society at large. In this regard, the cost of early retirement 
and unemployment benefits may fall disproportionately on public budgets, 
while the benefits of restructuring may be captured privately. These structural 
issues, while relevant to the effects of takeovers on employment, do not 
directly pertain to the realm of takeover regulation and are for the largest part 
better addressed using horizontal legislation. 
Summary 
To summarise, the effects of takeover on employment are not necessarily 
pervasive and need to be considered over the medium rather than the short 
term. Three main factors are at stake:  
i) the presence of exploitable inefficiencies in the offeree company and any 
restructuring plans by the offeror devised to reduce such inefficiencies 
and capture the benefits;  
ii) the business plan of the offeror and the success of the deal, which may 
result in business expansion over the medium term, possibly with the 
recruitment of new employees; and  
iii) the commitment of employee representatives and management to 
mitigate the effects of restructuring on individual employees.  
The Directive intervenes only at the level of information and 
consultation rights for employee representatives, promoting negotiation to 
alleviate the effects of any restructuring planned by the offeror. 
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14.3 Employment provisions in the Directive 
Trade-offs 
The regulation of takeovers faces several trade-offs as highlighted previously 
in this study. Some of these trade-offs relate to balancing the interests of the 
different stakeholders involved, including employees and shareholders. These 
interests are usually presumed to be contradictory, although this assumption 
may not always be accurate in practice. The Directive includes a number of 
provisions in favour of employees’ interests, mainly concerning information 
rights (Arts. 6 and 9 of the Directive). At the same time, the Directive does not 
affect national rules relating to the information and consultation of employee 
representatives (Art. 14 of the Directive). In the latter regard, three legislative 
texts are of particular relevance at the EU level: 
 Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework relating to 
information and consultation of workers, 
 Directive 2001/23/EC on transfers of undertakings, and 
 Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies. 
Legislative recast 
The European Commission started to revise this legislation in 2010 and is due 
to introduce new proposals in 2012.74 It follows that the future revision of 
related provisions in the Directive should take into account any changes 
introduced in the overall framework of the Directives above. In this regard, it 
may be desirable to consolidate all legislative provisions referring to employee 
information and consultation in a single instrument. As highlighted in a 2006 
impact assessment commissioned by the European Parliament, consolidation 
would allow European co-legislators to conduct an in-depth cost-benefit 
analysis. Furthermore, consolidation would help clarify workers’ rights and 
enhance legal certainty by unifying the legal base (European Parliament, 2006).  
Board neutrality rule 
In addition to information and consultation, the discussion on the protection of 
employees in the Directive also relates to the latter’s core provisions. In this 
respect, the academic literature is particularly wary of the board neutrality rule 
(Sjåfjell, 2010a). It argues that imposing passivity at the board level 
significantly reduces the extent to which employees’ interests may influence 
                                                        
74  See “‘Fitness check’ on EU acts in the area of Information and Consultation of 
Workers”, Information Note, European Commission, Brussels, 2010. 
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the outcome of the bid. The relevant authors point out what they consider to be 
a fundamental incoherence in the Directive: on the one hand, at the level of 
principles, the board is required to act in the interests of the company as a 
whole, following a stakeholder approach, and therefore encompassing the 
interests of employees (Art. 3.1(c) of the Directive). On the other hand, at the 
rule level, the neutrality rule withdraws from the board the power to decide on 
the deal, granting such power solely to shareholders. As a consequence, the 
interests of employees are likely to have little influence on the process of the 
deal and any subsequent restructuring despite the information and 
consultation procedures in the Directive.  
Stakeholder interests 
Several authors highlight that given the premium and liquidity offered by the 
offeror, shareholders are likely to pay little attention to firm-specific 
investments by employees when confronted with a takeover. Some 
commentators use the expression ‘blind voting’ to refer to shareholder 
behaviour during a takeover and consider that board neutrality exacerbates 
short-termism in management. The tension between stakeholder and 
shareholder interests and its link with long-term value creation and firm-
specific investments is thus of the utmost relevance in takeover regulation. 
This tension affects corporate governance legislation as a whole, not just the 
Directive. Piecemeal solutions are likely to have unintended effects and hence a 
structured approach running through the entire legislative body is preferable.  
In Figure 34, the provisions of the Directive are organised according to 
which interest they are intended to further. As explained in the discussion 
above, the reader will find that the core provisions uphold shareholder interest 
rather than employee interest.  
Board participation 
The distribution of voice and voting rights between shareholders and 
employees determines how these interests are balanced in the event of a deal. 
The board neutrality rule confers decisional rights solely to shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the balancing of rights in a takeover bid cannot be fully 
understood without considering the broader framework of corporate 
governance law. In this regard, employees participate in board decisions 
through codetermination procedures in a minority of cases, while in most 
jurisdictions they are only accorded information or consultation rights. 
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Figure 34. Employees’ interest vs. shareholders’ interest 
 
(Art. 6.1) 
Information right of employees as 
soon as the bid is public 
 
(Art. 6.3.i) 
Offeror to disclose employment 
plans in the offer document 
 
(Art. 9.5) 
Offeree board to draw up an 
opinion on employment 
 
(Art. 9.5) 
Employees’ own opinion appended 
to the board’s 
 
(Art. 14) 
National rules on information and 
consultation 
 
(Art. 3.1.c) 
Offeree board to consider the 
interests of the whole company 
(Art. 9) 
Board neutrality rule 
 
(Art. 5) 
Mandatory bid rule 
 
(Art. 5) 
Equitable compensation 
 
(Art. 16) 
Squeeze-out right 
 
(Art. 3.1.c) 
Offeree board not to deny 
shareholders the opportunity to 
decide on the merits of the offer 
Cooperative culture 
The degree of workers’ participation in managerial decisions may explain, at 
least partially, the attitude of employees and their representatives in the case of 
restructuring. Consultation and codetermination procedures are expected to 
encourage cooperative behaviour and mitigate discrepancies between 
shareholders and employees. Conversely, the lack of information or 
negotiation may lead to hostility and industrial action, exacerbating any 
divergences between the two stakeholder groups.75  A European Company 
                                                        
75 See the Eurofound website, “Industrial relations aspects of mergers and takeovers”, 
Eurofound, Dublin, last updated 27 June 2002 (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ 
eiro/2001/02/study/tn0102401s.htm). 
Employees' 
interest
Shareholders' 
interest
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Survey conducted by Eurofound (2009b) concluded that a majority of both 
employee representatives and management believe that there is a rather good 
cooperative culture between them, and that social dialogue is positive for the 
workplace. These results probably signal the existence of a balanced approach 
to workers’ participation in the EU as a whole. Yet, in light of the 
methodological constraints of this survey, its results should be interpreted with 
caution.  
Planning horizons 
Given the impact of the shareholding structure on management’s horizons, the 
degree of shareholder and control concentration also explains industrial 
relations. Dispersed ownership may reduce planning horizons and force 
management to focus excessively on short-term performance, disregarding 
firm-specific investments through human capital. On the other hand, the 
presence of stable and larger shareholders allows managers to focus more on 
generating value over the medium to long term, encouraging firm-specific 
investments in the workforce. As found by Fehn and Meier (2000), the 
institutional structures of capital and labour markets are not independent of 
one another, but rather are strongly intertwined. Fehn and Meier’s empirical 
research shows a negative correlation between labour protection and 
shareholders’ rights. 
Bridging the gap 
Together, the degree of workers’ participation in decision-making and the level 
of concentration of ownership and control explain the nexus between 
cooperative industrial relations and the long-term performance of the 
company, in both the ordinary course of business and the case of restructuring 
or takeover. As represented in Figure 35, stable shareholders and employee 
decision-making favour firm-specific investments in human capital for the 
benefit of the company’s long-term performance. At the same time, the 
cooperation of employees and their representatives in the case of restructuring, 
including collective lay-offs, increases the chances of restoring the viability and 
profitability of a troubled company. Cooperation in restructuring will probably 
be more effective if employee participation has existed throughout the 
ordinary course of business than if regulation only requires it in the case of 
restructuring.  
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Figure 35. Ownership concentration and workers’ participation 
Varying degrees of ownership concentration and 
workers’ participation partially explain 
management’s time horizons and  
trade unions’ attitudes 
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As such, the link between corporate governance and firm-specific 
investments in human capital should not be underestimated. The information 
and consultation provisions in the Directive do further these investments by 
promoting workers’ cooperation in the event of a deal. Nonetheless, as 
highlighted, these provisions play a relatively minor role in the overall 
legislative framework on employee participation. Their impact therefore 
remains limited, even where the board neutrality rule is not enforced.  
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APPENDIX 1. EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS ON 
EMPLOYMENT: CASE STUDIES 
Table A1.1 Effects of takeovers on employment: Case studies 
Year/country/ 
type of deal 
Companies 
involved 
Reason for 
deal 
Involvement of 
trade unions 
Effects on 
employment 
Outcome for 
the company 
2006 
Belgium 
Acquisition 
Mittal Steel 
acquired 
Arcelor 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction Mittal’s 
position 
strengthened 
2007 
Bulgaria 
Merger 
HVB Bank 
Biochim and 
Hebros Bank 
merged with 
Bulbank 
To rationalise 
activities and 
expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction Increase in 
equity value 
2005 
Czech Republic 
Acquisition 
Kooperativa 
Pojišťovna 
acquired ČPP 
To increase 
competitive-
ness and 
rationalise 
activities 
No Creation Increase in 
turnover 
2008 
Germany 
Acquisition 
Bayer 
acquired 
Shering 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (voting 
rights) 
Reduction Increase in 
profits 
2005 
Estonia 
Acquisition 
Sorbes AG 
acquired Repo 
Vabrikud 
To expand 
market share 
No Reduction Repo became 
the biggest 
producer in 
the Baltic 
region 
2001 
Ireland 
Acquisition 
Trustee Saving 
Banks was 
acquired by 
Irish Life and 
Permanent 
Market 
expansion 
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Creation Unclear 
2005 
Greece 
Acquisition 
Mytilineo 
Group 
acquired 
Aluminium de 
Grèce 
To strengthen 
market 
position 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Unchanged Turnover rose 
2004 
France 
Merger 
Neuf Telecom 
merged with 
Cegetel 
To improve 
market 
position 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction New company 
became the 
biggest French 
operator 
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Table A1.1 cont’d 
Italy 
Acquisition 
ABB acquired 
Elasag Bailey 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Creation ABB position 
strengthened 
2006 
Cyprus 
Acquisition 
Laiki Bank 
acquired 
Egnatia bank 
and Marfin 
Financial 
Group 
To increase 
size 
No Creation Group became 
stronger 
2006 
Latvia 
Merger 
Tapeks 
acquired Aile 
To rationalise 
activities and 
expand 
market share 
No Creation 
(expected) 
Larger market 
share 
2006 
Lithuania 
Acquisition 
PKN Orlen 
acquired 
Mažeikių 
Naftą 
To strengthen 
market 
position 
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Unchanged PKN became 
the largest oil 
refiner in 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
2005 
Luxembourg 
Acquisition 
IVC acquired 
Tarkett 
To expand 
market share 
geographically 
No Creation Geographical 
expansion 
2005 
Hungary 
Acquisition 
BAA acquired 
Budapest 
airport 
Handling 
(BAH); after 
18 months 
Celebi 
acquired BAH 
Unclear 
concerning 
BAA; 
to enter the 
European 
market 
concerning 
Celebi 
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Unclear Business 
expansion 
2006 
Malta 
Acquisition 
Emirate 
International 
Telecommuni-
cations Malta 
Ltd acquired 
60% stake in 
Maltacom PLC 
To expand 
market share 
No Reduction Modern-
isation, 
profitability 
and expansion 
2007 
Netherlands 
Acquisition 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Bank 
Fortis and 
Banco 
Santander 
took over the 
ABN AMRO 
To expand 
market share  
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Reduction Decline in the 
financial 
position 
2005 
Austria 
Acquisition 
Frenzel 
acquired Frost 
To expand 
market share 
No Unclear Frost avoided 
closure risks 
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Table A1.1 cont’d 
2008 
Poland 
Acquisition 
Bauer 
Publishing 
acquired 
Interia.pl 
To expand 
market share 
No Creation Revenues 
increased 
2007 
Portugal 
Acquisition 
Sonae 
Distribuição 
acquired 
Carrefour in 
Portugal 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Unchanged Expansion and 
decrease in 
overall costs 
1999 
Romania 
Acquisition 
Renault 
acquired 
Automobile 
Dacia 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction  Expansion 
1997 
Slovenia 
Acquisitions 
Saturnus 
Avtooprema 
acquired Hella 
To find a 
strategic 
partner and to 
expand 
operations 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Creation Increase in 
turnover and 
employment 
2005 
Slovakia 
Acquisition 
Enel acquired 
66% of the 
shares of 
Slovenské 
Elektrárne 
(SE) 
To strengthen 
SE’s position 
in the 
domestic 
electrical 
market 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction Increase in 
competitive-
ness 
2006 
Finland 
Merger 
Tallink 
Finland Oy 
acquired Silja 
Oy Ab 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Reduction Reduction in 
costs 
2005 
Sweden 
Acquisition 
Ericsson and 
Marconi 
To expand 
market share 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction Ericsson 
strengthened 
its competitive 
position 
2006 
UK 
Merger 
Boots and 
Alliance 
UniChem 
merged in 
Alliance Santé 
Economies of 
scale and 
scope 
Yes (information 
rights) 
Reduction Rationalisa-
tion of the 
operations 
and 
international 
expansion 
2006 
Norway 
Acquisition 
Statoil 
acquired 
Norsk Hydro 
To gain 
competitive-
ness and 
rationalise 
activities 
Yes (collective 
negotiation 
rights) 
Unchanged Expansion 
and rationalis-
ation  
Source: Eurofound (2009a).  
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APPENDIX 2. PLANNED JOB CREATION IN 
M&A DEALS IN THE EU-27 
AND NORWAY  
Table A2.1 Planned job creation in M&A deals in the EU-27 and Norway  
20
02
 
Country No. of 
planned 
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
 creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
France 4,708 38.71 0 0 9 42.86 
UK 2,480 20.39 0 0 4 19.05 
Belgium 3,175 26.10 0 0 4 19.05 
Germany 1,100 9.04 0 0 1 4.76 
Sweden  150 1.23 0 0 1 4.76 
Netherlands  250 2.06 0 0 1 4.76 
Ireland 300 2.47 0 0 1 4.76 
Total 2002 12,163 100.00 0 100 21 100.00 
20
03
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
 creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
UK 1,925 42.45 0 0 5 29.41 
Italy 1,010 22.27 0 0 4 23.53 
Finland 60 1.32 160 100 2 11.76 
Netherlands  125 2.76 0 0 2 11.76 
Spain  390 8.60 0 0 1 5.88 
Portugal 305 6.73 0 0 1 5.88 
Germany 470 10.36 0 0 1 5.88 
Denmark 250 5.51 0 0 1 5.88 
Total 2003 4,535 100.00 160 100 17 100.00 
20
04
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
 creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
UK 7,535 49.56 250 69.44 14 40.00 
France 3,159 20.78 0 0.00 8 22.86 
Germany 2,234 14.69 110 30.56 7 20.00 
Netherlands  340 2.24 0 0.00 2 5.71 
Finland 685 4.51 0 0.00 2 5.71 
Austria 1,000 6.58 0 0.00 1 2.86 
Sweden  250 1.64 0 0.00 1 2.86 
Total 2004 15,203 100.00 360 100.00 35 100.00 
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Table A2.1 cont’d 
20
05
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
Germany 6,329 25.01 0 0.00 13 23.64 
UK 6,822 26.96 0 0.00 11 20.00 
France 2,584 10.21 100 4.32 8 14.55 
Poland 6,568 25.96 1,000 43.20 5 9.09 
Netherlands  1,125 4.45 0 0.00 4 7.27 
Romania 100 0.40 370 15.98 3 5.45 
Austria 370 1.46 0 0.00 2 3.64 
Sweden  800 3.16 – 0.00 2 3.64 
Slovenia 175 0.69 – 0.00 2 3.64 
Czech Rep. 0 0.00 250 10.80 1 1.82 
Denmark 230 0.91 – 0.00 1 1.82 
Estonia 0 0.00 295 12.74 1 1.82 
Italy 200 0.79 – 0.00 1 1.82 
Slovakia – 0.00 300 12.96 1 1.82 
Total 2005 25,303 100.00 2,315 100.00 55 100.00 
20
06
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
Germany 7,375 26.56 700 22.08 12 23.53 
France 1,139 4.10 0 0.00 6 11.76 
UK 3,266 11.76 450 14.20 6 11.76 
Italy 8,150 29.36 0 0.00 4 7.84 
Spain  2,637 9.50 0 0.00 4 7.84 
Czech Rep. 1,190 4.29 470 14.83 3 5.88 
Austria 904 3.26 0 0.00 3 5.88 
Belgium 408 1.47 – 0.00 2 3.92 
Finland 728 2.62 – 0.00 2 3.92 
Romania 1,300 4.68 0 0.00 2 3.92 
Poland 100 0.36 470 14.83 2 3.92 
Greece – 0.00 1,000 31.55 1 1.96 
Sweden  100 0.36 80 2.52 1 1.96 
Norway 200 0.72 – 0.00 1 1.96 
Ireland 106 0.38 – 0.00 1 1.96 
Slovakia 160 0.58 – 0.00 1 1.96 
Total 2006 27,763 100.00 3,170 100.00 51 100.00 
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Table A2.1 cont’d 
20
07
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
France 1,987 11.70 62,388 90.18 8 16.33 
Germany 4,130 24.31 150 0.22 7 14.29 
Austria 544 3.20 275 0.40 4 8.16 
Spain  610 3.59 150 0.22 3 6.12 
Czech Rep. 450 2.65 630 0.91 3 6.12 
Italy 2,700 15.89 – 0.00 3 6.12 
UK 920 5.42 – 0.00 3 6.12 
Romania – 0.00 5,200 7.52 2 4.08 
Sweden  100 0.59 190 0.27 2 4.08 
Portugal 141 0.83 200 0.29 2 4.08 
Belgium 303 1.78 – 0.00 2 4.08 
Hungary 500 2.94 – 0.00 2 4.08 
Ireland 970 5.71 – 0.00 2 4.08 
Netherlands  1,500 8.83 – 0.00 1 2.04 
 Finland 115 0.68 – 0.00 1 2.04 
 
Poland 200 1.18 – 0.00 1 2.04 
Norway 1,500 8.83 – 0.00 1 2.04 
Denmark 118 0.69 – 0.00 1 2.04 
Greece 200 1.18 – 0.00 1 2.04 
Total 2007 16,988 100.00 69,183 100.00 49 100.00 
20
08
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
France 2,429 9.42 515 27.99 8 21.05 
UK 5,772 22.40 625 33.97 7 18.42 
Germany 7,928 30.76 0 0.00 5 13.16 
Netherlands  2,045 7.93 0 0.00 5 13.16 
Austria 220 0.85 0 0.00 2 5.26 
Italy 6,136 23.81 0 0.00 2 5.26 
Poland 170 0.66 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Norway 352 1.37 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Lithuania 340 1.32 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Ireland 0 0.00 100 5.43 1 2.63 
Slovenia 0 0.00 120 6.52 1 2.63 
Sweden  80 0.31 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Portugal 0 0.00 100 5.43 1 2.63 
Belgium 300 1.16 0 0.00 1 2.63 
Greece 0 0.00 380 20.65 1 2.63 
Total 2008 25,772 100.00 1,840 100.00 38 100.00 
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Table A2.1 cont’d 
20
09
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
UK 6,200 46.87 0 0.00 6 26.09 
France 1,019 7.70 0 0.00 5 21.74 
Czech Rep. 350 2.65 480 100.00 4 17.39 
Spain  420 3.17 0 0.00 2 8.70 
Estonia 166 1.25 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Belgium  104 0.79 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Denmark 100 0.76 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Austria 1,000 7.56 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Germany 220 1.66 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Italy 3,650 27.59 0 0.00 1 4.35 
Total 2009 13,229 100.00 480 100.00 23 100.00 
20
10
 
Country No. of 
planned  
job 
reductions 
% Planned 
 job 
reductions 
No. of 
planned 
 job 
creations 
% Planned 
 job 
creations 
No. of 
cases 
% Cases 
France 596 5.43 1,800 45.57 5 27.78 
Spain  3,030 27.61 0 0.00 3 16.67 
Germany 1,750 15.95 150 3.80 3 16.67 
Austria 100 0.91 0 0.00 1 5.56 
UK 150 1.37 0 0.00 1 5.56 
Poland 0 0.00 2,000 50.63 1 5.56 
Latvia 100 0.91 0 0.00 1 5.56 
Netherlands  5,000 45.57 0 0.00 1 5.56 
Belgium 122 1.11 0 0.00 1 5.56 
Italy 125 1.14 0 0.00 1 5.56 
Total 2010 10,973 100.00 3,950 100.00 18 100.00 
Source: European Monitoring Centre on Change. 
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APPENDIX 3. METHODOLOGY FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION SCORES 
The scores below have been elaborated by CEPS on the basis of the legal 
review in Marccus Partners and CEPS (2012). 
1) Board neutrality rule (BNR) 
a) Basic criteria 
0 points: BNR is optional 
2 points: BNR is the default rule 
3 points: BNR is mandatory 
b) Additional criteria 
1 point: reciprocity is not available 
2) Breakthrough rule (BTR) 
a) Basic criteria 
0 points: BTR is optional 
1 point: BTR is mandatory but partially transposed  
3 points: BTR is mandatory and fully transposed 
b) Additional criteria  
1 point: reciprocity is not available  
3) Squeeze-out right (SqOR) 
a) Basic criteria 
3 points: a threshold of 90% 
1 point: a threshold of 95% 
b) Additional criteria 
1 point: a dual test (ownership/acceptance tests are alternatives) 
1 point: the threshold only refers to voting rights/capital 
4) Mandatory bid rule (MBR) 
a) Basic criteria: points are awarded given the definition of control 
2 points: a one-third or 33% threshold or lower 
1 point: consideration of working control 
b) Additional criteria: points are added where the national implementation 
effectively considers 
2 points: creeping-in 
1 point: a second threshold 
1 point: acting in concert does not require acquisition 
c) Negative criteria: points are subtracted where national provisions in the 
following area are found to undermine the MBR 
1 point: derogatory discretion granted to supervisory authorities 
264 | APPENDICES 
Table A3.1 Implementation scores 
Country BNR BTR SqOR MBR  Country BNR BTR SqOR MBR 
Austria 4 1 3 4  Ireland 4 1 3 3 
Belgium 0 0 1 3  Italy 2 0 2 4 
Cyprus 4 0 3 2  Luxembourg 0 0 1 2 
Czech Rep. 4 1 4 2  Netherlands 0 0 1 2 
Denmark 0 0 3 1  Poland 0 0 4 4 
Estonia 4 4 3 1  Portugal 3 0 3 4 
Finland 3 1 3 3  Romania 2 1 2 3 
France 3 2 1 4  Slovakia 4 1 1 2 
Germany 0 0 2 2  Spain 3 0 4 4 
Greece 3 0 4 4  Sweden 4 1 4 2 
Hungary 0 0 4 3  UK 4 1 3 3 
Source: Authors. 
Table A3.2 Board neutrality rule 
Country Score Description 
Austria 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Belgium 0 No; reciprocity 
Cyprus 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Czech Rep. 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Denmark 0 No; reciprocity 
Estonia 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Finland 3 Yes; no reciprocity 
France 3 Yes; reciprocity 
Germany 0 No (modified passivity rule); reciprocity 
Greece 3 Yes; reciprocity 
Hungary 0 No; reciprocity 
Ireland 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Italy 2 Yes (subject to opt-out in the bylaws); reciprocity (subject to bylaws) 
Luxembourg 0 No; reciprocity 
Netherlands 0 No; reciprocity 
Poland 0 No; reciprocity 
Portugal 3 Yes; reciprocity 
Romania 2 Yes (for voluntary bids only, not for mandatory bids); no reciprocity 
Slovakia 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Spain 3 Yes (clarified); reciprocity 
Sweden 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
UK 4 Yes (slightly strengthened); no reciprocity 
Source: Authors. 
Table A3.3 Breakthrough rule 
Country Score Description 
Austria 1 No; no reciprocity 
Belgium 0 No; reciprocity 
Cyprus 0 No; reciprocity 
Czech Rep. 1 No; no reciprocity 
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Table A3.3 cont’d 
Denmark 0 No (optional only, subject to a grandfather clause for agreements concluded before 31.03.2004); reciprocity 
Estonia 4 Yes; no reciprocity 
Finland 1 No; no reciprocity 
France 2 No (exception: voting caps are suspended at the first GM following a successful bid, that is, two-thirds post-bid holding); no reciprocity 
Germany 0 No; reciprocity 
Greece 0 No; reciprocity 
Hungary 0 No; reciprocity 
Ireland 1 No; no reciprocity 
Italy 0 No; reciprocity (subject to bylaws) 
Luxembourg 0 No; reciprocity 
Netherlands 0 No; reciprocity 
Poland 0 No; reciprocity 
Portugal 0 No; reciprocity 
Romania 1 No; no reciprocity 
Slovakia 1 No; no reciprocity 
Spain 0 No; reciprocity 
Sweden 1 No; no reciprocity 
UK 1 No; no reciprocity 
Source: Authors. 
Table A3.4 Squeeze-out right 
Country Basic score 
Addition
al score 
Description (C=capital;  
VR=voting rights) 
Total  
score 
Austria 3 – 90% C & VR ownership test 3 
Belgium 1 – 95% C & VR ownership (a dual test after a voluntary bid, also 90% C acceptance, no dual test for a mandatory bid) 1 
Cyprus 3 – 90% C & VR ownership test 3 
Czech Rep. 3 1 90% C or 90% VR ownership test 4 
Denmark 3 – 90% C &VR ownership test 3 
Estonia 3 – 90% C & VR to request GM; 90% approval ownership test 3 
Finland 3 – 90% C & VR ownership test 3 
France 1 – 95% C & VR ownership test 1 
Germany 1 1 95% VR ownership test 2 
Greece 3 1 90% VR ownership test 4 
Hungary 3 1 90% VR ownership test 4 
Ireland 3 – 90% C & VR ownership test 3 
Italy 1 1 95% C ownership test 2 
Luxembourg 1 – 95% C & VR ownership test 1 
Netherlands 1 – 95% C & VR ownership test 1 
Poland 3 1 90% VR ownership test 4 
Portugal 3 – 90% VR and 90% of acceptance 3 
Romania 1 1 95% VR or 90% C (acceptance) 2 
Slovakia 1 – 95% C & VR ownership test 1 
Spain 3 1 Dual test: 90% VR, 90% acceptance test 4 
Sweden 3 1 90% C ownership test 4 
UK 3 – 90% C & VR (acceptance) 3 
Source: Authors. 
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Table A3.5 Mandatory bid rule 
Basic threshold Consideration of 
actual control 
Second threshold Consideration of 
creeping-in 
Acting in concert  Derogatory discretion 
granted to supervisory 
authorities 
 
 
Country Brief 
description 1 
Score Brief 
description 2 
Score Brief 
description 3 
Score Brief 
description 4 
Score Brief 
description 5 
Score Brief 
description 6 
Score Total 
score 
Austria 30% 2 – 0 – 0 2% increase 
between 30% 
and 50% 
within 12 mos. 
2 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 4 
Belgium 30% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Both 1 – 0 3 
Cyprus 30% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 
30% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Intermediary 
Takeover 
Directive/ 
Transparency 
Directive 
0 – 0 2 
Denmark 50% 0 Or a majority 
of members 
of the board 
or 
controlling 
influence 
1 – 0 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 1 
Estonia 50% voting 
rights 
0 Or a majority 
of members 
of the board 
1 – 0 – 0 Intermediary 
Takeover 
Directive/ 
Transparency 
Directive 
0 – 0 1 
Finland 30% 2 – 0 50% 1 – 0 Both 1 General 
discretion 
-1 3 
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Table A3.5 cont’d 
 Basic threshold Consideration of 
actual control 
Second threshold Consideration of 
creeping-in 
Acting in concert  Derogatory discretion 
granted to supervisory 
authorities 
 
Country Brief 
description 1 
Score Brief 
description 2 
Score Brief 
description 3 
Score Brief 
description 4 
Score Brief 
description 5 
Score Brief 
description 6 
Score Total 
score 
France 30% (capital 
and voting 
rights) 
2 – 0 – 0 2% increase 
between 30% 
and 50% within 
12 mos. 
2 Both 1 Self-granted 
discretion but 
approved by a 
Court of Appeal 
-1 4 
Germany 30% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Both 1 Limited 
discretion 
-1 2 
Greece 33% 2 – 0 – 0 3% increase 
between 33% 
and 50% within 
12 mos. 
2 Intermediary 
Takeover 
Directive/ 
Transparency 
Directive 
0 – 0 4 
Hungary 33% 2 – 0 25% if no 
other 
shareholder 
above 10% 
1 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 3 
Ireland 30% 2 – 0 – 0 0.05% increase 
between 30% 
and 50% within 
12 mos. 
2 Takeover 
Directive 
0 General 
discretion 
-1 3 
Italy 30% 2 – 0 – 0 3% increase of 
30-50% within 
12 mos. 
2 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 4 
Luxembourg 33% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 2 
Netherlands 30% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 2 
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Table A3.5 cont’d 
 Basic threshold Consideration of actual 
control 
Second threshold Consideration of creeping-
in 
Acting in concert  Derogatory discretion 
granted to supervisory 
authorities 
 
Country Brief 
description 1 
Score Brief 
description 2 
Score Brief 
description 3 
Score Brief 
description 4 
Score Brief 
description 5 
Score Brief 
description 6 
Score Total 
score 
Poland 33% 2 – 0 66% 1 10% increase 
by a 
shareholder 
holding less 
than 33% 
within 60 days 
or 5% increase 
by a share-
holder 
holding more 
than 33% 
within 12 mos. 
0 Both 1 – 0 4 
Portugal 33% 2 – 0 50% 1 – 0 Both 1 – 0 4 
Romania 33% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Both 1 – 0 3 
Slovakia 33% 2 – 0 – 0 – 0 Takeover 
Directive 
0 – 0 2 
Spain 30% 2 Or a majority 
of members of 
the board 
within 24 mos. 
1 – 0 5% increase 
between 30% 
and 50% 
within 12 mos. 
0 Both 1 – 0 4 
Sweden 30% 2 – – – – –   Both 1 General 
discretion 
-1 2 
UK 30% 2 – 0 – 0 Any increase 
between 30% 
and 50% 
2 Takeover 
Directive 
0 General 
discretion 
-1 3 
Source: Authors. 
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APPENDIX 4. STAKEHOLDER PROTECTION 
INDICES 
Adapted by CEPS from La Porta et al. (1998) and Martynova and Renneboog 
(2010) with the support of Marccus Partners.  
Shareholder rights protection index 
Maximum 23 points. The higher the score, the higher is the protection for 
shareholders. The index does not take into account rules transposed under the 
Takeover Bids Directive. 
1) Proxy voting by mail:  
 2 if allowed  
 0 if not allowed 
2) Requirement to deposit/register bearer/nominal shares prior to a 
general meeting:  
 0 if deposit required  
 1 if only registration 
 2 if deposit and registration are forbidden 
3) Requirement for related-party transactions to be approved by 
shareholders:  
 2 if required 
 0 if not required 
4) Percentage needed to convene an extraordinary meeting:  
 2 if 5% or less 
 1 if 20% to 6% 
 0 if 20% or more (or no right to convene a meeting is specified) 
5) Voting caps that would hold in the event of a takeover bid:  
 0 if allowed 
 3 if not allowed 
6) Two-tier boards – nomination of the board by shareholders:  
 2 if required  
 0 if not required 
7) Two-tier boards – overlap between the management and supervisory 
board is forbidden: 
 0 if allowed 
 2 if not allowed 
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8) One-tier boards – the CEO can be the chairman of the board of directors: 
 0 if allowed 
 2 if not allowed 
9) Separate board of auditors:  
 2 if an independent body separate from the board 
 1 if a specific committee set up within the board 
 0 otherwise 
10) Requirement to disclose top managerial compensation:  
 2 if required on an individual basis 
 1 if required on an aggregate basis 
 0 if not required 
11) Requirement to disclose any transactions between management and 
company:  
 2 if required 
 0 if not required 
Minority shareholder rights protection index  
Maximum 21 points. The higher the score, the higher is the protection for 
minority shareholders. The index does not take into account rules transposed 
under the Takeover Bids Directive. Issue numbers 4–7 above are shared with 
the general shareholder protection index. 
1) Minority representation on the board:  
 2 if required 
 0 if not required 
2) Voting caps limiting the power of large shareholders:  
 2 if allowed 
 0 if not allowed 
3) Multiple voting rights and non-voting shares:  
 0 if both allowed 
 1 if one allowed 
 2 if none allowed 
4) Percentage needed to convene an extraordinary meeting:  
 2 if 5% or less 
 1 if 20% to 6% 
 0 if 20% or more (or no percentage is specified) 
5) Two-tier boards – nomination of the board by shareholders:  
 2 if required  
 0 if not required 
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6) Two-tier boards – overlap between the management and supervisory 
board is forbidden: 
 0 if allowed 
 2 if not allowed 
7) One-tier boards – the CEO can be the chairman of the board of directors: 
 0 if allowed 
 2 if not allowed 
8) Principle of equal treatment among all shareholders: 
 1 if mandated  
 0 if not mandated 
9) Percentage for mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes:  
 3 if 5% or less 
 2 if 6% to 10%  
 1 if 11% to 24%  
 0 if 25% or more (or no mandatory disclosure is specified) 
10) Percentage for minority claim against the board:  
 3 if 5% or less 
 2 if 6% to 10% 
 1 if 11% or more 
 0 if 25% or more (or no minority claims are allowed) 
Creditor rights protection index 
Maximum 10 points. The higher the score, the higher is the protection for 
creditors. The index does not take into account rules transposed under the 
Takeover Bids Directive. 
1) Reorganisation is allowed by insolvency legislation: 
 0 if allowed 
 2 if not allowed (the legislation only provides for liquidation) 
2) Automatic stay on the assets in case of reorganisation:  
 0 if compulsory  
 2 if not compulsory 
3) Ranking of creditors in a liquidation procedure:  
 3 if secured creditors are ranked first  
 0 if government and/or employees are ranked first 
4) Creditor approval of bankruptcy to initiate reorganisation or liquidation:  
 2 if required  
 0 if not required 
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5) Appointment of an independent third party to manage the 
reorganisation/liquidation procedure:  
 1 if required  
 0 if not required 
Employee rights protection index 
1) Employee voice in the board: 
 2 if required 
 0 if not required 
2) Employee voting rights in the board: 
 2 if required 
 0 if not required 
Table A4.1 Stakeholder protection indices 
Country Shareholder 
rights 
protection 
index 
Minority 
shareholder 
rights protection 
index 
(full) 
Minority shareholder 
rights protection index 
(excl. issues in common 
with shareholder rights 
protection index) 
Creditor 
rights 
protection 
index 
Employee 
rights 
protection 
index 
Austria 13 11 4 6 2 
Belgium 8 7 7 4 0 
Cyprus 9 9 6 3 2 
Czech Republic 17 14 8 6 2 
Denmark 9 10 6 1 2 
Estonia 14 11 6 4 0 
Finland 12 11 6 4 0 
France 16 13 9 1 1 
Germany 14 13 8 4 2 
Greece 10 10 8 4 0 
Hungary 12 10 4 4 0 
Ireland 10 8 7 4 0 
Italy 13 14 10 3 0 
Luxembourg 16 8 4 1 2 
Netherlands 15 11 6 8 0 
Poland 18 16 10 4 0 
Portugal 11 11 5 5 0 
Romania 13 11 8 4 0 
Slovakia 9 12 6 1 2 
Spain 11 10 8 3 0 
Sweden 14 7 4 6 2 
UK 16 11 7 6 0 
Source: Marccus Partners and CEPS (2012), based on a survey of national legal systems through local partner 
law firms. 
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APPENDIX 5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Variables 
Sub-indices  d = deals c = country t = time 
Dependent variable 
ܥܣܴ݈ௗ — Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-41, 41) event window 
Independent variables 
ܸܣܮௗ — Rank value (size indicator) 
ܦℎ݋ݏݐ݈݅݁ௗ — Hostile bid =1 
ܦܿܽݏℎ݋݈݊ݕௗ — Cash only =1 
ܦܾ݀݁ݐௗ — Debt proceeding =1 
ܥܣ ௖ܲ — Stock market capitalisation per deal, per country, per year (market 
size indicator) 
ܥܣܲܩܦ ௖ܲ  — Stock market capitalisation over GDP per deal, per country, per 
year (indicator development financial sector) 
ܩܦ ௧ܲ  — EU GDP growth (economic cycle indicator) 
ܥܴܧ௖,௧ — Credit to non-financial institutions (financial cycle indicator) 
ݏℎܽݎܰܦௗ௖  — Shareholder protection index (offeree company country) 
ݏℎܽݎܰܦݎ௖  — Shareholder protection index (offeree company country) – 
restricted (to avoid overlapping with the minority shareholder index) 
݉݅݊݋ܰܦݎ௖  — Minority shareholder protection index (offeree company 
country) – restricted 
ܿݎ݁݀ܰܦ௖ — Creditors protection index (offeree company country) 
݁݌݅௖  — Employee protection index (offeree company country) 
ܿ݋݉݌ܰܦ௖  — Competitiveness indicator (based on the GCI of the WEF) 
ܾ݊ݎܦܦܥ௖ — Board neutrality rule implementation score, 2003-201076 
ܾݐݎܦܦܥ௖ — Breakthrough rule implementation score, 2003-2010 
ܾ݉ݎܦܦܥ௖ — Mandatory bid rule implementation score, 2003-2010 
ݏݍݎܦܦܥ௖ — Squeeze-out right implementation score, 2003-2010 
ܦܿ݋ݒௗ  — Deal covered by Takeover Bids Directive (deal occurring after the 
transposition of the Directive in each member state) =1 
                                                        
76 We have calculated a score for the implementation of the rule from 2003 because 
some of the countries were already using some of the rules imposed by the Directive. 
274 | APPENDICES 
 
Regression specifications 
Regression 1. Consideration of the effect of introducing the European Takeover Bids 
Directive  
This regression considers deals occurring from the beginning of 2003 up until 
the end of 2010. 
ܥܣܴ݈ௗ = ߙ + 	ߚଵ	ܦℎ݋ݏݐ݈݅݁ௗ 	+ 	ߚଶ	ܦܿܽݏℎ݋݈݊ݕௗ + 	ߚଷ	ܦܾ݀݁ݐௗ + ߚସ	 lnܥܣܲௗ௖ 	+ ߚହܩܦ ௗܲ௖ +
	ߚ଺	ݏℎܽݎܰܦݎௗ௖ + 	ߚ଻	݉݅݊݋ܰܦݎௗ௖ + ߚ଼	݁݌݅ௗ௖ 	+ ߚଽ		ܾ݊ݎܦܦܥௗ௖ + 	ߚଵ଴	ܾݐݎܦܦܥௗ௖ +
ߚଵଵ	ݏ݋ݎܦܦܥௗ௖ + ߚଵଶ	ܾ݉ݎܦܦܥௗ௖ + ߝ  
 
 
 
By adding the competitiveness index (WEF) and removing growth and 
market capitalisation: 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5407503   .2049186     2.64   0.008     .1386066    .9428941
      mbrddc     .0079896   .0280169     0.29   0.776    -.0469924    .0629716
      sorddc     .0346918   .0232928     1.49   0.137    -.0110192    .0804029
      btrddc      .188681   .0441171     4.28   0.000     .1021032    .2752588
      bnrddc    -.0550158    .019015    -2.89   0.004    -.0923318   -.0176997
         epi    -.1885781   .0898895    -2.10   0.036    -.3649824   -.0121739
      minndr    -.0377507   .0139076    -2.71   0.007    -.0650438   -.0104576
     sharndr    -.0174085   .0121541    -1.43   0.152    -.0412605    .0064435
         gdp    -.0109961    .003476    -3.16   0.002    -.0178177   -.0041746
       lncap      .024881   .0191879     1.30   0.195    -.0127744    .0625363
       ddebt     .0603525   .0833701     0.72   0.469    -.1032576    .2239626
   dcashonly     .0862943   .0302792     2.85   0.004     .0268727    .1457159
    dhostile     -.053032   .0444654    -1.19   0.233    -.1402934    .0342293
                                                                              
        carl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    143.003715   965  .148190379           Root MSE      =    .375
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0510
    Residual    134.016311   953   .14062572           R-squared     =  0.0628
       Model    8.98740423    12  .748950353           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,   953) =    5.33
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     966
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                              
       _cons    .54075034***  
      mbrddc    .00798955     
      sorddc    .03469185     
      btrddc    .18868102***  
      bnrddc   -.05501576***  
         epi   -.18857814**   
      minndr   -.03775073***  
     sharndr   -.01740847     
         gdp   -.01099615***  
       lncap    .02488096     
       ddebt    .06035254     
   dcashonly    .08629429***  
    dhostile   -.05303204     
                              
    Variable      active      
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Regression 2. Consideration of the implementation scores for those deals occurring 
after the transposition of the Takeover Bids Directive in each member state  
This regression considers the deals occurring until the end of 2010. 
ܥܣܴ݈ௗ = ߙ + 	ߚଵ	ܦℎ݋ݏݐ݈݅݁ௗ 	+ 	ߚଶ	ܦܿܽݏℎ݋݈݊ݕௗ + 	ߚଷ	ܦܾ݀݁ݐௗ + ߚସ	 lnܥܣܲௗ௖ 	+ ߚହܩܦ ௗܲ௖+ 	ߚ଺	ݏℎܽݎܰܦௗ௖ + 	ߚ଻	݉݅݊݋ܰܦݎௗ௖ + ߚ଼	݁݌݅ௗ௖ 	+ ߚଽ		݀ܥܱ ௗܸ + ߝ 
 
 
 
 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                              
       _cons   -.89592349     
      mbrddc    .03096075     
      sorddc     .0222711     
      btrddc    .13161581**   
      bnrddc   -.02970031     
         epi     -.148435*    
      minndr   -.00585663     
     sharndr   -.02372061**   
    lncompnd    .87463729**   
       lncre   -.01152841     
       ddebt    .07882606     
   dcashonly    .08767323***  
    dhostile    -.0510077     
                              
    Variable      active      
                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .2113868   .1604251     1.32   0.188    -.1034392    .5262128
        dcov     .1378499   .0254476     5.42   0.000     .0879104    .1877895
         epi    -.0455088   .0701355    -0.65   0.517    -.1831461    .0921285
      minndr    -.0221778   .0102336    -2.17   0.030    -.0422607   -.0020948
      sharnd    -.0013022   .0085072    -0.15   0.878    -.0179971    .0153926
         gdp    -.0094561   .0034698    -2.73   0.007    -.0162654   -.0026467
       lncap     .0192989   .0180782     1.07   0.286    -.0161787    .0547765
       ddebt     .0487042   .0829768     0.59   0.557    -.1141335    .2115418
   dcashonly     .0786355   .0301352     2.61   0.009     .0194967    .1377742
    dhostile    -.0615823   .0441667    -1.39   0.164    -.1482571    .0250926
                                                                              
        carl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    143.003715   965  .148190379           Root MSE      =  .37413
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0554
    Residual    133.817139   956  .139976087           R-squared     =  0.0642
       Model    9.18657624     9  1.02073069           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   956) =    7.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     966
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                              
       _cons    .21138682     
        dcov    .13784992***  
         epi   -.04550882     
      minndr   -.02217779**   
      sharnd    -.0013022     
         gdp   -.00945607***  
       lncap    .01929888     
       ddebt    .04870417     
   dcashonly    .07863548***  
    dhostile   -.06158226     
                              
    Variable      active      
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Regression 3. Consideration of the implications of protection indices, growth and the 
Directive on market capitalisation 
݈݊ܥܣ ௗܲ௖ = ߙ + 	ߚଵ	ܩܦ ௗܲ௖ 	+ 	ߚଶ	݉݅݊݋ܰܦௗ௖ + 	ߚଷ	ܿݎ݁݀ܰܦௗ௖ 	+ ߚସ		݁݌݅ௗ௖ + 	ߚହ	݀ܥܱ ௗܸ + ߝ 
 
 
Regression 4. Consideration of the implications of protection indices, cumulative 
abnormal returns and the Directive on the financial development index 
݈݊ܥܣܲܩܦ ௗܲ = ߙ + 	ߚଵ	ܥܣܴ݈ௗ 	+ 	ߚଶ	݉݅݊ܰܦݎௗ௖ + ߚଷ	ܿݎ݁݀ܰܦௗ௖ 	+ ߚସ		݁݌݅ௗ௖ + 	ߚହ	݀ܥܱ ௖ܸ +
ߝ
 
                                                                              
       _cons     6.142555   .2728565    22.51   0.000     5.607091     6.67802
        dcov     .0021518   .0534014     0.04   0.968     -.102645    .1069487
         epi    -2.305047    .126282   -18.25   0.000    -2.552868   -2.057227
      crednd     .1201413   .0182373     6.59   0.000     .0843518    .1559308
      minond     .0930652   .0172516     5.39   0.000       .05921    .1269204
         gdp     .0151995   .0073414     2.07   0.039     .0007924    .0296066
                                                                              
       lncap        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1090.99441   965  1.13056416           Root MSE      =  .79418
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4421
    Residual    605.493868   960  .630722779           R-squared     =  0.4450
       Model    485.500545     5  97.1001091           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   960) =  153.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     966
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                              
       _cons    6.1425555***  
        dcov    .00215182     
         epi   -2.3050473***  
      crednd    .12014134***  
      minond     .0930652***  
         gdp    .01519952**   
                              
    Variable      active      
                              
                                                                              
       _cons     1.042224   .1288166     8.09   0.000     .7894299    1.295019
        dcov    -.0917051    .024172    -3.79   0.000     -.139141   -.0442691
         epi    -.5598668   .0589069    -9.50   0.000     -.675468   -.4442655
      crednd     .0782006   .0085105     9.19   0.000     .0614992     .094902
      minond    -.1075782   .0080355   -13.39   0.000    -.1233474   -.0918091
       lnval    -.0111157   .0055343    -2.01   0.045    -.0219763    -.000255
                                                                              
    lncapgdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    212.202351   965  .219898809           Root MSE      =  .37062
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3754
    Residual    131.863072   960  .137357367           R-squared     =  0.3786
       Model    80.3392784     5  16.0678557           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   960) =  116.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     966
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Table A5.1 Summary table (betas, standard error, p-value) 
 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                              
       _cons    1.0422244***  
        dcov   -.09170506***  
         epi   -.55986675***  
      crednd    .07820061***  
      minond   -.10757822***  
       lnval   -.01111568**   
                              
    Variable      active      
                              
                                        legend: b/se/p
                                                      
           F     5.326     7.316   153.951   116.978  
        rmse     0.375     0.374     0.794     0.371  
        r2_a     0.051     0.056     0.442     0.375  
          r2     0.063     0.064     0.445     0.379  
        df_m    12.000     9.000     5.000     5.000  
        df_r   953.000   956.000   960.000   960.000  
           N       966       966       966       966  
                                                      
                0.0085    0.1517    0.0000    0.0000  
                 0.205     0.164     0.273     0.129  
       _cons     0.541     0.235     6.143     1.042  
                                              0.0449  
                                               0.006  
       lnval                                  -0.011  
                                    0.0000    0.0000  
                                     0.018     0.009  
      crednd                         0.120     0.078  
                                    0.0000    0.0000  
                                     0.017     0.008  
      minond                         0.093    -0.108  
                          0.0000    0.9679    0.0002  
                           0.025     0.053     0.024  
        dcov               0.138     0.002    -0.092  
                0.7756                                
                 0.028                                
      mbrddc     0.008                                
                0.1367                                
                 0.023                                
      sorddc     0.035                                
                0.0000                                
                 0.044                                
      btrddc     0.189                                
                0.0039                                
                 0.019                                
      bnrddc    -0.055                                
                0.0362    0.4545    0.0000    0.0000  
                 0.090     0.073     0.126     0.059  
         epi    -0.189    -0.055    -2.305    -0.560  
                0.0068    0.0272                      
                 0.014     0.010                      
      minndr    -0.038    -0.023                      
                0.1524    0.6371                      
                 0.012     0.011                      
     sharndr    -0.017    -0.005                      
                0.0016    0.0065    0.0387            
                 0.003     0.003     0.007            
         gdp    -0.011    -0.009     0.015            
                0.1950    0.2133                      
                 0.019     0.018                      
       lncap     0.025     0.023                      
                0.4693    0.5649                      
                 0.083     0.083                      
       ddebt     0.060     0.048                      
                0.0045    0.0098                      
                 0.030     0.030                      
   dcashonly     0.086     0.078                      
                0.2333    0.1642                      
                 0.044     0.044                      
    dhostile    -0.053    -0.061                      
                                                      
    Variable   CARru~s   CARdir     CAPd     CAPGDPd  
                                                      
 
